Asymmetric Information in Dynamic Contract Settings: Evidence from the Home Equity Credit Market

Author(s):  
Sumit Agarwal ◽  
Brent W. Ambrose ◽  
Souphala Chomsisengphet ◽  
Chunlin Liu
2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sumit Agarwal ◽  
Brent W. Ambrose ◽  
Souphala Chomsisengphet ◽  
Chunlin Liu

2011 ◽  
Vol 43 (4) ◽  
pp. 633-655 ◽  
Author(s):  
SUMIT AGARWAL ◽  
BRENT W. AMBROSE ◽  
SOUPHALA CHOMSISENGPHET ◽  
CHUNLIN LIU

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
Adelia Oktarina ◽  
Idqan Fahmi ◽  
Irfan Syauqi Beik

<em>The credit market was identical to asymmetric information in it, both conventional and sharia credit markets. One of the forms of this asymmetric information was moral hazard. This study aimed to identify the existence of moral hazard in credit market (financing) by comparing the customer conditions in islamic rural bank and conventional rural bank. This study also intended to identify the factors influencing the moral hazard. The analysis used was logistic regression method. The result showed that islamic rural bank had a bigger potential to experience moral hazard compared to the conventional customers. Generally, the factors which influence the moral hazard such as age, business conditions, amount of financing, length of financing, and type of bank.</em>


2018 ◽  
Vol 40 (3) ◽  
pp. 453-474
Author(s):  
Michael LaCour-Little ◽  
Yanan Zhang

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