Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis and Collective Action

AbstractDominant analytical approaches to environmental law exhibit a similar, problematic form: they treat that which should be outcome determining as, instead, outcome determined. This form is most evident and influential in the welfare economic technique of regulatory cost–benefit analysis, which treats all resources – including the monetary value of human lives – as potential means towards seemingly higher yielding ends. In contrast, an environmental constitutionalism, in which certain needs and interests of present and future generations, the global community, and other forms of life are given foundational legal importance, would help to restore conceptual coherence and normative priority to the subjects of environmental law.

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A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis

University of Pennsylvania Law Review ◽

10.2307/3312942 ◽

2002 ◽

Vol 150 (5) ◽

pp. 1343 ◽

Cited By ~ 12

Author(s):

Jason Scott Johnston

Keyword(s):

Cost Benefit Analysis ◽

Cost Benefit ◽

Benefit Analysis ◽

Theoretic Analysis ◽

Game Theoretic Analysis ◽

Regulatory Cost ◽

Game Theoretic ◽

Alternative Institutions

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Misuse of Institutions: Its Causes and Consequences

Voprosy Ekonomiki ◽

10.32609/0042-8736-2008-8-28-44 ◽

2008 ◽

pp. 28-44 ◽

Cited By ~ 7

Author(s):

L. Polishchuk

Keyword(s):

Collective Action ◽

Cost Benefit Analysis ◽

Cost Benefit ◽

Political Elites ◽

Benefit Analysis ◽

Rent Extraction ◽

Market Institutions ◽

Collective Action Problems ◽

Insight Into

Institutions are often misused, i. e. applied or resorted to for reasons which have little in common with their intended or anticipated purpose. The aim of the present paper is to get a further insight into the origins and causes of institutional misuse. A typology and cost-benefit analysis of misuse of institutions are presented and illustrated by examples largely drawn from Russian realities. Causes of vulnerability of institution to misuse are discussed. It is argued that institutions are not protected from misuse at the grassroots due to unresolved collective action problems, whereas economic and political elites are either indifferent to misuse of institutions or perpetrate such misuse by subverting market institutions for the purpose of rent extraction.

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