Related Party Transactions: Legal Strategies and Associations with Corporate Governance and Firm Value in Brazil

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira ◽  
Viviane Muller Prado ◽  
Rafael de Campos Sasso
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Related Party Transactions ◽  
Legal Strategies

scholarly journals The moderating role of audit quality and firm size in the effect of corporate governance on related party transactions: Evidence from Indonesia

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 166-176
Author(s):  
Perdana Wahyu Santosa ◽  
Sovi Ismawati Rahayu ◽  
Zainal Zawir Simon ◽  
Martua Eliakim Tambunan
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Size ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Information Quality ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Transfer Pricing ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Related Party Transactions

This study aims to analyze the essential corporate governance determinants of related party transactions (RPTs) in Indonesia. Based on a hand-collected sample of three business groups of small, medium, and large-cap publicly listed firms on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for 2013–2019, panel regression results find that foreign shareholders and firm size have a significant effect, at –2.402 and 0.248, respectively. The moderating model of audit quality shows that domestic shareholders, foreign shareholders, and firm size are significantly negatively associated, with –5.627 and –5.958 at 5%, respectively. Similar results show that foreign shareholders and independent commissioners significantly negatively affect related party transactions at –2.864 and –1.845, moderating the firm size at 10% and 5%, respectively. The moderation of regression results also indicates that audit quality and firm size tend to strengthen negative effects on the association between related party transactions and corporate governance. The moderation interaction confirms that audit quality will determine that domestic and foreign shareholders tend to increase the number of affiliate transactions. The interaction of complete information quality will force domestic and foreign shareholders to increase the role of affiliate transactions in creating firm value. The larger size of the firm, which is owned by foreign shareholders, will increase the intensity of cross-border related party transactions through the combined effects in the context of internationalization with a tendency of expropriation and transfer pricing practices, which can reduce government tax incomes. Acknowledgment We are grateful to the Ministry of Education, Culture, Research and Technology, Indonesia, for research grant No. 163/E4.1/AK.04.PT/2021, as well as the editor of the Investment Management and Financial Innovations journal, peer reviewers, and some colleagues for their suggestions, criticism and comments that significantly improved this paper.

Independent Directors' Tenure, Expropriation, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Value

2022 ◽  
pp. 369-394
Author(s):  
Chee Yoong Liew ◽  
S. Susela Devi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Moderating Effect ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Related Party Transactions ◽  
Financial Valuation ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter analyses the relationship between related party transactions (RPT) and firm value and whether independent directors' tenure (IDT) strengthens or weakens this relationship. Further, it examines ownership concentration's role on this moderating effect of IDT in Malaysian family and non-family corporations. It is found that that IDT weakens the relationship between RPT and firm value. However, ownership concentration strengthens this moderating effect of IDT. Interestingly, family corporations are more likely to show a stronger impact of ownership concentration which we allude to concerns of maintaining reputation. The research results remain after controlling for technology corporations. The findings' have important implications for policy makers, practitioners and regulators, especially in emerging economies globally.Keywords: Agency Conflict, Corporate Financial Valuation, Independent Directors' Term in the Office, Corporate Governance, Family Corporations, Emerging Markets

Corporate governance and detrimental related party transactions

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 196-227
Author(s):  
Masood Fooladi ◽  
Maryam Farhadi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Social Implications ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Conflict Of Interests ◽  
Related Party Transactions ◽  
Distinct Effect ◽  
Opportunistic Behaviour ◽  
Practical Implications

