Auditor’s Industry Specialization and Earnings Management of Firms Reporting Internal Control Weaknesses Under SOX Section 404

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Santanu Mitra ◽  
Mahmud Hossain
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses

Earnings Management of Firms Reporting Material Internal Control Weaknesses under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act

2008 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 161-179 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kam C. Chan ◽  
Barbara Farrell ◽  
Picheng Lee
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Corporate Disclosure ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Potential Benefits ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Reported Earnings

SUMMARY: The main objectives of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 are to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosure. Under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the external auditor has to report an assessment of the firm’s internal controls and attest to management’s assessment of the firm’s internal controls. Material weaknesses in internal controls must be disclosed in the auditor and management reports. The objective of this study is to examine if firms reporting material internal control weaknesses under Section 404 have more earnings management compared to other firms. The results provide mild evidence that there are more positive and absolute discretionary accruals for firms reporting material internal control weaknesses than for other firms. Since the findings of ineffective internal controls by auditors under Section 404 may cause firms to improve their internal controls, Section 404 has the potential benefits of reducing the opportunity of intentional and unintentional accounting errors and of improving the quality of reported earnings.

Client Engagement Risks and the Auditor Search Period

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 685-702 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samer K. Khalil ◽  
Jeffrey R. Cohen ◽  
Kenneth B. Schwartz
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Financial Distress ◽  
Business Risk ◽  
Audit Risk ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Client Engagement ◽  
Or Management ◽  
Auditor Industry Specialization ◽  
Audit Firms ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses

SYNOPSIS This paper investigates whether client engagement risks lengthen the client acceptance phase for audit firms and result in a longer auditor search period for their clients. Using a sample of auditor resignations over the period 2003–2008, we document that the auditor search period is longer for firms associated with client business risk (financial distress) and audit risk (internal control weaknesses or management integrity issues), while it is shorter for firms representing reduced auditor business risk (auditor industry specialization). These findings highlight the importance of client risk assessment and explain audit firms' response to perceived client risks.

scholarly journals Internal Control Weakness and Bank Loan Contracting: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures

2011 ◽  
Vol 86 (4) ◽  
pp. 1157-1188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeong-Bon Kim ◽  
Byron Y. Song ◽  
Liandong Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Internal Control ◽  
Bank Loan ◽  
Control Problems ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
Loan Spread ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Loan Contracting ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Loan Contract

ABSTRACT Using a sample of borrowing firms that disclosed internal control weaknesses (ICW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, this study compares various features of loan contracts between firms with ICW and those without ICW. Our results show the following. First, the loan spread is higher for ICW firms than for non-ICW firms by about 28 basis points, after controlling for other known determinants of loan contract terms. Second, firms with more severe, company-level ICW pay significantly higher loan rates than those with less severe, account-level ICW. Third, lenders impose tighter nonprice terms on firms with ICW than on those without ICW. Fourth, fewer lenders are attracted to loan contracts involving firms with ICW. Finally, our within-firm analyses show that banks increase loan rates charged to ICW firms after their disclosure of internal control problems and that banks reduce loan rates after firms remediate previously reported ICW.

SOX 404 Reported Internal Control Weaknesses: A Test of COSO Framework Components and Information Technology

2009 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-23 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnie K. Klamm ◽  
Marcia Weidenmier Watson
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Negative Impact ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
First Year ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
Assessment And Monitoring ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses

ABSTRACT: This paper examines internal controls, from both an information technology (IT) and non-IT perspective, in relation to the five components of the Committee of Sponsoring Organization's Internal Control-Integrated Framework (COSO 1992), as well as the achievement of one of COSO's three objectives-reporting reliability. Our sample consists of 490 firms with material weaknesses reported under Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 during the first year of compliance. We classify the weaknesses by COSO component and as IT-related or non-IT-related. Our results support the interrelationships of the COSO Framework. The results also show that the number of misstated accounts is positively related to the number of weak COSO components (i.e., scope) and certain weak COSO components (i.e., existence). Firms with IT-related weak components report more material weaknesses and misstatements than firms without IT-related weak components, providing evidence on the pervasive negative impact of weak IT controls, especially in control environment, risk assessment, and monitoring.

