scholarly journals Secondary Privatization in Poland (Part I): Evolution of Ownership Structure and Company Performance in Firms Privatized by Employee Buyouts

Author(s):  
Piotr Kozarzewski ◽  
Richard Woodward
2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yan Irianis

The purpose of the research is to analyze the effect of Intellectual Capital, Company Size, and Ownership Structure, namely managerial ownership and institusional ownership toward company performance. This research used samples from manufacturing companies that listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during 2012-2015. Based on purposive sampling technique, it got 17 companies as research samples, so as long as 4 years observation there were 68 annual reports were analyzed. Type of data used is secondary data obtained from www.idx.co.id. The analyctical method used is multiple regression analysis.The results of this research showed than Intellectual Capital doesn’t have significant effect to company performance, company size has significant effect to company performance, managerial ownership has significant effect to company performance, and institutional ownership doesn’t have significant effect to company performance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-55
Author(s):  
Oleksandra Laktionova ◽  
Olha Rudenok

Introduction. Significantly important factors that define the company's efficiency are the structure of proprietorship and capital structure. Therefore, the item of the relationship between these factors is reflected in the works of scientists. The necessary issue is the pick of correlation between own and borrowed funds since the optimum structure of capital leads to magnification of the market value based on company performance results. The relevance of deciding on the capital structure determines the feasibility of determining the effect of concentrated ownership on capital structure. In an unstable political, social, legal, and economic environment, ownership concentration turns into a compensatory mechanism that fills numerous institutional gaps. Concentrated possession enables it possible to influence the capital structure through agency costs. Aim and tasks. The main purpose of the article is to determine the link between concentration level of ownership and capital structure, between ownership structure and leverage. This paper substantiates the problem of “principal-agent” to identify problematic issues to further develop recommendations to strengthen appropriate market incentives. Results. The paper shows that the problem of the “principal-agent” exists independently of the rate of ownership concentration in the corporation. Agency costs are one of the determining factors in the composition of a corporation’s capital. This paper has clearly shown approaches to identifying the nature of the effect of ownership structure on the capital structure. It has been established how this influence is carried out, taking into account the mismatch of various groups of owners' interests and the effect of their “entrenching”, as well as the consequences of monitoring and expropriation with a highly concentrated structure of ownership. Conclusions. The choice of the ratio of own and borrowed funds depends on the actual ownership structure. Assumptions are made, the increase in the corporation's leverage owing to an increase in the blockholders shares. There is a reciprocal interconnection between leverage and agency costs. Because changing leverage is an instrument that helps to overcome agency conflicts and not just only proves is the result of their presence. The selected special characteristics gave grounds to conclude that the adjustment of the ratio of a company's debt to the value of its equity also depends on the goal of management solutions, as well as the current facility and prospects of the corporation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 1801
Author(s):  
Zaini Danu Brata ◽  
Maria M. Ratna Sari

The purpose of this study is to determine the effect of the application of Good Corporate Governance, Ownership Structure, and Company Size on Company Performance. Several factors This study aims to determine the effect of Good Corporate Governance (CGPI) on the Performance of Companies listed on the IDX for the period 2013-2017. The research population is a company that is listed on the Indonesian stock exchange and at the same time follows the ranking of the Corporate Governance Perception Index with sample selection through a purposive sampling method. There are 55 companies that meet the criteria as research samples. The results show that Good Corporate Governance has a significant positive effect on company performance, Managerial Ownership has a positive and significant effect on company performance, Institutional Ownership does not have a positive and significant effect on Company Performance, Company Size positive and significant effect on Financial Performance. Keywords : Good corporate governance, ownership structure, company size, company performance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-36
Author(s):  
Waleed Alahdal ◽  
Mohammed H. Alsamhi ◽  
Mohammed S. Barakat

This paper uses panel data to examine the impact of ownership structure index on the financial performance of 73 listed companies of the Indian national stock exchange from 2009 to 2016. To measure the Panel Regression in this study, the FEM model was used. The different dimensions of the ownership structure index involve ten items used as the Independent variable of this study. Two measures have been adopted to estimate the firm performance that is; ROA and ROE. In contrast, the control variables are firm size and leverage. This study's empirical evidence shows that the ownership structure index has significant impact on a firm's performance measured by ROA and ROE of Indian Nifty 100 listed companies. Findings of this study support previous empirical studies performed and add some value in the research area of finance that explores different aspects of the board of directors' index and ownership structure index in Indian market by using Nifty 100 as an example.


2015 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-327 ◽  
Author(s):  
Krishna Reddy ◽  
Sazali Abidin ◽  
Linjuan You

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between Chief Executive Officers’ (CEOs) compensation and corporate governance practices of publicly listed companies in New Zealand for the period 2005-2010. Design/methodology/approach – Prior literature argues that corporate governance systems and structures are heterogeneous, that is, corporate governance mechanisms that are important tend to be specific to a country and its institutional structures. The two corporate governance mechanisms most important for monitoring CEO compensation are ownership structure and board structure. The authors use a generalised least squares regression estimation technique to examine the effect ownership structure and board structure has on CEO compensation, and examine whether ownership structure, board structure, CEO and director compensation have an effect on company performance. Findings – After controlling for size, performance, industry and year effects, the authors report that internal features rather than external features of corporate governance practices influence CEO compensation. Companies that have their CEO on the board pay them more than those who do not sit on the board, suggesting CEOs on boards have power to influence board decisions and therefore boards become less effective in monitoring CEO compensation in the New Zealand context. Companies that pay their directors more tend to reward their CEOs more as well, thus supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. Research limitations/implications – The results confirm the findings reported in prior studies that institutional investors are ineffective in monitoring managerial decisions and their focus is on decisions that benefit them on a short-term basis. Practical implications – The findings indicate that although the proportion of independent directors on boards does not significantly influence CEO compensation, it does indicate that outside directors are passive and are no more effective than insiders when it comes to the oversight and supervision of CEO compensation. Originality/value – Being a small and open financial market with many small- and medium-sized listed companies, New Zealand differs from large economies such as the UK and the USA in the sense that CEOs in New Zealand tend to be closely connected to each other. As such, the relationship between pay-performance for New Zealand is found to be different from those reported for the UK and the USA. In New Zealand, the proportion of institutional and/or block shareholders is positively associated with CEO compensation and negatively associated with company performance, suggesting that it is not an effective mechanism for monitoring CEO compensation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 29
Author(s):  
Rina Malahayati

This study is aimed to examine the influence of managerial ownership structure, institutional  ownership structure, and firm size on company performance and the impact on the earning  management on companies of sector  coal mining in 2017 – 2019. Unit analysis are companies listed on coal mining  for period 2017-2019. The population are 75 observations (25 companies x 3 years). Data processing uses panel data processed by using SPSS. For testing the hypothesis, the study uses path analysis. The result showed that (1) managerial ownership structure, institutional  ownership structure, and firm size simultaneously to company performance, (2) the managerial ownership structure no effect on company performance, (3) the institutional  ownership structure effect to negatively on company performance, (4) the firm size effect to  positively on  company performance, and (5) the company performance effect to negatively on earning management.


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