The Value of a Good Reputation Online: An Application to Art Auctions

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
José J. Canals-Cerda
Keyword(s):  
Art Auctions ◽  
Good Reputation

Charity Art Auctions

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
José J. Canals-Cerda
Keyword(s):  
Art Auctions

Investigating Overbidders in Online Art Auctions Using a Bilinear Mixed Model

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mayukh Dass ◽  
Lynne Seymour ◽  
Srinivas K. Reddy
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Model ◽  
Art Auctions

scholarly journals Reviewing Stranger on the Internet: The Role of Identifiability through “Reputation” in Online Decision Making

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 110
Author(s):  
Mirko Duradoni ◽  
Stefania Collodi ◽  
Serena Coppolino Perfumi ◽  
Andrea Guazzini
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Ultimatum Game ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Self Disclosure ◽  
Quantitative Evidence ◽  
Web Technologies ◽  
Social Acts ◽  
Good Reputation ◽  
The Stranger

The stranger on the Internet effect has been studied in relation to self-disclosure. Nonetheless, quantitative evidence about how people mentally represent and perceive strangers online is still missing. Given the dynamic development of web technologies, quantifying how much strangers can be considered suitable for pro-social acts such as self-disclosure appears fundamental for a whole series of phenomena ranging from privacy protection to fake news spreading. Using a modified and online version of the Ultimatum Game (UG), we quantified the mental representation of the stranger on the Internet effect and tested if people modify their behaviors according to the interactors’ identifiability (i.e., reputation). A total of 444 adolescents took part in a 2 × 2 design experiment where reputation was set active or not for the two traditional UG tasks. We discovered that, when matched with strangers, people donate the same amount of money as if the other has a good reputation. Moreover, reputation significantly affected the donation size, the acceptance rate and the feedback decision making as well.

scholarly journals Developing and Applying a Selection Model for Corrugated Box Precision Printing Machine Suppliers

Mathematics ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 68
Author(s):  
Chin-Tsai Lin ◽  
Cheng-Yu Chiang
Keyword(s):  
Supplier Selection ◽  
Analytic Network Process ◽  
Selection Model ◽  
Selection Strategy ◽  
Modified Delphi ◽  
Commitment Cost ◽  
Network Process ◽  
High Investment ◽  
Good Reputation ◽  
Printing Machine

Corrugated box printing machines are precision equipment produced by markedly few manufacturers. They involve high investment cost and risk. Having a corrugated box precision printing machine (CBPPM) supplier with a good reputation enables a corrugated box manufacturer to maintain its competitive advantage. Accordingly, establishing an effective CBPPM supplier selection model is crucial for corrugated box manufacturers. This study established a two-stage CBPPM supplier selection model. The first stage involved the use of a modified Delphi method to construct a supplier selection hierarchy with five criteria and 14 subcriteria. In the second stage, an analytic network process was employed to calculate the weights of criteria and subcriteria and to determine the optimal supplier. According to the results, the five criteria in the model, in descending order of importance, are quality, commitment, cost, service attitude, and reputation. This model can provide insights for corrugated box manufacturers formulating their CBPPM supplier selection strategy.

scholarly journals Local stability of cooperation in a continuous model of indirect reciprocity

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sanghun Lee ◽  
Yohsuke Murase ◽  
Seung Ki Baek
Keyword(s):  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Continuous Model ◽  
Cost Ratio ◽  
Continuous Variables ◽  
Perturbative Calculation ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Benefit Cost Ratio ◽  
Good Reputation ◽  
Benefit Cost ◽  
Powerful Mechanism

AbstractReputation is a powerful mechanism to enforce cooperation among unrelated individuals through indirect reciprocity, but it suffers from disagreement originating from private assessment, noise, and incomplete information. In this work, we investigate stability of cooperation in the donation game by regarding each player’s reputation and behaviour as continuous variables. Through perturbative calculation, we derive a condition that a social norm should satisfy to give penalties to its close variants, provided that everyone initially cooperates with a good reputation, and this result is supported by numerical simulation. A crucial factor of the condition is whether a well-reputed player’s donation to an ill-reputed co-player is appreciated by other members of the society, and the condition can be reduced to a threshold for the benefit-cost ratio of cooperation which depends on the reputational sensitivity to a donor’s behaviour as well as on the behavioural sensitivity to a recipient’s reputation. Our continuum formulation suggests how indirect reciprocity can work beyond the dichotomy between good and bad even in the presence of inhomogeneity, noise, and incomplete information.

