Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy & the Role of Behavioral Economics

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Maurice E. Stucke
Keyword(s):  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Competition Policy

Voting Trusts and Antitrust: Rethinking the Role of Shareholder Litigation in Public Regulation, from the 1880s to the 1930s

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 569-600
Author(s):  
Naomi R. Lamoreaux ◽  
Laura Phillips Sawyer
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Federal Government ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
State Legislatures ◽  
Antitrust Policy ◽  
Minority Shareholders ◽  
Public Regulation ◽  
Economic Concentration ◽  
Over Time

Scholars have long recognized that the states’ authority to charter corporations bolstered their antitrust powers in ways that were not available to the federal government. Our paper contributes to this literature by focusing attention on the relevance for competition policy of lawsuits brought by minority shareholders against their own companies, especially lawsuits challenging voting trusts. Historically judges had been reluctant to intervene in corporations’ internal affairs and had been wary of the potential for opportunism in shareholders’ derivative suits. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, they had begun to revise their views and see shareholders as useful allies in the struggle against monopoly. Although the balance between judges’ suspicion of and support for shareholders’ activism shifted back and forth over time, in the end the lawsuits provoked state legislatures to strengthen antitrust policy by making devices like voting trusts unsuitable for purposes of economic concentration.

scholarly journals Designing Competition Policy for Telecommunications

2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Glen O. Robinson ◽  
Dennis L. Weisman
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Dynamic Efficiency ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Competitive Outcome ◽  
Static Efficiency ◽  
Competitive Process ◽  
Welfare Losses ◽  
Network Sharing

This paper explores the role of the essential facilities doctrine in circumscribing the scope of network sharing obligations in telecommunications. Among other things it argues that a proper application of the doctrine of essential facilities should recognize the prominence of dynamic over static efficiency in promoting consumer welfare. Regulators may be averse to recognizing these tradeoffs because unlike the behavior of prices the welfare losses from foregone innovation may be unobservable to the regulators' constituency. Moreover, an emphasis on dynamic efficiency requires the short-term regulator to take the "long view" – fostering the competitive process rather than emulating the competitive outcome.

Market dynamics in the Netherlands: Competition policy and the role of small firms

2001 ◽  
Vol 19 (5) ◽  
pp. 795-821 ◽  
Author(s):  
David B. Audretsch ◽  
George van Leeuwen ◽  
Bert Menkveld ◽  
Roy Thurik
Keyword(s):  
The Netherlands ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Small Firms ◽  
Market Dynamics

The Life Cycle Model of Cyber-economics

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 63-72
Author(s):  
Srinivas Nowduri
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Life Cycle ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Research Work ◽  
Life Cycle Model ◽  
Cycle Model ◽  
Business World ◽  
Exponential Increase ◽  
Financial Metrics

The exponential increase in modern technological advancements within the business world, is impacting every national economy from different directions/perspectives. This research work focuses on main issues behind cyber economics along with cyber-economic values; based on cyber events and their associated financial damages. It also made a comparative study between cyber and financial metrics, based on a professional look at cybersecurity in modern digital firms. Then it emphasizes on the role of applied and behavioral economics, in digital forms. Finally propose a model for cyber economic growth vital for modern digital firms

Fundamental Rights in EU Competition Enforcement

2021 ◽  
pp. 313-386
Author(s):  
Jan Wouters ◽  
Michal Ovádek
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Internal Market ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Fundamental Rights ◽  
National Competition ◽  
Eu Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Enforcement

This chapter assesses the role of fundamental rights in EU competition enforcement. EU competition policy comprises a number of limbs, each with its own peculiarities and rules but together contributing to the objective of protecting (relatively) undistorted competition in the Union's internal market. The key reason why EU competition policy is an interesting and important case study from the point of view of fundamental rights application is enforcement. Unlike in other areas, the EU, in particular the European Commission, wields considerable powers when it comes to the protection of undistorted competition in the internal market. Although the extent of the enforcement powers and their potential impact on fundamental rights differs between the various aspects of competition policy, the field as a whole embodies supranational authority as almost none other. This is so despite the fact that in enforcing competition law the Commission cooperates closely with national competition authorities (NCAs) as part of the European Competition Network (ECN) and that the majority of decisions applying EU antitrust rules are taken by the NCAs.

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