Defense Procurement Fraud, Penalties, and Contractor Influence

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan M. Karpoff ◽  
D. Scott Scott Lee ◽  
Valaria P. Vendrzyk
1999 ◽  
Vol 107 (4) ◽  
pp. 809-842 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan M. Karpoff ◽  
D. Scott Lee ◽  
Valaria P. Vendrzyk

2019 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 208-228
Author(s):  
Moshe Schwartz

This article explores the evolution of social and economic public policy goals and programs embedded in the defense procurement process and explores the impact of these policies on acquisition.


2020 ◽  
pp. 128-131
Author(s):  
И.В. Баранова ◽  
М.А. Власенко

В статье рассмотрен гособоронзаказ как драйвер развития предприятий оборонно-промышленного комплекса, требования обеспечения финансовой устойчивости предприятий при исполнении ими гособоронзаказа. Диверсификация оборонно-промышленного комплекса РФ и конверсия производства предприятий, входящих в данный комплекс, ориентированные на производство продукции двойного назначения, а также повышение объемов продаж в среднесрочной перспективе рассматриваются как факторы повышения их финансовой устойчивости. The article considers the defense procurement and acquisition as a driver for the development of enterprises of the military-industrial complex; the requirements for ensuring the financial stability of enterprises when they perform a state contract under the state defense order. The diversification of the Russian military-industrial complex and the conversion of production of enterprises included in this complex, focused on the production of dual-use products, increasing sales in the medium term, are considered as factors for increasing the financial stability of enterprises in the military-industrial complex.


2011 ◽  
Vol 474-476 ◽  
pp. 1435-1439
Author(s):  
Sheng Li Chen ◽  
Xiao Dong Liu

We formulate the model of R&D investment scale adjustment of defense procurement by applying game theory and contest theory and study the equilibrium of manufacturers’ R&D investment decision-making in defense procurement. We explore mainly the influence of valuation of monopolistic contract and differences among manufacturers’ abilities on investment. The conclusion shows that manufacturers’ investment equilibrium of R&D projects is what the government expects under certain conditions, however, manufacturers’ abilities effect on the investment equilibrium and makes it deviate from the government expectation. Therefore, the government must keep practically manufacturers’ anticipation about the monopolistic contact being consistent with government’s and set basic admission criterion to enable manufactures’ ability well-matched to induce the manufacturers’ investment decisions to the investment equilibrium that it desired.


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