scholarly journals Labor Supply Effects of the Interaction between the Social Security Disability and Retirement Programs at Full Retirement Age

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicole Maestas ◽  
Na Yin
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Retirement Age ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Security Disability

scholarly journals The Postretirement Well-Being of Workers With Disabilities

2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
April Yanyuan Wu ◽  
Jody Schimmel Hyde
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Older Workers ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Vulnerable Groups ◽  
Retirement Age ◽  
Social Security Administration ◽  
Retirement Benefits ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Security Disability ◽  
Better Than

Older workers who develop significant limitations in health or functioning face declines in income and consumption and an increased likelihood of poverty in the years prior to retirement. We assess the extent to which those differences persist after reaching retirement age. We use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) linked to Social Security Administration (SSA) records to compare the postretirement financial well-being of workers who experienced disability onset during their working years with those who did not, based on their claiming behavior for Social Security disability and retirement benefits. We find that even after full retirement age, gaps that emerged prior to retirement persist; those who experienced disability prior to retirement had lower incomes, were more likely to be in poverty, and had significantly lower wealth. Workers with disabilities who claimed Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) fared better than those who were rejected for such benefits, yet both groups were worse off than those who delayed claiming benefits until they were eligible for Social Security Old Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) benefits. Our findings indicate that any changes to the Social Security benefit structure must be mindful of the short- and longer term implications for already-vulnerable groups of workers.

Differential mortality, aging and social security: delaying the retirement age when educational spillovers matter

2016 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 395-418 ◽  
Author(s):  
GILLES LE GARREC ◽  
STÉPHANE LHUISSIER
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Population Aging ◽  
Spillover Effects ◽  
Economic Incentives ◽  
Differential Mortality ◽  
Retirement Age ◽  
Industrialized Countries ◽  
The Social ◽  
Unskilled Workers ◽  
The Postponement

AbstractTo lower the forecasted increase in the social security burden linked to population aging, delaying the legal age of retirement has been privileged throughout industrialized countries. Compared with a uniform delay, some argue that those who have entered precociously the labor market should be allowed to retire earlier. They assert that such a ‘long career’ exception is all the more justified that those unskilled workers live also less long due to heavier and potentially health-damaging jobs. In this paper, we then study macroeconomic and distributional consequences of global gain in life expectancy, with or without the postponement of the legal age of retirement and with or without a ‘long career’ exception. By considering a framework where individuals decide to acquire skills depending on economic incentives and differential mortality, we focus particularly on spillover effects possibly generated by education. We show in particular that introducing a ‘long career’ exception cannot be to the advantage of future unskilled workers unless education yields no spillover effects.

scholarly journals Work incentives in the Social Security Disability benefit formula

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 165-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
GOPI SHAH GODA ◽  
JOHN B. SHOVEN ◽  
SITA NATARAJ SLAVOV
Keyword(s):  
Social Security ◽  
Older Workers ◽  
Extensive Margin ◽  
Disability Benefit ◽  
Payroll Tax ◽  
Payroll Taxes ◽  
The Social ◽  
Social Security Disability ◽  
Work Disincentives ◽  
Different Levels

AbstractWe examine the connection between taxes paid and benefits accrued under the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program on both the intensive and extensive margins. We perform these calculations for stylized workers given the existing benefit structure and disability hazard rates. On the intensive margin, we examine the effect of an additional dollar of earnings on the marginal payroll taxes contributed and future benefits earned. We find that the present discounted value of disability benefits received from an additional dollar of earnings, net of the SSDI payroll tax, generally declines with age, becoming negative around age 40 and reaching almost zero at age 63. On the extensive margin, we determine the effect of working an additional year on the additional payroll taxes and future benefits as a percentage of income. The return to working an additional year at an income level just large enough to earn Social Security credits for the year is large and positive through age 60. However, the return to working an additional full year is substantially smaller and becomes negative at approximately age 57. Thus, older workers face strong incentives to earn enough to obtain creditable coverage through age 60, but they face disincentives for additional earnings. In addition, workers aged 61 and older face work disincentives at any level of earnings. We repeat this analysis for stylized workers at different levels of earnings and find that, while the program transfers resources from high earners to low earners, the workers experience similar patterns in the returns to working.

Social Security Disability Application Experiences of People With Multiple Sclerosis in the United States

2007 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 131-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa I. Iezzoni ◽  
Long Ngo ◽  
R. Philip Kinkel
Keyword(s):  
Multiple Sclerosis ◽  
Social Security ◽  
Disability Insurance ◽  
The United States ◽  
Legal Assistance ◽  
Income Support ◽  
Social Security Administration ◽  
The Social ◽  
Working Age ◽  
Social Security Disability

Studies suggest that more than half of working-age Americans with multiple sclerosis (MS) are unemployed because of their health. Many turn to public disability insurance for income support, applying through the Social Security Administration for either Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), which provides benefits to formerly employed people, or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), which supports impoverished individuals. Anecdotal reports suggest that many patients with MS face considerable problems when applying for federal disability benefits. To gather more systematic information about these experiences, we surveyed 983 working-age people with MS nationwide from May through November 2005. Most (60.2%) were unemployed; 36.4% had federal disability insurance, with 27.8% having SSDI alone. Almost one third (31.3%) had their initial SSDI application denied, and 31.9% used legal assistance when applying for this benefit. Although the time elapsed between SSDI application and approval was <12 months for 60.4% of applicants, 12–23 months passed for 19.8% and 24+ months for another 19.8%. Among people without SSDI, 15.4% had applied for this benefit at some time. Failure to meet disability criteria caused 60.3% of rejections, and inadequate documentation contributed to 32.1%. Neurologists must fully document the breadth of MS-related impairments in their patients' disability applications.

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