Essays on Consumer Welfare and Competition Policy

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory J. Werden
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Consumer Welfare

Theory in closer contact with industrial life: American institutional economists on competition theory and policy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Matthew T. Panhans ◽  
Reinhard Schumacher
Keyword(s):  
20Th Century ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Self Regulation ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Mainstream Economic ◽  
Competition Theory ◽  
One Stage ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Experimental Attitude

Abstract This paper investigates the views on competition theory and policy of the American institutional economists during the first half of the 20th century. These perspectives contrasted with those of contemporary neoclassical and later mainstream economic approaches. We identify three distinct dimensions to an institutionalist perspective on competition. First, institutionalist approaches focused on describing industry details, so as to bring theory into closer contact with reality. Second, institutionalists emphasized that while competition was sometimes beneficial, it could also be disruptive. Third, institutionalists had a broad view of the objectives of competition policy that extended beyond effects on consumer welfare. Consequently, institutionalists advocated for a wide range of policies to enhance competition, including industrial self-regulation, broad stakeholder representation within corporations, and direct governmental regulations. Their experimental attitude implied that policy would always be evolving, and antitrust enforcement might be only one stage in the development toward a regime of industrial regulation.

scholarly journals Designing Competition Policy for Telecommunications

2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Glen O. Robinson ◽  
Dennis L. Weisman
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Dynamic Efficiency ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Competitive Outcome ◽  
Static Efficiency ◽  
Competitive Process ◽  
Welfare Losses ◽  
Network Sharing

This paper explores the role of the essential facilities doctrine in circumscribing the scope of network sharing obligations in telecommunications. Among other things it argues that a proper application of the doctrine of essential facilities should recognize the prominence of dynamic over static efficiency in promoting consumer welfare. Regulators may be averse to recognizing these tradeoffs because unlike the behavior of prices the welfare losses from foregone innovation may be unobservable to the regulators' constituency. Moreover, an emphasis on dynamic efficiency requires the short-term regulator to take the "long view" – fostering the competitive process rather than emulating the competitive outcome.

scholarly journals Agency Insight from Portugal’s Autoridade da Concorrência

2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 233-238
Author(s):  
Margarida Matos Rosa
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Industrial Policy ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The Eu

Abstract 2020 will be a landmark year for reasons that had not been anticipated. But it is also a critical year for the implementation, by national legislators in the European Union, of the ECN+ Directive. This will grant competition agencies stronger means of enforcement and will consecrate independence of enforcement decisions based on the pursuit of consumer welfare protection. Another developing topic in 2020 is industrial policy in the EU and its coexistence with competition policy. While the EU needs to remain pragmatic, it need not — must not, I would argue - lose its distinctive economic features.

Antitrust as Public Interest Law: Redistribution, Equity, and Social Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-101
Author(s):  
Dina I. Waked
Keyword(s):  
Public Interest ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Private Property ◽  
Allocative Efficiency ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
The Public ◽  
Public Interest Law ◽  
Antitrust Laws ◽  
History Of ◽  
Do So

This article proposes the use of antitrust law to reduce poverty and address inequality. It argues that the antitrust laws are sufficiently malleable to achieve such goals. The current focus of antitrust on the efficiency-only goals does not only lead to increasing inequality further but is also inconsistent with the history of antitrust. This history is presented through the lens of the public interest that emerges into the balance between private property and competition policy. Tracing the public interest at different historical moments, we get to see how it has been broad enough to encompass social welfare concerns. Over time, the public interest concern of antitrust was narrowed to exclusively cover consumer welfare and its allocative efficiency. Once we frame antitrust as public interest law, in its broadest sense, we are empowered to use it to address inequality. A proposal to do so is exposed in this article.