scholarly journals Internal Control Weakness and Managerial Myopia: Evidence from SOX Section 404 Disclosures

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amy E. Ji
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Investment Decisions ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Internal Controls ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Managerial Myopia ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
The Impact

Problem/ Relevance: Managerial myopia is an important issue of interests to academics, practitioners, and regulators as managers have been condemned for their obsession with short-term earnings and myopic investment decisions that sacrifice firms’ long term value for shareholders. This article contributes by examining whether the quality of firms’ internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) is associated with managerial myopia. Research Objective/ Questions: The purpose of this study is to examine whether managers in firms reporting material internal control weaknesses (ICW) under Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 engage in myopic behaviors more than those in firms without reporting ICW. Methodology: The study uses the logit regression model to investigate a sample obtained from Compustat for the period of 2005-2013. Major Findings: The study finds a positive association between internal control weaknesses reported by auditors under Section 404 of the SOX and managerial short-termism which is measured by the probability of cutting R&D expenses in the current year from the previous year. Implications: Whereas prior studies mostly examine the impact of internal controls on accounting quality, this study demonstrates the implication of internal controls beyond financial reporting quality by showing an association between internal control quality and managerial myopia. Future research may further investigate the association between firms’ financial reporting quality and managerial investment decisions.

scholarly journals SOX Section 404 Twenty Years After: Reviewing Costs and Benefits

2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-112
Author(s):  
Bianca Fischer ◽  
Bernadette Gral ◽  
Othmar Lehner
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Earnings Quality ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Positive Effects ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley

Some issues of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 are still discussed controversially in literature. Thereof, Section 404 concerning internal control over financial reporting is one of the most criticized parts. This article focuses on costs and benefits of the section and impacts on earnings management. Most authors agree that compliance costs of Section 404 far outweigh its benefits. However, long-term benefits are expected. Regarding earnings management, studies show that the section has positive effects such as increased earnings quality and improved internal control systems. Although the section is heavily debated in literature, there is consensus that SOX Section 404 greatly contributed to the improvement of quality of financial reporting and of corporate governance as a whole.

Unexpected Fees and the Prediction of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control Over Financial Reporting

2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 485-505 ◽  
Author(s):  
Susan M. Albring ◽  
Randal J. Elder ◽  
Xiaolu Xu
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Audit Fees ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Sarbanes Oxley ◽  
Material Weaknesses ◽  
New Material ◽  
Internal Control Weaknesses ◽  
Section 302

We investigate whether prior year unexpected audit fees help predict new material weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting reported under Section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX). Predicting material weaknesses may be useful to investors and other financial statement users because these disclosures have adverse economic impacts on disclosing firms. Unexpected fees are significantly associated with material weaknesses reported under Section 404, even after controlling for Section 302 disclosures and other factors associated with internal control weaknesses. Unexpected fees are associated with company-level weaknesses but are not significantly associated with account-specific weaknesses, consistent with differences in the nature and severity of the two types of material weaknesses. Our results are consistent with unexpected audit fees containing information on unobserved audit costs and client control risks, which help predict future internal control weaknesses.

Auditor Realignments Accompanying Implementation of SOX 404 ICFR Reporting Requirements

2011 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Ettredge ◽  
James Heintz ◽  
Chan Li ◽  
Susan Scholz
Keyword(s):  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Internal Control ◽  
Section 404 ◽  
Industry Specialization ◽  
Reporting Requirements ◽  
Big 4 ◽  
Two Measures ◽  
The Impact ◽  
To Receive

ABSTRACT: We examine the impact of adverse auditors’ opinions on clients’ internal control over financial reporting (ICFR), issued under SOX Section 404, on auditor dismissals. Companies receiving adverse ICFR opinions are more likely to subsequently dismiss their auditors. This association between adverse reports and dismissals persists over a four-year period beginning with the initial year of SOX 404 reporting. Our evidence also suggests that these dismissals tend to be part of clients’ efforts to improve their overall financial reporting. Clients receiving adverse reports are more likely to switch to higher-quality auditors, as proxied by Big 4 membership and two measures of industry specialization, than are clients receiving favorable reports. Further, adverse opinion clients that dismiss auditors and then hire new auditors that specialize in the client’s industry are more likely to receive an improved ICFR report in the next year.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document