PurposePrior studies suggest that most expropriation of firm’s resources is conducted through related party transactions (RPTs). Based on the conflict of interest view, related parties opportunistically use their authorities to expropriate firms’ resources for their own benefits via RPTs subsequently increasing agency costs and reduce firm value. One important monitoring system suggested by agency theory to reduce the agency problem is corporate governance (CG). CG monitors firm’s performance to align the interests of those who control and those who own the residual claims in a firm. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the moderating effect of CG characteristics on the relationship between RPTs and firm value.Design/methodology/approachIn order to clarify the distinct effect of RPTs, this study categorises RPTs into two groups including beneficial and detrimental RPTs (DRPTs). Applying “proportionate stratified random sampling”, this study covers a panel of 271 firms listed on Bursa Malaysia over the period of 2009–2011, using a moderated multiple regression model.FindingsThis study documents that firm value is positively associated with beneficial RPTs (BRPTs) and negatively related to detrimental RPTs (DRPTs). In addition, results show that divergence can intensify the negative relationship between DRPTs and firm value. Findings support the necessity for more scrutiny by regulators, policy makers and standard setters to monitor the conflict of interests in RPTs and restrain the power of related parties to protect the firm’s wealth by introducing stricter regulations for RPTs and improve CG practices especially to monitor RPTs in order to limit the opportunistic behaviour of related parties.Research limitations/implicationsResearch implications have been presented in Section 10. It has also been summarised in practical implications and social implications sections.Practical implicationsThe findings of this study indicate that investors, creditors and policy makers should not consider all RPTs as harmful transactions and it seems necessary to categorise RPTs into different groups including transactions which are detrimental and transactions which are beneficial to the firm.Social implicationsThe findings of this study support the necessity for more scrutiny by regulators, policy makers and standard setters to monitor the conflict of interests in RPTs. They should restrain the power of related parties to protect the firm’s wealth by introducing stricter regulations for RPTs and improving CG practices especially to monitor RPTs in order to limit the opportunistic behaviour of related parties.Originality/valueThis study contributes to the RPTs literature by showing that the effect of RPTs on firm value depends on the types of RPTs, and market participants allocate different values to different types of RPTs. Therefore, to fill the gap and clarify the distinct effect of RPTs, this study categorizes RPTs into two groups including beneficial and detrimental RPTs.

Independent Directors' Tenure, Expropriation, Related Party Transactions, and Firm Value

2020 ◽  
pp. 182-207
Author(s):  
Chee Yoong Liew ◽  
S. Susela Devi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Moderating Effect ◽  
Ownership Concentration ◽  
Independent Directors ◽  
Policy Makers ◽  
Related Party Transactions ◽  
Financial Valuation ◽  
Agency Conflict ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter analyses the relationship between related party transactions (RPT) and firm value and whether independent directors' tenure (IDT) strengthens or weakens this relationship. Further, it examines ownership concentration's role on this moderating effect of IDT in Malaysian family and non-family corporations. It is found that that IDT weakens the relationship between RPT and firm value. However, ownership concentration strengthens this moderating effect of IDT. Interestingly, family corporations are more likely to show a stronger impact of ownership concentration which we allude to concerns of maintaining reputation. The research results remain after controlling for technology corporations. The findings' have important implications for policy makers, practitioners and regulators, especially in emerging economies globally.Keywords: Agency Conflict, Corporate Financial Valuation, Independent Directors' Term in the Office, Corporate Governance, Family Corporations, Emerging Markets

Pengaruh Kinerja Keuangan dan Good Corporate Governance (GCG) Terhadap Nilai Perusahaan

MBIA ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Rolia Wahasusmiah
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Sampling Method ◽  
Total Population ◽  
Annual Report ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Good Corporate Governance

This study aims to determine the effect of financial performance and good corporate governance (GCG) on the value of companies in manufacturing companies listed on the stock exchange Indonesia. The type of data used is secondary data in the form of annual report 2016. Population used in this study are all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI). This research uses purposive sampling method with total population of 144 companies and sample of 31 companies. The results show that simultaneously ROA, OPM, NPM, KM, and KI have a positive influence on firm value. While partially ROA  have a positive influence on firm value. While OPM, NPM, KM, and KI have no positive influence on firm value).

Corporate Governance, Board Diversity, and Firm Value

CFA Digest ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 22-23
Author(s):  
Spencer L. Klein
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Board Diversity
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