Fiscal Federalism: A Return to Theory and Measurement

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Sorens
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Federalism

Tax competition and the activity of the regional tax policy

2020 ◽  
pp. 5-27
Author(s):  
S. M. Drobyshevsky ◽  
N. S. Kostrykina ◽  
A. V. Korytin
Keyword(s):  
Tax Competition ◽  
Tax Policy ◽  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Policy Instruments ◽  
Tax Incentives ◽  
Fiscal Autonomy ◽  
Tax Legislation ◽  
Tax Exemptions ◽  
Open Question ◽  
Regional Budgets

The problem of efficiency of regional tax expenditures is an actual issue of the fiscal policy and fiscal federalism in Russia. A large fiscal autonomy allows federal subjects to realize a more active tax policy to attract new investments. One cannot claim current fiscal powers of the Russian regions to be wide. However, not all the regions use even existing tax policy instruments. Moreover, out of the regions that use them only few provide incentives to stimulate investment decisions. Others use regional tax measures to support businesses that already have strong positions in the region. And it is an open question whether such tax incentives are efficient. On the other hand, an aggressive tax competition for investors can also be wasteful for regional budgets. In this paper, we calculate indicators that characterize the depth and scope of tax exemptions provided at the regional level. The calculations are based on the open tax statistics. Through the analysis of the tax legislation as well as the economic structure of selected regions, we reveal the inducements of their higher activity: federal regional tax policy, tax competition or benefits for budget-forming companies of the region.

scholarly journals Empirical Fiscal Federalism

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Federico Revelli ◽  
Emanuele Bracco
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Federalism

A CABINET MEMBER'S VIEWPOINT ON FISCAL FEDERALISM

1971 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-306
Author(s):  
JOHN B. CONNALLY
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Federalism

Harmonization and Side Payments in Political Cooperation

2007 ◽  
Vol 97 (3) ◽  
pp. 871-889 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bård Harstad
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Fiscal Federalism ◽  
Theoretical Foundation ◽  
Bargaining Game ◽  
Local Conditions ◽  
Side Payments ◽  
Political Cooperation ◽  
Political Centralization ◽  
Decentralized Cooperation

For two districts or countries that try to internalize externalities, I analyze a bargaining game under private information. I derive conditions for when it is efficient with uniform policies across regions—with and without side payments—and when it is efficient to prohibit side payments in the negotiations. While policy differentiation and side payments allow the policy to better reflect local conditions, they create conflicts between the regions and, thus, delay. The results also describe when political centralization outperforms decentralized cooperation, and they provide a theoretical foundation for the controversial “uniformity assumption” traditionally used by the fiscal federalism literature. (JEL C78, D72, D82, H77)

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