scholarly journals Dynamic modulation of social influence by indirect reciprocity

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua Zonca ◽  
Anna Folsø ◽  
Alessandra Sciutti
Keyword(s):  
Social Influence ◽  
Information Transmission ◽  
Social Group ◽  
Social Norm ◽  
Cooperative Behavior ◽  
Perceptual Task ◽  
Indirect Reciprocity ◽  
Dynamic Modulation ◽  
Human Partner ◽  
Good Reputation

AbstractIndirect reciprocity is a pervasive social norm that promotes human cooperation. Helping someone establishes a good reputation, increasing the probability of receiving help from others. Here we hypothesize that indirect reciprocity regulates not only cooperative behavior but also the exchange of opinions within a social group. In a novel interactive perceptual task (Experiment 1), we show that participants relied more on the judgments of an alleged human partner when a second alleged peer had been endorsing participants’ opinions. By doing so, participants did not take into account the reliability of their partners’ judgments and did not maximize behavioral accuracy and monetary reward. This effect declined when participants did not expect future interactions with their partners, suggesting the emergence of downstream mechanisms of reciprocity linked to the management of reputation. Importantly, all these effects disappeared when participants knew that the partners’ responses were computer-generated (Experiment 2). Our results suggest that, within a social group, individuals may weight others’ opinions through indirect reciprocity, highlighting the emergence of normative distortions in the process of information transmission among humans.

scholarly journals Variation and the response to variation as a basis for successful cooperation

2010 ◽  
Vol 365 (1553) ◽  
pp. 2627-2633 ◽  
Author(s):  
John M. McNamara ◽  
Olof Leimar
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Environmental Influences ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Trait Variation ◽  
Social Sensitivity ◽  
Good Reputation ◽  
Contingent Behaviour

In applying game theory to problems in biology, differences between individuals are often ignored. In particular, when analysing the evolution of cooperation it is often implicitly assumed that ignoring variation will produce predictions that approximate the solution when differences are included. This need not be true. As we demonstrate, differences are not innocuous noise, but can fundamentally change the nature of a game. Even small amounts of variability can stabilize cooperation by, for example, maintaining the need to deal with cheaters. Differences promote the need to learn about others in an interaction, leading to contingent behaviour that can reduce conflict, and to negotiated outcomes that may or may not be more cooperative than unconditional actions. Once there are mechanisms such as mutation and environmental influences that maintain variation within populations, whether cooperation evolves may depend on the variation in the cooperativeness trait. Variation means that it may be worth taking a chance that a partner is cooperative by being cooperative. When there are markets, so that individuals can break off interactions to seek a better partner, variation promotes choosiness and hence penalizes those uncooperative individuals, who are rejected. Variation promotes the need to monitor the previous behaviour of others, and once this social sensitivity exists, the need to maintain a good reputation can promote cooperation.

Neophilia and Old Master paintings: changes in consumer choice and the evolution of art auctions in the eighteenth century

2016 ◽  
Vol 31 (3) ◽  
pp. 361-389
Author(s):  
BRUNO BLONDÉ ◽  
DRIES LYNA
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Consumer Culture ◽  
Consumer Choice ◽  
Export Market ◽  
Art Auctions ◽  
Works Of Art ◽  
Old Masters ◽  
Abundant Supply ◽  
Artistic Legacy

abstractOver the course of the eighteenth century the Austrian Netherlands witnessed the emergence of specialised art auctions. In this article we argue that both the evolution of the auctions and of the prices paid for works of art at the auctions can only be understood as a response to changes in consumer culture during the eighteenth century. Although auctions rapidly gained in importance as a commercial arena through which Old Masters could be resold in Antwerp and Brussels, the prices paid for art saw only modest movement during the 1700s, but then collapsed at the end of the century. By analysing both how local demand for art in Austrian Netherlands failed to absorb the abundant supply of paintings during this period, and how this created a flourishing export market, the study reported here maps the mechanisms that ensured the – often permanent – movement of Flanders’ artistic legacy to collections and museums abroad.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document