Backward Induction and Common Strong Belief of Rationality

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Itai Arieli
Keyword(s):  
Backward Induction ◽  
Strong Belief

PLAUSIBILITY ORDERINGS IN DYNAMIC GAMES

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 331-364 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrés Perea
Keyword(s):  
Belief Revision ◽  
Dynamic Games ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Common Belief ◽  
Revision Theory ◽  
Forward Induction ◽  
Strong Belief ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Plausibility Ordering

In this paper we explore game-theoretic reasoning in dynamic games within the framework of belief revision theory. More precisely, we focus on the forward induction concept of ‘common strong belief in rationality’ (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and the backward induction concept of ‘common belief in future rationality’ (Baltag et al. 2009; Perea 2014). For both concepts we investigate whether the entire collection of selected belief revision policies for a player can be characterized by a unique plausibility ordering. We find that this is indeed possible for ‘common strong belief in rationality’, whereas this may be impossible in some games for ‘common belief in future rationality’.

Skills, Complexity, and Backward Induction

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Konrad Grabiszewski ◽  
Alex R. Horenstein
Keyword(s):  
Backward Induction

scholarly journals Dynamic consistency, valuable information and subjective beliefs

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spyros Galanis
Keyword(s):  
Value Of Information ◽  
Single Agent ◽  
Bayesian Updating ◽  
Dynamic Consistency ◽  
Decision Problems ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Subjective Expected Utility ◽  
Trading Behavior ◽  
Subjective Beliefs ◽  
Convex Preferences

AbstractAmbiguity sensitive preferences must fail either Consequentialism or Dynamic Consistency (DC), two properties that are compatible with subjective expected utility and Bayesian updating, while forming the basis of backward induction and dynamic programming. We examine the connection between these properties in a general environment of convex preferences over monetary acts and find that, far from being incompatible, they are connected in an economically meaningful way. In single-agent decision problems, positive value of information characterises one direction of DC. We propose a weakening of DC and show that one direction is equivalent to weakly valuable information, whereas the other characterises the Bayesian updating of the subjective beliefs which are revealed by trading behavior.

Interpreting Knowledge in the Backward Induction Problem

Episteme ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 248-261 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ken Binmore
Keyword(s):  
Common Knowledge ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Finite Games ◽  
Common Knowledge Of Rationality

AbstractRobert Aumann argues that common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction in finite games of perfect information. I have argued that it does not. A literature now exists in which various formal arguments are offered in support of both positions. This paper argues that Aumann's claim can be justified if knowledge is suitably reinterpreted.

Water Scarcity and Conflict Between Upstream and Downstream Riparian Countries

2021 ◽  
Vol 07 (03) ◽  
pp. 2150012
Author(s):  
Sahar Farid Yousef
Keyword(s):  
Water Availability ◽  
Water Scarcity ◽  
Water Allocation ◽  
Allocation Problem ◽  
The Other ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Transboundary River ◽  
Militarized Conflicts ◽  
The Future ◽  
Water Scarce

More than one-quarter of the world’s population lives in water-scarce areas, while most countries share at least one transboundary river. If water scarcity is this prevalent, should we expect riparian countries to fight over the water allocation of shared rivers? To answer this question, I develop a modified one-shot three-stage river-sharing game where countries can resort to force to solve their water allocation problem. Using backward induction, I solve for the probability of the downstream country initiating conflict against the upstream country and the likelihood of the latter responding with force to the former’s hostile actions. I test the model empirically using a set of all upstream–downstream riparian dyads with available data from AQUASTAT and the Correlates of War Project for the years 1960–2010. The main contribution of this paper is that it demonstrates how upstream and downstream riparian countries differ in their decision to use force against the other country when experiencing water scarcity. I find that water scarcity increases the likelihood of the downstream country initiating the conflict, but it has no effect on the upstream country’s likelihood of responding with force. If history is a predictor of the future, then the results imply that as more riparian countries become water-scarce, militarized conflicts between upstream and downstream countries are likely to increase, especially if there is heterogeneity in water availability between the riparian dyad.

scholarly journals ‘Shaking up’ neoliberal policy in schools: Looking for democratic alternatives in Jacinta’s satchel

2018 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 392-403 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janean Robinson ◽  
Barry Down ◽  
John Smyth
Keyword(s):  
Young People ◽  
Young Person ◽  
Research Project ◽  
Strong Belief ◽  
Life Chances ◽  
Ethnographic Interviews ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Young Lives

Our research is driven by a strong belief that the stories of young people gathered through ethnographic interviews can generate awareness not only of the complexities, uncertainties and possibilities of young people’s lives but also the ways in which their identities and life chances are shaped by broader structural, institutional and historical forces beyond their control. In this article, we introduce Jacinta, a young person who describes the events and conditions which serve to hinder and/or support her journey in school and beyond. We have used Jacinta’s story from a larger research project, to speak back to the impact the broader neoliberalising agenda is having on young lives with a view to reimagining democratic alternatives in education.

scholarly journals Endogena korupcija kao ravnoteza sekvencijalne igre

2003 ◽  
Vol 44 (156) ◽  
pp. 21-43
Author(s):  
Milic Milovanovic
Keyword(s):  
Working Conditions ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Equilibrium Strategy ◽  
Backward Induction ◽  
Power Struggle ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Sequential Game ◽  
Privatized Firms ◽  
Motivational Structure ◽  
Insider Privatization

In this paper power struggle over the control of an insider privatized firm is modeled as a sequential game with perfect information. The endogenous corruption is a consequence of an insider privatization plan, where employees obtain majority of shares. In the post privatization game three players are dominant: managers, employees, and outside owners. Managers are by far the strongest player, with their key position in privatized firms despite their minority ownership stake. Since managers control working conditions of employees-cum-owners, they exercise an unparalleled power. Motivational structure is given for each player. Their ranked lists of goals and fears are necessary in order to specify parameters for the model. The game is modeled in an extensive form, and backward induction suggests a coalition of insiders (managers and employees) against the interests of outsiders. Under stated conditions, the equilibrium strategy results in an endogenous corruption.

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