Internal Corporate Governance, CEO Turnover, and Earnings Management

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonali Hazarika ◽  
Jonathan M. Karpoff ◽  
Rajarishi Nahata
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ceo Turnover

Internal corporate governance, CEO turnover, and earnings management

2012 ◽  
Vol 104 (1) ◽  
pp. 44-69 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonali Hazarika ◽  
Jonathan M. Karpoff ◽  
Rajarishi Nahata
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Ceo Turnover

HUBUNGAN BOARD DAN KOMITE AUDIT TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fivi Anggraini
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Conflict Of Interest ◽  
Significant Relationship ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Relationship Of ◽  
The Relationship

Earnings management is the moral hazard problem of manager that adses because of the conflict of interest between the manager as agent and the stakeholder and the owner as principal. The behavior of earnings management will immediately influence the reported earning. The aims of this research at examining the relationship of board and audit committe to earnings management. The samples of this research is all of companies member Corporate Governance Perception Index (CGPI) in the years of 2003-2006 which were listed in Jakarta Stock Exchange. The results of this study show that (1) the proportion of independent directors on the board had not significant relationship to earning management, (2) competence of independent directors on the board had not significant relationship to earning management, (3) the size of board had significant relationship to earning management, (4) the proportion of independent directors on the audit committe had not significant relationship to earning management, and (5) competence of members of the audit committe had significant relationship to earning management.

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