scholarly journals Capital Taxation, Long-Run Growth and Bequests

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars Kunze
Keyword(s):  
2017 ◽  
Vol 53 ◽  
pp. 207-221 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping-ho Chen ◽  
Angus C. Chu ◽  
Hsun Chu ◽  
Ching-chong Lai

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 492-503 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Frankel

A known result holds that capital taxes should be high in the short run and low or zero in the long-run steady state. This paper studies the dynamics of optimal capital taxation during the transition, when a high rate is no longer optimal but the economy is still in flux. The main result is that capital should be taxed whenever the sum of the elasticities of marginal utility with respect to consumption and labor supply are rising and subsidized whenever this sum is falling. If the utility function displays increasing relative risk aversion, this paradoxically implies that capital should be taxed when the capital stock is below the modified golden-rule level and subsidized whenever it exceeds this level. Thus, savings incentives sometimes can be more desirable when the capital stock is large than when it is small.


2010 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 326-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Catarina Reis

This paper considers a Ramsey model of linear taxation for an economy with capital and two kinds of labor. If the government cannot distinguish between the return from capital and the return from entrepreneurial labor, then there will be positive capital income taxation, even in the long run. This happens because the only way to tax entrepreneurial labor is by also taxing capital. Furthermore, under fairly general conditions, the optimal tax on observable labor income is higher than the capital tax, although both are strictly positive. Thus, even though both income taxes are positive, imposing uniform income taxation would lead to additional distortions in the economy.


2010 ◽  
Vol 32 (4) ◽  
pp. 1067-1082 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lars Kunze
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Vol 110 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-119 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ludwig Straub ◽  
Iván Werning

According to the Chamley-Judd result, capital should not be taxed in the long run. In this paper, we overturn this conclusion, showing that it does not follow from the very models used to derive it. For the main model in Judd (1985), we prove that the long-run tax on capital is positive and significant, whenever the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is below one. For higher elasticities, the tax converges to zero but may do so at a slow rate, after centuries of high tax rates. The main model in Chamley (1986) imposes an upper bound on capital taxes. We provide conditions under which these constraints bind forever, implying positive long-run taxes. When this is not the case, the long-run tax may be zero. However, if preferences are recursive and discounting is locally nonconstant (e.g., not additively separable over time), a zero long-run capital tax limit must be accompanied by zero private wealth (zero tax base) or by zero labor taxes (first-best). Finally, we explain why the equivalence of a positive capital tax with ever-increasing consumption taxes does not provide a firm rationale against capital taxation. (JEL H21, H25)


2014 ◽  
Vol 129 (3) ◽  
pp. 1255-1310 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Piketty ◽  
Gabriel Zucman

Abstract How do aggregate wealth-to-income ratios evolve in the long run and why? We address this question using 1970–2010 national balance sheets recently compiled in the top eight developed economies. For the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France, we are able to extend our analysis as far back as 1700. We find in every country a gradual rise` of wealth-income ratios in recent decades, from about 200–300% in 1970 to 400–600% in 2010. In effect, today’s ratios appear to be returning to the high values observed in Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (600–700%). This can be explained by a long-run asset price recovery (itself driven by changes in capital policies since the world wars) and by the slowdown of productivity and population growth, in line with the β=sg Harrod-Domar-Solow formula. That is, for a given net saving rate s = 10%, the long-run wealth-income ratio β is about 300% if g = 3% and 600% if g = 1.5%. Our results have implications for capital taxation and regulation and shed new light on the changing nature of wealth, the shape of the production function, and the rise of capital shares.


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