Optimal Design of Rating-Trigger Step-Up Bonds: Agency Conflicts Versus Asymmetric Information

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Koziol ◽  
Jochen Lawrenz
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Design ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Agency Conflicts

Survey and Synthesis of the IPO Underpricing Literature

2018 ◽  
pp. 145-174
Author(s):  
Steven Jones ◽  
John C. Yeoman
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Institutional Arrangements ◽  
Core Level ◽  
The Other ◽  
Agency Conflicts ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Behavioral Issues ◽  
Vast Literature ◽  
Public Offering

This chapter surveys the vast literature on initial public offering (IPO) underpricing, focusing on the major theories of underpricing, along with the most relevant empirical findings. These theories, or explanations, are classified into those based on asymmetric information, agency conflicts, behavioral issues, share allocation targets, and institutional arrangements. This last classification has received little attention in the previous couple of decades, although the authors argue that the related fixed-offer price constraint, first proposed as an explanation by Ibbotson (1975), can explain a “core” level of underpricing equal to about one-half to two-thirds of that historically observed, while still assuming that issuing firms seek to maximize offering proceeds net of the spread. In addition, it provides a unifying framework for understanding how, and when, the other explanations can contribute to underpricing beyond this core level.

Optimal Design of Securities under Asymmetric Information

1994 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Nachman ◽  
Thomas H. Noe
Keyword(s):  
Optimal Design ◽  
Asymmetric Information
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