scholarly journals The Role of State Attorneys General in U.S. Antitrust Policy: Public Enforcement Through Private Enforcement Methods

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Firat Cengiz
2014 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 143-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Dunne

AbstractPrivate enforcement is an increasingly prominent element of EU competition law. The forthcoming Directive on damages actions aims to strengthen and, to a degree, harmonise procedures for private competition litigation, while recent case law of the Court of Justice reaffirms the centrality of the right to claim compensation for losses stemming from breach of the competition rules. Moreover, this right has been presented as an essentially unitary one, whereby any victim of any type of competition infringement has, in principle, the right to claim damages. This chapter reviews the evolving framework, and considers, specifically, the role for private enforcement within the overall system of EU competition law. Taking into account the Commission’s efforts to facilitate and increase private enforcement, the emerging EU public enforcement framework, as well as the substantive EU competition rules more generally, this chapter argues that, contrary to the rhetoric, private enforcement is a mechanism best adapted, and arguably most appropriate, for use only in the context of hard-core cartels. It is further suggested that the gap between rhetoric and reality is not problematic as such, yet difficulties may arise insofar as these divergences conflict with the principle of effectiveness.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 237-257
Author(s):  
Rimantas Antanas Stanikunas ◽  
Arunas Burinskas

This paper provides a study of the interaction between public and private enforcement of Lithuanian antitrust law. The study refers to the Damages Directive. It has been found that private enforcement depends greatly on public enforcement of competition law. Therefore, their compatibility and balance are of great importance to antitrust policy. The Lithuanian NCA prioritises cases where an economic effect on competition does not have to be proven. This creates uncertainty about the outcome of private enforcement cases. Private enforcement in Lithuania is also in need of detailed rules on the identification of harm and causality. The analysis reveals how challenging it can be to estimate and prove harm or a causal link in private enforcement cases. Support from the NCA is therefore exceedingly needed. Moreover, even though the use of the leniency programme helps, it remains insufficient to solve the problem of under-deterrence. However, measures introduced by the Damages Directive do not make the leniency programme safe.


2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-600
Author(s):  
Naomi R. Lamoreaux ◽  
Laura Phillips Sawyer

Scholars have long recognized that the states’ authority to charter corporations bolstered their antitrust powers in ways that were not available to the federal government. Our paper contributes to this literature by focusing attention on the relevance for competition policy of lawsuits brought by minority shareholders against their own companies, especially lawsuits challenging voting trusts. Historically judges had been reluctant to intervene in corporations’ internal affairs and had been wary of the potential for opportunism in shareholders’ derivative suits. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, they had begun to revise their views and see shareholders as useful allies in the struggle against monopoly. Although the balance between judges’ suspicion of and support for shareholders’ activism shifted back and forth over time, in the end the lawsuits provoked state legislatures to strengthen antitrust policy by making devices like voting trusts unsuitable for purposes of economic concentration.


Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne

This chapter sketches the history and functions of the EU and its institutions in order to set the EU competition rules in context. It then describes the competition provisions themselves and outlines the way in which the rules are applied and enforced, including the public enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 under Regulation 1/2003, the control of mergers with a European dimension under Regulation 139/2004, public enforcement by the national competition authorities of the Member States, and the role of private enforcement. It discusses the position and powers of the European Commission, particularly the role of the Competition Directorate General (DG Comp); the powers of the EU Courts; the significance of fundamental rights and the general principles of EU law in competition cases; the application of competition rules to particular sectors of the economy; and the application of the EU rules to the EEA.


Vniversitas ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 65 (132) ◽  
pp. 311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ingrid S. Ortiz Baquero ◽  
Diego A. Solano Osorio

<p>La introducción de la aplicación privada o private enforcement en los diferentes sistemas jurídicos de derecho de la competencia presentes en el mundo, se ha dado tras un largo y consolidado desarrollo de la aplicación pública o public enforcement, que ve las acciones de daños como su complemento, más allá de considerarlas como su detractor. En este sentido, el presente documento pretende analizar el sistema público de cumplimiento de las normas del derecho de la competencia preponderante tanto en la Comunidad Andina, como en sus países integrantes y, de esta manera, identificar sus elementos característicos y evaluar las ventajas que ha traído a estos países el mantenimiento de este sistema. </p>


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