Fiduciary Obligations in the Supreme Court of Canada: A Retrospective

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Duggan
2012 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 655 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ciara Toole

Two recent unanimous decisions from the Supreme Court of Canada in Galambos v Perez and Alberta v Elder Advocates of Alberta Society have narrowed and refreshed the requirements for recognizing fiduciary relationships and obligations. All fiduciary obligations must be founded by an undertaking, either express or implied, on the part of the fiduciary to act in the best interest of the beneficiary. At the heart of the fiduciary obligation, the undertaking of a fiduciary may also serve as a foundation for the goals of fiduciary accountability. The developing “Galambos approach” remains incomplete in its application in this regard. In the spirit of Galambos and Elder Advocates, I propose that the undertaking of the fiduciary can provide principled guidance in the availability of gain-based relief for breach of fiduciary duty. Particularly, I suggest that the imposition of a constructive trust as proprietary gain-based relief may be rationalized under the objective of perfecting or enforcing the fiduciary undertaking. To demonstrate my proposal, I investigate three example undertakings and breaches of fiduciary duty in which the fiduciary acquires property through the breach of duty. By grounding this overall discussion towards a conceptual remedial goal of enforcing the fiduciary’s undertaking, Galambos may spark the development of a principled approach to understanding both the making and the breach of fiduciary obligations.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (5) ◽  
pp. 118-137
Author(s):  
Tatiana Vasilieva ◽  

This article explores the evolution of the Supreme Court of Canada’s approach to the application of the concept of human dignity in constitutional equality cases. Traditionally, in human rights cases, this concept serves only to strengthen the argument, to show that the violation affects the person’s intrinsic worth. It is only in Canada and in South Africa that there is experience in applying the concept as a criterion for identifying discrimination. In 1999, in Law v. Canada, the Supreme Court recognized the purpose of Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms of 1982 to be the protection of human dignity and stated that discrimination must be established based on assessment of the impact of a program or law on human dignity. However, in 2008, in R. v. Kapp, the Court noted that the application of the concept of human dignity creates difficulties and places an additional burden of prove on the plaintiff. It is no coincidence that victims of discrimination have preferred to seek protection before human rights tribunals and commissions, where the dignity-based test is not used. Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected the use of the concept of human dignity as a criterion for identifying discrimination. The unsuccessful experience of applying the concept of human dignity as legal test has demonstrated that not every theoretically correct legal construction is effective in adjudication.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 25-39
Author(s):  
Vera Rusinova ◽  
Olga Ganina

The article analyses the Judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada on the Nevsun v. Araya case, which deals with the severe violations of human rights, including slavery and forced labor with respect of the workers of Eritrean mines owned by a Canadian company “Nevsun”. By a 5 to 4 majority, the court concluded that litigants can seek compensation for the violations of international customs committed by a company. This decision is underpinned by the tenets that international customs form a part of Canadian common law, companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law, and under ubi jus ibi remedium principle plaintiffs have a right to receive compensation under national law. Being a commentary to this judgment the article focuses its analysis on an issue that is of a key character for Public International Law, namely on the tenet that international customs impose obligations to respect human rights on companies and they can be called for responsibility for these violations. This conclusion is revolutionary in the part in which it shifts the perception of the companies’ legal status under International Law. The court’s approach is critically assessed against its well-groundness and correspondence to the current stage of International law. In particular, the authors discuss, whether the legal stance on the Supreme Court of Canada, under which companies can bear responsibility for violations of International Human Rights Law is a justified necessity or a head start.


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