The Interrelationships Between Information Technology Expenditures, CEO Compensation and Firm Value

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adi Masli ◽  
Vernon J. Richardson ◽  
Juan Manuel Sanchez ◽  
Rod E. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Information Technology Expenditures ◽  
Technology Expenditures

The Interrelationships Between Information Technology Spending, CEO Equity Incentives, and Firm Value

2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 41-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adi Masli ◽  
Vernon J. Richardson ◽  
Juan Manuel Sanchez ◽  
Rodney E. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
It Governance ◽  
Business Value ◽  
Risky Asset ◽  
Equity Compensation ◽  
Equity Incentives ◽  
Compensation Incentives

ABSTRACT We examine the interrelationships between information technology spending, CEO equity compensation incentives, and firm value. We present two related pieces of evidence. First, we find that CEO equity incentives are associated with IT spending, suggesting that CEOs with higher incentives are more likely to invest in a risky asset such as IT. Second, we find that the association between IT spending and business value is stronger for firms that grant CEOs higher equity incentives. Our study contributes to the CEO compensation and IT governance literatures.

CEO Deal-Making Activity, CEO Compensation and Firm Value

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eliezer M. Fich ◽  
Laura T. Starks ◽  
Adam S. Yore
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Deal Making

Family CEOs vs. Nonfamily CEOs in the Family-Controlled Firm: An Examination of the Level and Sensitivity of Pay to Performance

2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-131 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel L. McConaughy
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Family Firms ◽  
Multivariate Analyses ◽  
Incentive Alignment ◽  
Founding Family ◽  
The Family

This study examines CEO compensation in 82 founding-family-controlled firms; 47 CEOs are members of the founding family and 35 are not. It tests the family incentive alignment hypothesis, which predicts that family CEOs have superior incentives for maximizing firm value and, therefore, need fewer compensation-based incentives. Univariate and multivariate analyses show that family CEOs' compensation levels are lower and that they receive less incentive-based pay—confirming the family incentive alignment hypothesis and suggesting the possible need for family firms to increase CEO compensation when they replace a founding family CEO with a nonfamily-member CEO.

CDS, CEO Compensation, and Firm Value

2021 ◽  
pp. 102445
Author(s):  
Abu Amin ◽  
Pawan Jain ◽  
Arun Upadhyay
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Ceo Compensation

An Examination of the Effect of IT Investments on Firm Value: The Case of Y2K-Compliance Costs

2000 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 95-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gopal V. Krishnan ◽  
Ram S. Sriram
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Stock Market ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Equity Valuation ◽  
Compliance Costs ◽  
Book Value ◽  
It Investments ◽  
Share Prices

In this study, using the recent Y2-compliance expenditures as an example, we examine whether disclosures relating to investments in information technology (IT) were relevant to investors in assessing the market value of equity. We use a sample of 190 firms that disclosed estimates of total Y2K-compliance costs in their 1997 annual reports to examine the association between Y2K-compliance costs and share prices. We test the joint hypothesis that Y2K-compliance costs were relevant to equity valuation of firms that chose to become Y2K-compliant and that these costs were sufficiently reliable to be reflected in share prices. We find that estimates of Y2K-compliance costs were positively and significantly related to share prices after controlling for earnings, book value of equity, and other factors. We find that the stock market is not shortsighted, and consider investments in Y2K-remediation efforts a significant and value-increasing activity for the average firm.

Firm Value Effects of Web Site Redesign

2010 ◽  
pp. 20-41
Author(s):  
Raquel Benbunan-Fich ◽  
Eliezer M. Fich
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Web Site ◽  
Empirical Literature ◽  
Publicly Traded ◽  
Cross Sectional ◽  
Web Presence ◽  
Service Companies ◽  
Study Methodology ◽  
Commercial Organizations

The redesign of a Web site can be classified as both an information technology (IT) investment and an e-commerce initiative. Although the empirical literature provides evidence that financial markets are sensitive to e-commerce announcements, it is still unknown what types of announcements affect the value of firms. We use the event study methodology on a sample of Web site redesigns from 1995 to 1999 to investigate the types of commercial organizations that announce changes to their Web presence and to study whether such redesign initiatives affect the value of publicly traded firms. Our findings indicate that, on average, refining a Web presence does not produce significant firm valuation adjustments. However, cross-sectional analyses reveal that Web site redesign increases firm value in service companies.

The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 1297-1339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Chaigneau ◽  
Nicolas Sahuguet
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Business Conditions ◽  
Ceo Selection ◽  
Low Ability

We consider a model of chief executive officer (CEO) selection, dismissal, and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention purposes, the compensation of these CEOs is more sensitive to firm value and relatively less sensitive to business conditions. Moreover, these CEOs receive lower salaries when CEO skills are sufficiently transferable. A diffusion of best monitoring practices increases competition for CEOs and raises CEO pay in all firms, including those with unchanged monitoring ability.

The Relevance of Information Technology Expenditures

2010 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 39-77 ◽  
Author(s):  
B. Charlene Henderson ◽  
Kevin Kobelsky ◽  
Vernon J. Richardson ◽  
Rodney E. Smith
Keyword(s):  
Information Technology ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Abnormal Returns ◽  
Firm Level ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Level Information ◽  
Information Technology Expenditures

ABSTRACT: Although information technology (hereafter, IT) expenditures represent an increasingly large investment for most corporations, firms are not required to disclose them separately in their financial statements. We hypothesize and find evidence that information about a firm’s IT expenditures helps explain its future performance as reflected in both accounting measures (residual income, earnings volatility) and market measures (stock price and long-run abnormal returns). In particular, we provide evidence of market mispricing and suggest the lack of firm-level annual IT expenditure disclosure as one potential reason for such mispricing. Altogether, the evidence presents a persuasive case that information about a firm’s IT expenditures is useful to stock market participants. The evidence we report is useful to managers and accounting policy makers contemplating the public disclosure of firm-level information about IT investments.

Excessive managerial entrenchment, corporate governance, and firm performance

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Christelle Antounian
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Inverse Correlation ◽  
Poor Performance ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Managerial Entrenchment ◽  
Board Monitoring ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates the impact of excessive managerial entrenchment on the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, CEO compensation, and firm value. We measure the degree of managerial entrenchment based on the E-index presented by Bebchuck et al. (2006). Our main focus is on firms’ excess managerial entrenchment, which is calculated by finding the difference between firm’s E-index and its industry median in a given year. Our findings suggest that an increase in excess CEO entrenchment reduces the likelihood of CEO turnover due to poor performance. We also show a positive correlation between excessive entrenchment and CEO compensation as managers gain more power and authority when they are entrenched. On the other hand, excess CEO entrenchment has an inverse correlation with firm value. We propose that excessive managerial entrenchment has a converse impact on board monitoring and firm performance. Also, we suggest that a sound corporate protects the shareholders’ interests as it prevents CEOs from over entrenchment.

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