Information vs. Risk-Sharing: Trading and Home Bias

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xi Dong
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Home Bias

scholarly journals Welfare Reversals in a Monetary Union

2014 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 246-290 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stéphane Auray ◽  
Aurélien Eyquem
Keyword(s):  
Financial Markets ◽  
Monetary Union ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Home Bias ◽  
Scale Model ◽  
Fiscal Policies ◽  
Medium Scale ◽  
Asymmetric Shocks ◽  
Inflation Rates ◽  
Carry Over

We show that welfare can be lower under complete financial markets than under autarky in a monetary union with home bias, sticky prices, and asymmetric shocks. Such a monetary union is a second-best environment in which the structure of financial markets affects risk-sharing but also shapes the dynamics of inflation rates and the welfare costs from nominal rigidities. Welfare reversals arise for a variety of empirically plausible degrees of price stickiness when the Marshall-Lerner condition is met. These results carry over a model with active fiscal policies, and hold within a medium-scale model, although to a weaker extent. (JEL E31, E52, E62, F33, F41)

scholarly journals Home bias and international risk sharing: Twin puzzles separated at birth

2007 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 587-605 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bent E. Sørensen ◽  
Yi-Tsung Wu ◽  
Oved Yosha ◽  
Yu Zhu
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Home Bias ◽  
International Risk Sharing

scholarly journals Pengaruh Penggabungan Mata Uang di Uni Eropa terhadap International Risk Sharing dan Home Bias

2012 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 136-147
Author(s):  
Risna Triandhari ◽  
Sugiharso Safuan
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Home Bias ◽  
International Risk Sharing

International Risk Sharing (IRS) adalah pembagian risiko secara internasional antar-negara dalam suatukawasan atau dalam kawasan berbeda yang disebabkan oleh adanya gejolak spesik terhadap suatuperekonomian yang menyebabkan pendapatan (konsumsinya) beruktuasi. Tujuan studi ini adalah untukmenganalisis pengaruh dari terjadinya penggabungan mata uang di negara-negara Uni Eropa terhadapperkembangan IRS dan home bias di negara-negara tersebut. Dengan melihat hubungan output danpendapatan suatu negara dengan output dan pendapatan rata-rata kawasan, menggunakan data sebelasnegara awal yang tergabung dalam mata uang tunggal Euro, studi ini menemukan bahwa penggabunganmata uang di wilayah negara-negara Uni Eropa meningkatkan risk sharing dan home bias secara signikan.

Institutional Investors and Development of Europe’s Capital Markets

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zsolt Darvas ◽  
Dirk Schoenmaker
Keyword(s):  
Capital Markets ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
Financial Integration ◽  
Home Bias ◽  
Main Hypothesis ◽  
Institutional Investment ◽  
Increased Risk ◽  
Capital Markets Union

This chapter investigates the role of institutional investment in developing capital markets. It also examines the role of institutional investment in risk sharing. The contribution of institutional investment to risk sharing depends on: the size of institutional investment; the degree of geographical diversification of portfolios, and the composition of assets (equities vs bonds) held. The chapter investigates these three aspects of financial integration in the EU's Capital Markets Union and assesses the prospects for increased risk sharing in the EU. The main hypothesis is that the larger the assets managed by institutional investors, the smaller the home bias and thereby the larger the scope for risk sharing, ceteris paribus. The analysis will focus on portfolio equity home bias.

Protecting All: Risk Sharing for a Diverse and Diversifying World of Work

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Truman Packard ◽  
Ugo Gentilini ◽  
Margaret Grosh ◽  
Philip O’Keefe ◽  
Robert Palacios ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Risk Sharing

Lending to the Borrower from Hell

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mauricio Drelichman ◽  
Hans-Joachim Voth
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Sixteenth Century ◽  
Sovereign Debt ◽  
Risk Sharing ◽  
The United States ◽  
Philip Ii ◽  
Loan Contracts ◽  
The Right ◽  
Intelligent Model ◽  
New Evidence

Why do lenders time and again loan money to sovereign borrowers who promptly go bankrupt? When can this type of lending work? As the United States and many European nations struggle with mountains of debt, historical precedents can offer valuable insights. This book looks at one famous case—the debts and defaults of Philip II of Spain. Ruling over one of the largest and most powerful empires in history, King Philip defaulted four times. Yet he never lost access to capital markets and could borrow again within a year or two of each default. Exploring the shrewd reasoning of the lenders who continued to offer money, the book analyzes the lessons from this historical example. Using detailed new evidence collected from sixteenth-century archives, the book examines the incentives and returns of lenders. It provides powerful evidence that in the right situations, lenders not only survive despite defaults—they thrive. It also demonstrates that debt markets cope well, despite massive fluctuations in expenditure and revenue, when lending functions like insurance. The book unearths unique sixteenth-century loan contracts that offered highly effective risk sharing between the king and his lenders, with payment obligations reduced in bad times. A fascinating story of finance and empire, this book offers an intelligent model for keeping economies safe in times of sovereign debt crises and defaults.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document