scholarly journals A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aytek Erdil ◽  
Paul Klemperer
Keyword(s):  
Package Auctions

Package Auctions and Exchanges

Econometrica ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 75 (4) ◽  
pp. 935-965 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Milgrom
Keyword(s):  
Package Auctions

Core-Selecting Package Auctions

2017 ◽  
pp. 226-240
Author(s):  
Robert Day ◽  
Paul R. Milgrom
Keyword(s):  
Package Auctions

Scheduling with package auctions

2010 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 476-499 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kan Takeuchi ◽  
John C. Lin ◽  
Yan Chen ◽  
Thomas A. Finholt
Keyword(s):  
Package Auctions

scholarly journals A NEW PAYMENT RULE FOR CORE-SELECTING PACKAGE AUCTIONS

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 537-547 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aytek Erdil ◽  
Paul Klemperer
Keyword(s):  
Package Auctions

Matching with Contracts

2005 ◽  
Vol 95 (4) ◽  
pp. 913-935 ◽  
Author(s):  
John William Hatfield ◽  
Paul R Milgrom
Keyword(s):  
Labor Market ◽  
Large Class ◽  
College Admissions ◽  
Aggregate Demand ◽  
Dominant Strategy ◽  
Matching Model ◽  
Matching Algorithm ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Package Auctions ◽  
Labor Market Matching

We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions. We introduce a new “law of aggregate demand” for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that, when workers are substitutes, this law is satisfied by profit-maximizing firms. When workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker-offering auction/matching algorithm. We also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions.

Core-selecting package auctions

2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 393-407 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Day ◽  
Paul Milgrom
Keyword(s):  
Package Auctions
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