Some Mistakes in the so-called Optimal Tariff Theory

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hak Choi
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Tariff

Regulatory Schemes on Public Transport

2017 ◽  
Vol 2649 (1) ◽  
pp. 113-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vicente Huerta ◽  
Patricia Galilea
Keyword(s):  
Analytical Solutions ◽  
Private Initiative ◽  
Route Design ◽  
Innovative Solutions ◽  
Payment Schemes ◽  
Innovative Capabilities ◽  
Urban Bus ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Optimal Tariff

Regulatory schemes have remained an open question about the implementation of an urban bus system. Because of the introduction of a higher private initiative within these systems, the expectation of increased patronage has not been met. Hence, studying the effect of regulation on innovation becomes the first objective of this research because innovative solutions may help to attract users. To fulfill that objective, an analysis of innovative capabilities was carried out. The aim was to understand the gap between potential and practical innovation on the authorities and operators. The second objective was to use theoretical modeling to find the effect of payment schemes on frequency and bus size. Both analyses used as a case study the experience of Transantiago in Santiago, Chile. Innovation proved to be dependent on the regulatory scheme in which an operation was framed. Both authorities and operators showed the existence of innovative capabilities dependent on the perceived incentives. Trusting cooperation was an aspect that might have encouraged some types of innovation, such as route design. Analytical solutions showed that as in the experience of Transantiago, supply-based payments provided higher frequency and smaller bus size than fixed payments. Finally, an optimal tariff gave incentives to the operators to provide socially optimal levels of frequency and bus size for a certain demand level.

Entry Charges on Immigrants

1994 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 338-354 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harry R. Clarke
Keyword(s):  
Immigration Policy ◽  
Capital Mobility ◽  
The Self ◽  
Open Door ◽  
International Capital ◽  
Open Door Policy ◽  
International Capital Mobility ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Pigovian Taxes ◽  
Optimal Tariff

With a perfectly elastic supply of immigrants and no domestic distortions, the pure Pareto gains to residents from immigration are maximized by an open door immigration policy. The only role then for entry charges is cost recovery. With inelastic supply, charges may be levied for optimal tariff reasons although there are practical difficulties in estimating appropriate supply elasticities. Priceable externalities provide a rationale for charging if, and only if, there are difficulties in making discriminatory reimbursements of optimal toll revenues to residents. Otherwise, relevant externalities should be internalized via appropriate Pigovian taxes and discriminatory reimbursements paid to residents. Then, an open door policy without entry charges should be pursued. Transaction costs and unpriceable externalities provide a weak case for charging. Where quotas are imposed for political reasons or to ease potentially unfavorable distributional implications, there are convincing second-best arguments for fees and, equivalently, quota auctions. The latter policies are generally preferable to unpriced quotas and to asset tests, even if coupled with a fee, whatever the degree of international capital mobility. Independently of humanitarian concerns, liberal immigration policies can be based on the self-interest of residents provided immigrants pay all costs they impose on a resident population.

Optimal tariff under domestic distortions

1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 371-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amar K. Parai
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Tariff
Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document