Politically Connected Boards and the Structure of CEO Compensation Packages in Taiwanese Firms

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hsin-Yi Yu
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Compensation Packages

scholarly journals CEO Compensation in the U.S.: Are CEOs Underpaid or Overpaid ?

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 78
Author(s):  
Phillip James ◽  
Il-woon Kim
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Regression Models ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Time Period ◽  
Multiple Regression Models ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Compensation Packages

This study investigates the adequacy of CEO compensation from the perspective of using accounting measures to assess the performance of CEOs. The main objective of this research is to determine to what extent compensation packages received by American CEOs represent an underpayment of CEOs based on the performance of their firms when firm performance is defined in terms of accounting measures. CEO compensation data are obtained from Compustat, 10K SEC filings, and Forbes listing of CEO data.  The analysis covers a two-phased time period i.e., before and after the financial crisis in the USA. CEO compensation data are analyzed for the years 2004, 2005, 2006, and 2007 (pre-financial crisis) and for years 2009 to 2013 (post financial crisis). Multiple regression models consisting of six accounting performance measures are used to perform the analysis to determine the extent of CEO underpayment or overpayment. Having examined 1151 CEO compensation packages to determine if CEO underpayment exist in light of what is an overwhelming literature supporting CEO overpayment, the results show that 67.33% of the CEOs were in fact underpaid based on their firms performance, and only 32.67% (376 CEOs) were overpaid based on firm performance.

scholarly journals How to control the controller – CEO compensation and motivation

2013 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-31 ◽  
Author(s):  
Udo C. Braendle ◽  
John E. Katsos
Keyword(s):  
Stock Options ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Pay For Performance ◽  
Control Mechanisms ◽  
Senior Managers ◽  
Extrinsic Motivators ◽  
Compensation Packages ◽  
The Right ◽  
Intrinsic Motivators

One of the main control mechanisms that shareholders have used to rein in rogue managers is compensation. Through a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic incentives, shareholders have tried to provide the right balance to motivate senior managers to perform at their best. Shareholders have often failed in achieving this balance through compensation. In this paper, we argue that this failure is not the result of compensation packages as such, but on the focus of compensation packages on extrinsic motivators such as pay-for-performance bonuses and stock options. Instead, the focus of compensation packages should be on cultivating intrinsic motivators such as firing and prestige.

CEO Turnover and Compensation: An Empirical Investigation

2014 ◽  
Vol 04 (02) ◽  
pp. 1450008
Author(s):  
Rachel Graefe-Anderson
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
The United States ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Ongoing Debate ◽  
Public Companies ◽  
Ceo Tenure ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Primary Determinant ◽  
Compensation Packages

Because CEO turnover events provide the board of directors with a unique opportunity to potentially completely restructure CEO compensation packages, changes to CEO compensation following a turnover event could prove to inform the ongoing debate regarding CEO compensation. This paper investigates what happens to CEO compensation when a turnover event occurs. Specifically, I examine CEO compensation levels and pay-performance sensitivity for incoming and outgoing CEOs involved in turnover events at public companies in the United States. My main findings are as follows: (1) incoming CEOs are paid as much as or more than those they replace, (2) outsider replacements are paid more than their predecessors even after controlling for education and skills, and (3) CEOs who are forced out are not paid differently from those who replace them, while CEOs who leave voluntarily are paid significantly less than their replacements. Further analysis reveals that proxies for managerial power including CEO tenure, CEO centrality, founder status, and high CEO ownership cannot explain these results. Overall, these findings are difficult to reconcile with the view that managerial power is the primary determinant of CEO compensation.

scholarly journals Re-examination of connectivity between CEO compensation and tenure at the helm and firm performance

2010 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 347-364
Author(s):  
Samuel Bulmash
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Performance ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Compensation Package ◽  
Asset Bubble ◽  
Compensation Packages ◽  
Statistical Relationships ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Short Time ◽  
The Relationship

This paper presents empirical evidence related to a CEO’s tenure, compensation, and performance. It reviews some generally accepted assumptions that have driven the rationale for CEO compensation packages, performance, and monitoring by the boards in charge of corporate governance. The empirical results of this paper provide only partial support for the underpinning basis of many of the compensation and corporate governance packages in today’s corporate world. The paper uses data that was available to management and shareholders prior to the onset of the asset bubble that imploded during 2007-2009 period, and shows that there was already by then room for concern. The empirical findings presented here suggest that there is a mild positive relation between improvement in firm performance and the compensation package but even this is more evident in firms where the CEO service has a longer tenure compared to firms with a shorter tenure serving CEO. The results also support the findings from earlier studies that it is desirable to have an incentive scheme contingent on future returns, not only on the short time horizon. The findings presented here also confirm that CEOs who have passed the “early probation” test of time and skills and gained time to develop experience to lead the firm and its business have a stronger relationship between compensation and firm performance. However, the relatively low statistical relationships between compensation and firm performance for the whole sample overall leave room for concerns about the limited extent of their effectiveness. This paper also raises indirectly also concerns that the theoretical motivations of some compensation packages and the actual practices in the real world were not well aligned despite the large number of studies and efforts aimed at improving the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance.

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

The Role And Effect Of Remuneration Consultants On CEO Compensation : Evidence Horn The UK Companic

2018 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
مريع سعد الهباش ◽  
صالح علي فراج العقلا
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
The Uk

CEO Deal-Making Activity, CEO Compensation and Firm Value

2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eliezer M. Fich ◽  
Laura T. Starks ◽  
Adam S. Yore
Keyword(s):  
Firm Value ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Deal Making
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