scholarly journals Anticommons and Optimal Patent Policy in a Model of Sequential Innovation

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gaston Llanes ◽  
Stefano Trento
Keyword(s):  
Patent Policy ◽  
Sequential Innovation

scholarly journals Anticommons and Optimal Patent Policy in a Model of Sequential Innovation

2011 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gastón Llanes ◽  
Stefano Trento
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Elasticity Of Substitution ◽  
Innovation Activity ◽  
Patent Policy ◽  
Patent Pools ◽  
Sequential Innovation ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
New Goods ◽  
Patent Breadth

Abstract We present a model of sequential innovation in which innovators use several research inputs to invent new goods. We extend work by Shapiro (2001) and Lerner and Tirole (2004) by studying the effects of increases in the number of patented research inputs on innovation incentives and optimal patent policy. We consider not only the effects on the incentives to invent final goods, but also on the incentives to invent research inputs (ex-ante effect). We find increasing complexity has a negative effect on innovation activity in the final goods sector when research inputs are complements. Either limiting market power through weaker patents or reducing the lack of coordination through patent pools may solve this problem. We also find the optimal patent breadth and show it is increasing in the elasticity of substitution between the inputs used in research and decreasing (increasing) in the complexity of the R&D process when research inputs are complements (substitutes).

Patent Conflicts

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tejas N. Narechania
Keyword(s):  
Regulatory Authority ◽  
Direct Action ◽  
Patent Policy ◽  
Context Sensitive ◽  
Court Of Appeals ◽  
Relative Preference ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Federal Circuit ◽  
Indirect Action ◽  
Striking Effect

Patent policy is typically thought to be the product of the Patent and Trademark Office, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, and, in some instances, the Supreme Court. This simple topography, however, understates the extent to which outsiders can shape the patent regime. Indeed, a variety of administrative actors influence patent policy through the exercise of their regulatory authority and administrative power. This Article offers a novel description of the ways in which nonpatent agencies intervene into patent policy. In particular, it examines agency responses to conflicts between patent and other regulatory aims, uncovering a relative preference for complacency (“inaction”) and resort to outside help (“indirect action”) over regulation (“direct action”). This dynamic has the striking effect of shifting authority from nonpatent agencies to patent policymakers, thereby supplanting some regulatory designs with the patent regime’s more general incentives. This Article thus offers agencies new options for facing patent conflict, including an oft-overlooked theory of regulatory authority for patent-related regulation. Such intervention and regulation by nonpatent agencies can give rise to a more efficient and context-sensitive regime that is better aligned with other regulatory goals.

Innovation in the Seed Market: The Role of IPRs and Commercialization Rules

2016 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Marc Baudry ◽  
Adrien Hervouet
Keyword(s):  
Product Differentiation ◽  
Economic Consequences ◽  
Vertical Product Differentiation ◽  
Legal Rules ◽  
Sequential Innovation ◽  
Seed Market ◽  
Second Category ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Compulsory Registration

AbstractThis article deals with the impact of legal rules on incentives in the seeds sector to create new plant varieties. The first category of rules consists in intellectual property rights and is intended to address a problem of sequential innovation and R&D effort. The second category concerns commercial rules that are intended to correct a problem of adverse selection. We propose a dynamic model of market equilibrium with vertical product differentiation that enables us to take into account the economic consequences of imposing either Plant Breeders’ Rights (PBRs) or patents as IPRs and either compulsory registration in a catalog or minimum standards as commercialization rules. The main result is that the combination of catalog registration and PBRs adopted in Europe is hardly supported by the model calibrated on data for wheat in France.

Two-Stage Patent Races and Patent Policy

2000 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 488 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincenzo Denicolo
Keyword(s):  
Patent Policy ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Patent Races
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