scholarly journals Blanket Guarantee and Restructuring Decisions for Multinational Banks in a Bargaining Model

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juha-Pekka Niinimäki ◽  
Ville Mälkönen
Keyword(s):  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Multinational Banks

Do Relative Status of Women and Marriage Characteristics Matter for the Intimate Partner Violence?

2021 ◽  
pp. 0192513X2110300
Author(s):  
Aysegul Kayaoglu
Keyword(s):  
Intimate Partner Violence ◽  
Partner Violence ◽  
Emotional Abuse ◽  
Intimate Partner ◽  
Resource Theory ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Relative Status ◽  
Turkish Case ◽  
Status Of Women

This article analyzes intimate partner violence (IPV) in a developing country context, namely, Turkey, which faces an enormous increase in femicide cases over the last decade. Analyzing a very rich nationwide representative survey on IPV, we show that it is not only the absolute status of women but also their relative status in terms of income and education that affects different types of domestic violence, ranging from emotional abuse to physical and sexual violence. Besides, factors related to marriage setting are found to have a significant role in the effect of women’s superior status on IPV. Overall, we provide evidence to support the relative resource theory and invalidate the intra-household bargaining model in the Turkish case.

Collective Risk and Distributional Equity in Climate Change Bargaining

2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272110273
Author(s):  
Aseem Mahajan ◽  
Reuben Kline ◽  
Dustin Tingley
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Characteristic Feature ◽  
Economic Loss ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Intergovernmental Panel ◽  
Climate Negotiations ◽  
Collective Risk ◽  
International Climate ◽  
Alternating Offers ◽  
International Climate Negotiations

International climate negotiations occur against the backdrop of increasing collective risk: the likelihood of catastrophic economic loss due to climate change will continue to increase unless and until global mitigation efforts are sufficient to prevent it. We introduce a novel alternating-offers bargaining model that incorporates this characteristic feature of climate change. We test the model using an incentivized experiment. We manipulate two important distributional equity principles: capacity to pay for mitigation of climate change and vulnerability to its potentially catastrophic effects. Our results show that less vulnerable parties do not exploit the greater vulnerability of their bargaining partners. They are, rather, more generous. Conversely, parties with greater capacity are less generous in their offers. Both collective risk itself and its importance in light of the recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report make it all the more urgent to better understand this crucial strategic feature of climate change bargaining.

scholarly journals Wage bargaining as an optimal control problem: a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Guerrazzi
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Control ◽  
Continuous Time ◽  
Bargaining Power ◽  
Wage Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Speed Of Convergence ◽  
Wage Setting ◽  
Dynamic Version ◽  
Efficient Bargaining ◽  
Over Time

AbstractIn this paper, I develop a dynamic version of the efficient bargaining model grounded on optimal control in which a firm and a union bargain over the wage in a continuous-time environment under the supervision of an infinitely lived mediator. Overturning the findings achieved by means of a companion right-to-manage framework, I demonstrate that when employment is assumed to adjust itself with some attrition in the direction of the contract curve implied by the preferences of the two bargainers, increases in the bargaining power of the firm (union) accelerate (delay) the speed of convergence towards the stationary solution. In addition, confirming the reversal of the results obtained when employment moves over time towards the firm’s labour demand, I show that the dynamic negotiation of wages tends to penalize unionized workers and favour the firm with respect to the bargaining outcomes retrieved with a similar static wage-setting model.

The impact of globalization on the performance of Banks in South Africa

2016 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-542 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fadzlan Sufian ◽  
Fakarudin Kamarudin
Keyword(s):  
South Africa ◽  
Host Country ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Generalized Method Of Moments ◽  
Estimation Method ◽  
Bank Performance ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Multinational Banks ◽  
Dynamic Panel Regression ◽  
The Impact

Purpose This paper aims to provide empirical evidence for the impact globalization has had on the performance of the banking sector in South Africa. In addition, this study also investigates bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomic conditions that may influence the performance of the banking sector. Design/methodology/approach The authors use data collected for all commercial banks in South Africa between 1998 and 2012. The ratio of return on assets was used to measure bank performance. They then used the dynamic panel regression with the generalized method of moments as an estimation method to investigate the potential determinants and the impact of globalization on bank performance. Findings Positive impact of greater economic integration and trade movements of the host country, while greater social globalization in the host country tends to exert negative influence on bank profitability. The results show that banks originating from the relatively more economically globalized countries tend to perform better, while banks headquartered in countries with greater social and political globalizations tend to exhibit lower profitability levels. Originality/value An empirical model was developed that allows for the performance of multinational banks to depend on internal and external factors. Moreover, unlike the previous studies on bank performance, in this empirical analysis, we control for the different dimensions of globalizations while taking into account the origins of the multinational banks. The procedure allows us to test for the home field, the liability of foreignness and global advantage hypotheses to deduce further insights into the prospects of banking across borders.

An Empirical Bargaining Model with Left-Digit Bias: A Study on Auto Loan Monthly Payments

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhenling Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Interest Rate ◽  
Interest Rates ◽  
Large Data ◽  
The United States ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Proposed Model ◽  
Lower Interest Rate ◽  
The Empirical Analysis

This paper studies price bargaining when both parties have left-digit bias when processing numbers. The empirical analysis focuses on the auto finance market in the United States, using a large data set of 35 million auto loans. Incorporating left-digit bias in bargaining is motivated by several intriguing observations. The scheduled monthly payments of auto loans bunch at both $9- and $0-ending digits, especially over $100 marks. In addition, $9-ending loans carry a higher interest rate, and $0-ending loans have a lower interest rate. We develop a Nash bargaining model that allows for left-digit bias from both consumers and finance managers of auto dealers. Results suggest that both parties are subject to this basic human bias: the perceived difference between $9- and the next $0-ending payments is larger than $1, especially between $99- and $00-ending payments. The proposed model can explain the phenomena of payments bunching and differential interest rates for loans with different ending digits. We use counterfactuals to show a nuanced impact of left-digit bias, which can both increase and decrease the payments. Overall, bias from both sides leads to a $33 increase in average payment per loan compared with a benchmark case with no bias. This paper was accepted by Matthew Shum, marketing.

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