Measuring Financial Regulation Architectures and the Role of the Central Banks: The Financial Supervision Herfindahl Hirschman Index

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donato Masciandaro ◽  
Marc Quintyn
Keyword(s):  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Financial Supervision

At the final stage of the global crisis: Economic tasksin 2017-2019

2018 ◽  
pp. 5-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. A. Mau
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Final Stage ◽  
Government Regulation ◽  
Inflation Targeting ◽  
Social Dynamics ◽  
Growth Stimulation ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Economic Area ◽  
National Trends

The paper deals with the global and national trends of economic and social development at the final stage of the global structural crisis. Special attention is paid to intellectual challenges economists will face with in the post-crisis world: prospects of growth without inflation, new global currencies and the role of cryptocurrencies, central banks independence and their role in economic growth stimulation, new tasks and patterns of government regulation, inequality and growth. Special features of Russian post-crisis development are also under consideration. Among them: prospects of macroeconomic support of growth, inflation targeting, new fiscal rule, social dynamics and new challenges to welfare state. The paper concludes that the main obstacles for economic growth in Russia are concentrated in the non-economic area.

PENGARUH KOMPETENSI, INDEPENDENSI DAN AKUNTABILITAS TERHADAP KUALITAS AUDIT APARAT INSPEKTORAT DALAM PENGAWASAN KEUANGAN DAERAH

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (02) ◽  
pp. 414
Author(s):  
SULFIANTY SULFIANTY
Keyword(s):  
Sampling Method ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Sample Selection ◽  
Selection Method ◽  
Civil Servants ◽  
Financial Supervision ◽  
Internal Auditors

The role of internal auditors is needed to encourage the realization of good and clean governance. This study aims to determine the effect of competence, independence and accountability on inspectorate audit quality in regional financial supervision. Population in this study are all civil servants Inspectorate of Pohuwat Regency. The sample selection method in this study is the saturated or census sampling method. The results of this study indicate that independence and accountability have an influence on audit quality both partially and simultaneously.   Peranan auditor internal sangat diperlukan untuk mendorong terwujudnya tata pemerintahan yang baik dan bersih. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahuipengaruh kompetensi, independensi dan akuntabilitas terhadap kualitas audit inspektorat dalam pengawasan keuangan daerah.Populasi dalam penelitian ini adalah seluruh PNS Inspektorat Kabupaten Pohuwato.Metode pemilihan sampel dalam penelitian ini adalah metode sampling jenuh atau sensus.Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa kompetensi, independensi dan akuntabilitas memiliki pengaruh terhadap kualitas audit baik secara parsial maupun secara simultan.

ANALYSIS OF THE SCO NATIONAL PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND PROPOSALS FOR OPTIMIZATION OF THE SETTLEMENTS IN SCO

2020 ◽  
Vol 2 (6) ◽  
pp. 147-158
Author(s):  
L. N. KRASAVINA ◽  
◽  
L. I. KHOMYAKOVA ◽  
Keyword(s):  
External Factor ◽  
Digital Technologies ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Payment System ◽  
Payment Systems ◽  
Shanghai Cooperation Organization ◽  
Regional Features

The article discusses the features of the functioning of national payment systems of the countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The specifics of the payment systems of the SCO countries are revealed, the emphasis is placed on their regional features. The role of central banks in ensuring the stable and safe functioning of national payment systems is highlighted. The importance of the supervisory function of central banks in order to control the payment system operators of the SCO countries is emphasized. Forecasts of the development of remote and digital technologies in the payment sector are given taking into account the influence of a new external factor (pandemic).

Economic Patriotism After the Crisis: Explaining Continuity and Change in European Securities Enforcement

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chase Foster
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Insider Trading ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Global Financial Crisis ◽  
Financial Supervision ◽  
Financial Centre ◽  
Continuity And Change ◽  
Financial Interests ◽  
Mixed Pattern ◽  
The Uk

Since the global financial crisis, European governments have sought to intensify the supervision of financial markets. Yet, few studies have empirically examined whether regulatory approaches have systematically shifted in the aftermath of the crisis, and how these reforms have been mediated by longstanding national strategies to promote domestic financial interests in the European single market. Examining hundreds of enforcement actions in three key European jurisdictions, I find a mixed pattern of continuity and change in the aftermath of the crisis. In the UK, aggregate monetary penalties and criminal sanctions have skyrocketed since 2009, while in France and Germany, the enforcement pattern suggests continuity, with both countries assessing penalties and prosecuting insider trading at similar rates before and after the crisis. I conclude that financial regulation is still structured by longstanding industrial strategies (Story and Walter, 1997), but where pre-existing regulatory approaches were seen as contributing to the crisis, a broader regulatory overhaul has been pursued. Thus, in the UK, where the financial crisis served as a direct rebuke to the country’s “light touch” regulation, financial supervision was overhauled, and monetary sanctions dramatically increased, to preserve London’s status as an international financial centre. By contrast, in France and Germany, where domestic regulatory systems were implicated by the financial crisis, domestic securities supervision and enforcement was less dramatically altered. While the crisis has led to the further institutionalization of European-level supervisory institutions, these changes have not yet led to convergence in national regulatory approaches.   Full text available at: https://doi.org/10.22215/rera.v12i1.1233

Arena Expansion and the Transnationalization of Business Advocacy

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abraham L. Newman ◽  
Elliot Posner
Keyword(s):  
Internal Structure ◽  
International Finance ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Banking Regulation ◽  
Great Powers ◽  
Soft Law ◽  
Financial Industry ◽  
Individual Industry ◽  
Industry Associations

Chapter 5 shifts the focus from soft law’s effects on great powers to its impact on influential business groups. It argues that by expanding arenas of contestation to the transnational level, soft law transforms business representation as well as individual industry associations. The chapter’s empirical focus is on banking regulation from the 1980s to the 2000s. Much of the literature on transnational banking standards centers on the role of industry associations and, in particular, on the Institute of International Finance. In this chapter, the authors explain the rise of direct industry participation in and influence over Basel-based standard setting. They show that the orientation and priorities of the IIF as well as its membership and internal structure were deeply conditioned by 1980s international soft law. The IIF’s transformation subsequently set off a series of changes to the ecology of financial industry associations and the politics of financial regulation.

scholarly journals Do Institutional Transplants Succeed? Regulating Raiffeisen Cooperatives in South India, 1930–1960

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-27
Author(s):  
Maanik Nath
Keyword(s):  
South India ◽  
Financial Regulation ◽  
Low Cost ◽  
Credit Market ◽  
Rural Credit ◽  
Market State ◽  
The Government ◽  
Political Economic ◽  
Rural Credit Market

The government in British-ruled India established cooperative banks to compete with private moneylenders in the rural credit market. State officials expected greater competition to increase the supply of low-cost credit, thereby expanding investment potential for the rural poor. Cooperatives did increase credit supply but captured a small share of the credit market and reported net losses throughout the late colonial and early postcolonial period. The article asks why this experiment did not succeed and offers two explanations. First, low savings restricted the role of social capital and mutual supervision as methods of financial regulation in the cooperative sector. Second, a political-economic ideology that privileged equity over efficiency made for weak administrative regulation.

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