scholarly journals The Interplay between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures: A Two-Stage Game

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Subhayu Bandyopadhyay ◽  
Todd M. Sandler
Keyword(s):  
Two Stage ◽  
Stage Game

scholarly journals Spillovers and R&D Incentive under Incomplete Information

2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 50-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rittwik Chatterjee ◽  
Srobonti Chattopadhyay ◽  
Tarun Kabiraj
Keyword(s):  
Distribution Function ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Complete Information ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
General Distribution ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Alternative Scenarios

Spillovers of R&D outcome affect the R&D decision of a firm. The present paper discusses the R&D incentives of a firm when the extent of R&D spillover is private information to each firm. We construct a two-stage game involving two firms when the firms first decide simultaneously whether to invest in R&D or not, then they compete in quantity. Assuming general distribution function of firm types we compare R&D incentives of firms under alternative scenarios based on different informational structures. The paper shows that while R&D spillovers reduce R&D incentives under complete information unambiguously, however, it can be larger under incomplete information. JEL Classification: D43, D82, L13, O31

On the Application of Uncertain Three-player Two-stage Game to the Competition among Shipping Alliances

2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Xiangfeng Yang ◽  
Kyoung Hoon Choi ◽  
Thi Minh Hoang Do ◽  
Gyei Kark Park
Keyword(s):  
Two Stage ◽  
Stage Game

scholarly journals The Two-Stage Game Approach to Coalition Formation: Where We Stand and Ways to Go

Games ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 3 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achim Hagen ◽  
Pierre von Mouche ◽  
Hans-Peter Weikard
Keyword(s):  
Public Good ◽  
Coalition Formation ◽  
Qualitative Properties ◽  
Research Strategies ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Second Stage ◽  
Coalition Structures ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Theoretical Results

Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used approach for the case where actions are simultaneous in each stage. Herein, we give special attention to the case of a symmetric physical game. Various theoretical results, in particular, for cartel games, are provided. As they are crucial, recent results on the uniqueness of coalitional equilibria of Cournot-like physical games are reconsidered. Various concrete examples are included. Finally, we discuss research strategies to obtain results about equilibrium coalition structures with abstract physical games in terms of qualitative properties of their primitives.

The Designation of Quality and Price Based on Vertical Product Differentiation

2011 ◽  
Vol 474-476 ◽  
pp. 2325-2328
Author(s):  
Ying Sheng Su ◽  
Jian Fu Li ◽  
Jiang Wu ◽  
Peng Fei Ji
Keyword(s):  
Product Differentiation ◽  
Perfect Information ◽  
Fixed Cost ◽  
Vertical Product Differentiation ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Game Analysis ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Consumer Demands ◽  
New Entrants

Different consumer demands different quality, which determines that existence of different quality of the same product is reasonable. The article uses two-stage game of fully non-perfect information. Through two-stage game analysis, the article concludes that whether new entrants should enter the market is not only related with the fixed cost of entry, the number of consumers and the highest taste of consumers, but also related to the quality choices of incumbents; after entrants enter the market, the choices of quality are decided by the quality choices of incumbents.

Two-Stage Game Strategy for Multiclass Imbalanced Data Online Prediction

2020 ◽  
Vol 52 (3) ◽  
pp. 2493-2512
Author(s):  
Haiyang Yu ◽  
Chunyi Chen ◽  
Huamin Yang
Keyword(s):  
Imbalanced Data ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Online Prediction ◽  
Stage Game

scholarly journals The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures: A Two-stage Game

Economica ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 78 (311) ◽  
pp. 546-564 ◽  
Author(s):  
SUBHAYU BANDYOPADHYAY ◽  
TODD SANDLER
Keyword(s):  
Two Stage ◽  
Stage Game

Strategy on Energy Capacity Control

2012 ◽  
Vol 512-515 ◽  
pp. 1227-1230
Author(s):  
Miao Sheng Chen ◽  
Yung Tse Tsai
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Game Theory ◽  
Energy Market ◽  
Excess Capacity ◽  
Energy Capacity ◽  
Capacity Control ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Optimal Cost ◽  
The Past ◽  
Stage Game

In the past, energy authorities attempted to prevent potential entrants from participating in the energy market. This study posits that this two-stage game theory is insufficient to describe the modern-day situation. Ware (1984) modified the Dixit (1980) model to develop a three-stage game structure. We use this mathematical model to analyze the optimal cost of an energy authority and the strategy of excess capacity.

The Impact of Ideology on Disinvestment Decisions of a Coalition

2016 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 821-849
Author(s):  
Ritika Jain ◽  
Shubhro Sarkar
Keyword(s):  
The State ◽  
Theoretic Model ◽  
Two Stage ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Stage Game ◽  
Game Theoretic Model ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Ideological Difference

We build a two-stage game theoretic model to capture the effect of ideologies of parties in a coalition on disinvestment decisions. We focus on three specific aspects of ideology—ideology score of the coalition, ideology dispersion of the coalition, and ideology difference between the center and the state where the enterprise is located. The benchmark two-party coalition predicts that a left government prefers less disinvestment than a right one more often than not. However, there may be a case where moving toward the left end of the ideology spectrum may raise disinvestment incidence. Similarly, a coalition with ideologically similar parties favors privatization more frequently than one in which parties are more diverse. However, for a narrow parametric range, the effect may be reversed. Low ideological difference between the center and the state in which the enterprise is located improves disinvestment incidence. Finally, we extend the model to three-party coalitions.

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