Capital Market Effects of Mandatory IFRS Reporting in the EU: Empirical Evidence

Securitisation represents a significant worldwide source of capital market financing. European investors commonly invest in asset-backed securities issued in U.S. securitisation transactions, and vice versa One of the key goals of the European Commission's proposed Capital Markets Union (CMU) is to further facilitate securitisation as a source of capital market financing as a viable alternative to bank-based finance for companies operating in the EU. To that end, this chapter explains securitisation and attempts to put its rise, its decline after the global financial crisis, and its recent CMU-inspired revival into a global perspective. It examines not only securitisation's relationship to the financial crisis but also post-crisis comparative regulatory approaches in the EU and the United States.

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Endogenous Preferences And Delegation In The European Union

Comparative Political Studies ◽

10.1177/0010414002239371 ◽

2003 ◽

Vol 36 (1-2) ◽

pp. 41-74 ◽

Cited By ~ 37

Author(s):

Simon Hug

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Empirical Evidence ◽

The European Union ◽

Endogenous Preferences ◽

The Eu

The interplay among intergovernmental and supranational actors is a defining feature of the institutional life of the European Union (EU). Too often, however, these actors are considered independent of each other, and their autonomy is assessed in a vacuum. This is problematic because if there is such a thing as "endogenous preferences" in the EU, it appears exactly through this interdependence of intergovernmental and supranational actors. None of the institutionalist approaches to the EU has come to grips with this fact yet. Based on some very simple gametheoretic ideas, I offer in this article a rationale for "endogenous preferences" and discuss their impact on issues of delegations. Some cursory empirical evidence supports the claims that the preferences of supranational actors are related to those of the actors who select or appoint them. Similarly, the analyses presented here suggest that preferences over delegation to supranational actors are influenced by differences in policy views between principals and agents.

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Reaksi Pasar atas Manajemen Laba

JIATAX (Journal of Islamic Accounting and Tax) ◽

10.30587/jiatax.v1i2.987 ◽

2019 ◽

Vol 2 (1) ◽

pp. 1

Author(s):

Fery Friyo Handoko ◽

Mu'minatus Sholichah

Keyword(s):

Data Analysis ◽

Earnings Management ◽

Empirical Evidence ◽

Capital Market ◽

Abnormal Return ◽

Accounting Information ◽

Financial Statement ◽

Agency Conflict ◽

Manufacturing Company ◽

Simple Regression

Abstract This research examine the capital market reaction on earnings management. Agency conflict represented by information asymetry caused earnings management. Managers have incentive to play accounting method and estimate to gain certain amount of earnings. Hereafter, investor have interest regarding their invesment decision. They rely on accounting information that represented in financial statement.Based on premise in Signalling Theory, we then hypothesized that investor would response any information addressed to them.Sample and population that used to test hypothesis taken from listed manufacturing company during 2015-2017. We documenting data from financial statement items. We obtain 40 manufacturing company that comply to purposive sampling requirement. We use simple regression to do data analysis. We found the empirical evidence that market reac the earnings management indication. There is empirical fact that cummulative abnormal return decreas when determinate by discretionarry accruals. This research conclude that market reacting the earnings management indication generally.

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