Herding in Aid Allocation

Author(s):  
Emmanuel Frot ◽  
Javier Santiso
Keyword(s):  
2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI)

2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Takaaki Masaki

Abstract:This article utilizes a newly available dataset on the geographical distribution of development projects in Zambia to test whether electoral incentives shape aid allocation at the subnational level. Based on this dataset, it argues that when political elites have limited information to target distributive goods specifically to swing voters, they allocate more donor projects to districts where opposition to the incumbent is strong, as opposed to districts where the incumbent enjoys greater popularity.


2009 ◽  
Vol 46 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tijen Demirel-Pegg ◽  
James Moskowitz
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Axel Dreher ◽  
Peter Nunnenkamp ◽  
Susanne Thiel ◽  
Rainer Thiele
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Axel Dreher ◽  
Florian Mölders ◽  
Peter Nunnenkamp
Keyword(s):  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document