Competition Policy and Consumer Welfare in a Liberalised Economy

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Dr. Faizanur Rahman ◽  
Dr. Musheer Ahmed
Keyword(s):  
Consumer Protection ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Paper Analysis ◽  
Business Community ◽  
Consumer Policy ◽  
Business Practices ◽  
Protection Policy ◽  
Policy Objectives ◽  
The Common

The discourse on competition policy often uses the term 'consumer welfare' but rarely is clear about its meaning or role. Promotion of consumer welfare is the common goal of consumer protection and competition policy. As India's economies move progressively towards increased liberalisation, certain undesirable business practices can emerge which act as a hindrance to development and economic growth. The absence of a competition and consumer protection policy in India has created opportunities for some sectors of the business community to engage in unfair business practices viz., price fixing, speculative hoarding and collusive tendering. Competition policy and consumer policy reinforce one another. In markets that are effectively competitive, producers have internal incentives to further consumer policy objectives, for example, to develop a relationship for quality or to attract customers away from rivals by providing the necessary information to minimise switching costs. At the same time, when consumers are able to exercise their choices effectively, they can act as a competitive discipline upon producers. Thus, there is a strong case to be made for the co-ordination of these two policy areas. In the light of India's commitment to a liberalised economy, there is a need for a fair and equitable environment where producer and consumer can maximise their profit and satisfaction respectively. There is therefore a need for India's Competition and Consumer Protection policy if market oriented policies are to be given the best possible chance of success. In the backdrop of this, it is therefore imperative for India to develop this Policy ensuring the supporting legislation, infrastructure and regulations. In this context, the present paper analysis the standard of consumer welfare required to be taken into consideration while dealing with competition issues, and to what extent is protection accorded to consumers under other legislations.

scholarly journals Innovating Big Tech firms and competition policy: favoring dynamic over static competition

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Petit ◽  
David J Teece
Keyword(s):  
Competition Policy ◽  
Dynamic Capabilities ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Use Of Data ◽  
Entrepreneurial Management ◽  
Resource Orchestration ◽  
Competition Process ◽  
Monopoly Rents ◽  
Sophisticated Version

Abstract This paper gives a fresh account of competition in the digital economy. Economic analysis in the field of industrial organization remains largely focused on a sophisticated version of the Schumpeter–Arrow debate, which is unresolved and largely irrelevant. We posit the need to look at competition anew. Static models of monopoly firms and markets in equilibrium are often used to characterize Big Tech firms’ size and scope. We suggest that this characterization is inappropriate because the growth and diversification of many digital firms lead to a situation of broad-spectrum competition that cuts across markets. Current market positions do not reflect entrenched monopoly power but are vulnerable to competitive pressure of disequilibrating forces arising from the use of data-driven operating models, astute resource orchestration, and the exercise of dynamic capabilities. A few strategic errors by management in the handling of internal transitions and/or external challenges and they could be competitively impaired. The implications of a more dynamic understanding of the competition process in the tech sector are explored. We consider how big data and entrepreneurial management impacts firm performance. We also explore the nature of different types of rents (Schumpeterian, Ricardian, and monopoly rents) and suggest a modified long-term consumer welfare standard for competition policy. We formulate preliminary tests and predictors to assess dynamic competition. Our perspective advances a policy stance that favors innovation.

scholarly journals A view on the treatment of collusive and restrictive practices in competition policy

1998 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 8-35
Author(s):  
W. D. Reekie
Keyword(s):  
South African ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Fee For Service ◽  
Department Of Health ◽  
Uniform Pricing ◽  
National Drug ◽  
National Drug Policy ◽  
Prescription Medicines ◽  
The Right

South African competition policy is in a state of flux. While professing to serve so-called national interest, legislation has tended to overlook the principles of economic efficiency and consumer welfare. The South African National Drug policy is a case in point. The best defence against collusion and restrictive practices in business is competition, but the Department of Health favours blanket rules like uniform pricing and a fixed fee-for-service.  Thus supermarkets may not employ dispensing pharmacists, and uniform price legislation would make it illegal to negotiate discounts on prescription medicines with retailers.  As a rule consumers are the losers.  Many fallacies are contained in the debate on the "right" competition policy for South Africa. For example, a firm may appear big simply because the domestic market is small.

1. Competition policy and economics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial for consumer welfare. Section 4 considers the expected functions of a system of competition law. Section 5 then introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document