Analysts, Institutional Investors, and Managers' Trade-Off between Earnings and Expectations Management

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhu Liu
2016 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 379
Author(s):  
Seoungpil Ahn ◽  
Gwangheon Hong

The negative relation between governance indices and acquisition performance weakens in the post Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. We examine whether firms remove anti-takeover provisions to eliminate the adverse impact of anti-takeover provisions. We find that strong external monitoring mechanisms such as the presence of public pension funds and large institutional investors leads firms to abolish some anti-takeover provisions and classified boards in particular. This partial elimination of anti-takeover provisions suggests a trade-off between benefit and cost of anti-takeover provisions.


2014 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 529-559 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred Zhu Liu

SYNOPSIS This study examines whether financial analysts and institutional investors play a disciplinary role in monitoring corporate financial reporting and disclosure. Using a sample of firms that meet or marginally beat analysts' forecasts, likely through upward earnings management and downward expectations management, this study shows that managers' use of the two tactics is associated with monitoring measures, including analyst following, analyst experience and independence, institutional ownership, and institutional investors' experience and investment style. Managers under more effective monitoring by analysts and institutional investors are more likely to manage expectations downward than to manage earnings upward. Overall, the findings are consistent with financial analysts and institutional investors playing a monitoring role in constraining distortions in reported earnings and inducing timely disclosure of bad news. Data Availability: All data are from public sources.


1982 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suleyman Tufekci
Keyword(s):  

2012 ◽  
Vol 11 (3) ◽  
pp. 118-126 ◽  
Author(s):  
Olive Emil Wetter ◽  
Jürgen Wegge ◽  
Klaus Jonas ◽  
Klaus-Helmut Schmidt

In most work contexts, several performance goals coexist, and conflicts between them and trade-offs can occur. Our paper is the first to contrast a dual goal for speed and accuracy with a single goal for speed on the same task. The Sternberg paradigm (Experiment 1, n = 57) and the d2 test (Experiment 2, n = 19) were used as performance tasks. Speed measures and errors revealed in both experiments that dual as well as single goals increase performance by enhancing memory scanning. However, the single speed goal triggered a speed-accuracy trade-off, favoring speed over accuracy, whereas this was not the case with the dual goal. In difficult trials, dual goals slowed down scanning processes again so that errors could be prevented. This new finding is particularly relevant for security domains, where both aspects have to be managed simultaneously.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document