Ownership Structure and Minority Expropriation in Non-Listed Firms: The Case for Multiple Large Shareholders

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
María Gutiérrez Urtiaga ◽  
Josep A. Tribo
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Large Shareholders

scholarly journals Ownership control and rights offerings in Chinese listed firms

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 481-491
Author(s):  
Yi-Hua Lin ◽  
Yenn-Ru Chen ◽  
Jeng-Ren Chiou
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Operating Performance ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
Institutional Transformation ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Chinese Listed Companies ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Rights Offering ◽  
The Government

Most Chinese listed companies were transformed from state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Institutional transformation results in an ownership structure that is characterized by highly concentrated ownership and state-owned shares, which may exert an influence on corporate finance. In China, listed companies rely heavily on equity for capital needs, but the government blockholders often subscribe to no shares or to partial shares; they tunnel seasoned offering equity (SEO) capital to their nonprofit units through related party transactions. Therefore, we examine large shareholders’ rights offering behavior and firms’ subsequent operating performance. The results reveal that with a higher ratio of state-owned shares, large shareholders tend to give up all preemptive rights for new shares of stock. Evidence confirms a predicted positive relation between large shareholders’ full rights subscription behavior and firms’ subsequent operating performance

The impact of board composition and ownership structure on dividend payout policy: evidence from Saudi Arabia

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Helmi A. Boshnak
Keyword(s):  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Dividend Policy ◽  
Payout Policy ◽  
Board Composition ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Listed Firms ◽  
Propensity To Pay ◽  
The Impact

PurposeThis study examines the impact of board composition and ownership structure variables on dividend payout policy in Saudi Arabian firms. In particular, it aims to determine the effect of board size, independence and meeting frequency, in addition to chief executive officer (CEO) duality, and state, institutional, managerial, family, and foreign ownership on both the propensity to pay dividends and dividend per share for Saudi-listed firms over the period 2016–2019.Design/methodology/approachThe paper captures dividend policy with two measures, propensity to pay dividends and dividend per share, and employs a range of regression methods (logistic, probit, ordinary least squares (OLS) and random effects regressions) along with a two-stage least squares (2SLS) model for robustness to account for heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and endogeneity issues. The data set is a large panel of 280 Saudi-listed firms over the period 2016 to 2019.FindingsThe results underline the importance of board composition and the ownership structure in explaining variations in dividend policy across Saudi firms. More specifically, there is a positive relationship between the propensity to pay dividends and board-meeting frequency, institutional ownership, firm profitability and firm age, while the degree of board independence, firm size and leverage exhibit a negative relation. Further, dividend per share is positively related to board meeting frequency, institutional ownership, foreign ownership, firm profitability and age, while it is negatively related to CEO duality, managerial ownership, and firm leverage. There is no evidence that family ownership exerts an impact on dividend payout policy in Saudi firms. The findings of this study support agency, signalling, substitute and outcome theories of dividend policy.Research limitations/implicationsThis study offers an important insight into the board characteristic and ownership structure drivers of dividend policy in the context of an emerging market. Moreover, the study has important implications for firms, managers, investors, policymakers, and regulators in Saudi Arabia.Originality/valueThis paper contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence on four board and five ownership characteristic drivers of dividend policy in Saudi Arabia as an emerging stock market, thereby improving on less comprehensive previous studies. The study recommends that investors consider board composition and ownership structure characteristics of firms as key drivers of dividend policy when making stock investment decisions to inform them about the propensity of investee firms to pay dividends and maintain a given dividend policy.

scholarly journals Ownership Structure And Managerial Behavior To Beat Market Expectation In Korea

2014 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 1063
Author(s):  
Hyewon Paik ◽  
YunSung Koh
Keyword(s):  
Ownership Structure ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Managerial Behavior ◽  
Analyst Expectations ◽  
Earnings Surprises ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Market Expectations ◽  
Negative Earnings

This paper examines whether firms ownership structure in Korea changes managers' behavior to meet or beat market expectations. We examine whether managers manage earnings upward and/or guide analyst expectations downward to avoid negative earnings surprises. By using companies listed on the Korean Stock Exchange, we find that the inclusion of a higher proportion of foreign ownership significantly increases the probability to meet or beat market expectations. The finding suggests that the firms with higher foreign ownership try to satisfy their foreign investors who emphasize current profits by boosting the stock price. We also find that managers are less likely to avoid negative earnings surprises as large shareholders ownership increases. The results imply that large shareholders play an internal monitoring role for managers' earnings and/or expectations management. In addition, firms with large shareholders ownership rely less on income-increasing discretionary accruals. Our findings supports the convergence-of-interest hypothesis that as the controlling shareholders ownership level increases, the interest of the controlling shareholder decreases managers opportunistic behavior to manage earnings.

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