Electoral Competition and Low Contribution Limits

Abstract Polarization may be the most consistent effect of populism, as it is integral to the logic of constructing populist subjects. This article distinguishes between constitutive, spatial and institutional dimensions of polarization, adopting a cross-regional comparative perspective on different subtypes of populism in Europe, Latin America and the US. It explains why populism typically arises in contexts of low political polarization (the US being a major, if partial, outlier), but has the effect of sharply increasing polarization by constructing an anti-establishment political frontier, politicizing new policy or issue dimensions, and contesting democracy's institutional and procedural norms. Populism places new issues on the political agenda and realigns partisan and electoral competition along new programmatic divides or political cleavages. Its polarizing effects, however, raise the stakes of political competition and intensify conflict over the control of key institutional sites.

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Parties on the Left, Parties on the Right: Electoral Competition and Citizenship Policy Change in Europe

British Journal of Political Science ◽

10.1017/s0007123420000368 ◽

2020 ◽

pp. 1-19

Author(s):

John Graeber

Keyword(s):

Policy Change ◽

Spatial Competition ◽

Electoral Competition ◽

Party Competition ◽

Policy Changes ◽

Far Right ◽

Left Party ◽

Political Spectrum ◽

The Right ◽

Restrictive Policy

Abstract In recent decades, citizenship policies in Europe have changed significantly: some governments have introduced restrictive new requirements for citizenship, while others have made citizenship more accessible. What explains this variation? Despite a burgeoning literature on both comparative citizenship and spatial competition among parties, scholarship on this question remains in its infancy and primarily focused on the influence of the far right. Expanding on this growing research, this article argues that citizenship policy change results from electoral competition on both sides of the political spectrum, in conjunction with governments’ ideological orientation. Using new data on citizenship policies across sixteen European countries from 1975 to 2014, the author demonstrates that left-of-center governments facing increasing levels of left party competition are associated with more accessible policy changes, while increasing levels of party competition from the far right yield more restrictive policy changes under not only right-of-center governments, but also centrist and left-of-center governments as well.

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Electoral Competition, Transparency, and Open Government Data

The 21st Annual International Conference on Digital Government Research ◽

10.1145/3396956.3398254 ◽

2020 ◽

Author(s):

Sounman Hong

Keyword(s):

Electoral Competition ◽

Open Government ◽

Open Government Data ◽

Government Data

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Estimating Dynamic Games of Electoral Competition to Evaluate Term Limits in US Gubernatorial Elections

The American Economic Review ◽

10.1257/aer.20150566 ◽

2017 ◽

Vol 107 (7) ◽

pp. 1824-1857 ◽

Cited By ~ 6

Author(s):

Holger Sieg ◽

Chamna Yoon

Keyword(s):

Political Economy ◽

Empirical Analysis ◽

Dynamic Games ◽

Electoral Competition ◽

Term Limits ◽

Relative Importance ◽

Political Candidates ◽

Trade Off ◽

Perfect Monitoring ◽

The Empirical Analysis

This paper shows how to identify and estimate, using standard semi-parametric techniques, a class of dynamic games with perfect monitoring, that have been at the frontier of recent research in political economy. The empirical analysis provides novel quantitative insights into the trade-off that voters face between ideology and ability, the differences in ability and ideology among parties and states, and the differences in preferences between political candidates and voters. We analyze the consequences of term limits and quantify their relative importance. Specifically, we characterize conditions under which term limits improve voters' welfare. (JEL C57, C73, D72)

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