Constitutional Judicial Review and Political Insurance

West-Nordic Constitutional Judicial Review is based on Kári á Rógvi’s doctoral dissertation, defended in 2009 at the University of Iceland with the esteemed Eivind Smith and Guðmundur Alfreðsson as thesis opponents. It provides an excellent account of judicial review in the West-Nordic tradition (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, the Faroe Islands and Greenland) based on a selection of ‘leading cases, reminiscent of the common law approach to legal studies. As such, it is something of a novelty in the Nordic legal literature and a long overdue supplement to what Kári laments as the staid legal treatises that form the basis of Nordic legal educations (323-335).

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Constitutional and administrative paradigms in judicial control over EU high and low politics

Perspectives on Federalism ◽

10.1515/pof-2017-0016 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 9 (2) ◽

pp. E-240-E-267

Author(s):

Pola Cebulak

Keyword(s):

Judicial Review ◽

Case Law ◽

Fundamental Rights ◽

Constitutional Theory ◽

Two Dimensional ◽

Judicial Control ◽

Policy Domain ◽

External Relations ◽

Constitutional Judicial Review ◽

High Politics

Abstract This article explores the particular tensions surrounding judicial review in EU external relations. The tensions are classified using a two-dimensional framework. Firstly, a distinction based on policy domains of high and low politics, which is derived from constitutional theory, and external to the CJEU; and secondly a distinction based on legitimizing paradigms of administrative (EU as effective global actor) or constitutional (judicial review as guarantee of fundamental rights) in character and determined by the Court itself. Even though one would expect a dominance of the administrative paradigm in the domain of high politics, the Court uses both the administrative and the constitutional paradigm in its external relations case-law. The decision on which of these becomes the guiding frame seems to depend more on the policy domain, and be made case by case, which suggests politically sensitive adjudication, rather than a coherent approach to legitimizing the nascent judicial review in EU external relations.

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Constitutionalism, Liberalism, and Democracy

Constitutionalism ◽

10.1093/oso/9780192896759.003.0002 ◽

2021 ◽

pp. 35-53

Author(s):

Andrei Marmor

Keyword(s):

Decision Making ◽

Judicial Review ◽

The Political ◽

Constitutional Courts ◽

Liberal Politics ◽

Similar Tendency ◽

External Threats ◽

The People ◽

Democratic System ◽

Constitutional Judicial Review

This chapter describes the tension between democratic decision-making procedures and constitutional judicial review. It shows that the liberal values that justify a democratic self-government may also vindicate some limits on majoritarian decision-making procedures, but not necessarily in the form of the current constitutional regimes. The chapter argues that constitutional courts are not a necessary feature of a liberal regime. It also acknowledges that democratic decision-making has many defects. These defects concern the fate of persistent vulnerable minorities, the tendency towards short-sightedness, a similar tendency to downplay people's rights and liberties for the sake of greater economic gains or in the force of external threats, and finally the dangers of populism and anti-liberal politics gaining ground within a democratic system. The chapter then depicts courts as essentially conservative institutions which are not — and cannot be — as counter-majoritarian as depicted by legal scholars, mainly because their legitimacy and the acceptance of their decisions depends on the people. It contends that the acceptance and efficacy of judicial review is context dependent, but that some fights still need to be fought in the political, not the legal arena.

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El recurso directo: entre protección jurídica y constitucionalidad objetiva = Directation: between legal protection and objetive constitutionality

Teoría y Realidad Constitucional ◽

10.5944/trc.34.2014.14096 ◽

2014 ◽

pp. 319

Author(s):

Otto Pfersmann

Keyword(s):

Rule Of Law ◽

Legal System ◽

Judicial Review ◽

Direct Action ◽

Legal Protection ◽

Fundamental Rights ◽

Constitutional Rule ◽

The Rule Of Law ◽

Constitutional Judicial Review

La posibilidad de que los individuos dispongan de un «recurso directo» para cuestionar normas del sistema jurídico ante el juez de la constitucionalidad no constituye un elemento necesario del Estado constitucional de Derecho. La institución de los «derechos fundamentales», no requiere, en cuanto tal, que la protección de los mismos deba corresponder al juez de la constitucionalidad de las leyes. Lo que permite distinguir los diferentes modelos es el grado en que concentran y distribuyen estas tareas (protección de derechos fundamentales y control de constitucionalidad de la ley, básicamente). Esto depende de varios factores: el grado de exhaustividad del control de la constitucionalidad de las normas, el tipo de supervisión (preventivo o correctivo), el número de órganos encargados del control y el número de componentes del mismo. Se plantea así el problema de la limitación que aqueja al Estado de Derecho, pues cuanto más exhaustiva pretende ser la realización del mismo, menos intensa resulta produciendo un paradójico debilitamiento del derecho fundamental y del principio de exhaustividad. Asistimos, pues, a una mutación del principio «monomicrodicástico» y exhaustivo de jurisdicción constitucional.The possibility for individuals to have a «direct action» to challenge the norms of the legal system before the judge of the constitutionality is not a necessary element of the constitutional Rule of law. The institution «fundamental rights» does not require, as such, that the judge of the constitutionality of the parliamentary statutes should grant their protection. What allows distinguishing the different models is the degree of the concentration and distribution of these basic tasks: protection of the fundamental rights, constitutional judicial review. This depends upon various factors: how exhaust the constitutional judicial review should be, what kind of constitutional supervision may be (preventive or corrective), the number of the organs charged with this task, and the number of its components. The question of the limitation of the Rule of Law is risen, because the more exhaustive its implementation is intended, the less intense, generating a paradoxal weakness of the fundamental right and the completeness principie. A phenomenon appears: the mutation of the «monomicrodicastic» principie and the completeness of the constitutional judicial review.

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I The Constitutional Court, 1 The Historical Development of Italian Constitutional Adjudication

10.1093/law/9780190214555.003.0001 ◽

2016 ◽

Author(s):

Barsotti Vittoria ◽

Carozza Paolo G ◽

Cartabia Marta ◽

Simoncini Andrea

Keyword(s):

Twentieth Century ◽

Judicial Review ◽

Historical Development ◽

Constitutional Court ◽

Constitutional Adjudication ◽

Constitutional Judicial Review ◽

The Way

One of the remarkable facts of constitutional judicial review in Italy is the way in which it was grafted onto a tradition of law that had been very inhospitable to any such practice prior to the mid-twentieth century. The development of this unprecedented institution and the factors that contributed to its success not only assist the reader to understand the subsequent contours and character of the Constitutional Court but also provide a number of very useful insights and lessons for other jurisdictions seeking to establish or consolidate new and fragile systems of constitutional adjudication. This chapter traces that history and identifies those features.

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