Stable Solutions to the Social Choice Problem: Dominant, Weakly Stable, Uncovered Sets and Their Extensions

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuad T. Aleskerov ◽  
Andrey Subochev
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
The Social ◽  
Stable Solutions ◽  
Weakly Stable

NON-MANIPULABLE PARTITIONING

2012 ◽  
Vol 08 (02) ◽  
pp. 273-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
CONAL DUDDY ◽  
JUAN PEROTE-PEÑA ◽  
ASHLEY PIGGINS
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Aggregation Rule ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Social Classification ◽  
The Social

Consider the following social choice problem. A group of individuals seek to classify the elements of X as belonging in one of two sets. The individuals may disagree as to how the elements of X should be classified, and so an aggregation rule is applied to determine a compromise outcome. We require that the social classification should not be imposed, nor should it be manipulable. We prove that the only aggregation rules satisfying these properties are dictatorships.

scholarly journals M-DPOP: Faithful Distributed Implementation of Efficient Social Choice Problems

2008 ◽  
Vol 32 ◽  
pp. 705-755 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Petcu ◽  
B. Faltings ◽  
D. C. Parkes
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Best Interest ◽  
Distributed Constraint Optimization ◽  
The Social ◽  
Structured Problems ◽  
Distributed Implementation ◽  
Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem ◽  
Sparse Problems

In the efficient social choice problem, the goal is to assign values, subject to side constraints, to a set of variables to maximize the total utility across a population of agents, where each agent has private information about its utility function. In this paper we model the social choice problem as a distributed constraint optimization problem (DCOP), in which each agent can communicate with other agents that share an interest in one or more variables. Whereas existing DCOP algorithms can be easily manipulated by an agent, either by misreporting private information or deviating from the algorithm, we introduce M-DPOP, the first DCOP algorithm that provides a faithful distributed implementation for efficient social choice. This provides a concrete example of how the methods of mechanism design can be unified with those of distributed optimization. Faithfulness ensures that no agent can benefit by unilaterally deviating from any aspect of the protocol, neither information-revelation, computation, nor communication, and whatever the private information of other agents. We allow for payments by agents to a central bank, which is the only central authoritythat we require. To achieve faithfulness, we carefully integrate the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism with the DPOP algorithm, such that each agent is only asked to perform computation, report information, and send messages that is in its own best interest. Determining agent i's payment requires solving the social choice problem without agent i. Here, we present a method to reuse computation performed in solving the main problem in a way that is robust against manipulation by the excluded agent. Experimental results on structured problems show that as much as 87% of the computation required for solving the marginal problems can be avoided by re-use, providing very good scalability in the number of agents. On unstructured problems, we observe a sensitivity of M-DPOP to the density of the problem, and we show that reusability decreases from almost 100% for very sparse problems to around 20% for highly connected problems. We close with a discussion of the features of DCOP that enable faithful implementations in this problem, the challenge of reusing computation from the main problem to marginal problems in other algorithms such as ADOPT and OptAPO, and the prospect of methods to avoid the welfare loss that can occur because of the transfer of payments to the bank.

On stable solutions to the Ordinal Social Choice problem

2009 ◽  
Vol 79 (3) ◽  
pp. 437-439 ◽  
Author(s):  
F. T. Aleskerov ◽  
A. N. Subochev
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Stable Solutions

The Social Choice Problem: Impossibility

2015 ◽  
pp. 135-158
Author(s):  
Michael C. Munger ◽  
Kevin M. Munger
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
The Social

scholarly journals A deliberative solution to the social choice problem

2011 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-142 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Mladenovic
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Deliberative Democracy ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Rational Decision ◽  
Choice Problem ◽  
Rational Decision Making ◽  
The Social

Is there a sense in which society makes rational decision in a democratic way that is similar to individual rational decision-making? Social choice theory claims that rational social choice is not possible. Or, at least, that if possible, then the social choice must be dictatorial. I shall present a deliberative solution to the social choice problem. This solution is called deliberative, because it is based on the assumptions of deliberative democracy.

Precursors to Public Choice

2019 ◽  
pp. 796-816
Author(s):  
Iain McLean
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Social Choice ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Social Choice Theory ◽  
Ancient Greek ◽  
The Social ◽  
Mathematical Skill ◽  
The Many ◽  
Selection Of

This chapter reviews the many appearances, disappearances, and reappearances of axiomatic thought about social choice and elections since the era of ancient Greek democracy. Social choice is linked to the wider public-choice movement because both are theories of agency. Thus, just as the first public-choice theorists include Hobbes, Hume, and Madison, so the first social-choice theorists include Pliny, Llull, and Cusanus. The social-choice theory of agency appears in many strands. The most important of these are binary vs. nonbinary choice; aggregation of judgement vs. aggregation of opinion; and selection of one person vs. selection of many people. The development of social choice required both a public-choice mindset and mathematical skill.

The ‘social choice’ of privatising urban water services: A case study of Madrid in Spain

2015 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 616-629 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto Ruiz-Villaverde ◽  
Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo ◽  
Francisco González-Gómez
Keyword(s):  
Social Choice ◽  
Urban Water ◽  
Water Services ◽  
The Social ◽  
Urban Water Services
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