scholarly journals Measuring Central Bank Independence in Selected Transition Countries and the Disinflation Process

2000 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandra Dvorsky
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Transition Countries ◽  
Central Bank Independence

scholarly journals Central Bank Independence – The Case of the Central Bank of Montenegro

2018 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 25-40
Author(s):  
Milivoje Radovic ◽  
Milena Radonjic ◽  
Jovan Djuraskovic
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Inflation Rate ◽  
Central Banks ◽  
Transition Countries ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Executive Power ◽  
Eu Accession ◽  
Key Factor ◽  
The Eu

Abstract In recent decades, there has been a trend in increasing the level of independence of central banks. The key factor that has contributed to a growing interest in this concept is grounded in economic theory that confirms the link between a lower inflation rate and a greater level of central bank independence. For this reason, in many countries, the existing regulations relating to central bank have been modified to protect its position from the absolute influence of the executive power of the state. This trend was particularly prevalent in transition countries, which was conditioned primarily by the EU accession criteria. The aim of this paper is to analyse independence of the Central Bank of Montenegro through the prism of functional, institutional, financial, and personal independence, and to assess the level of its legal independence by using appropriate indices.

scholarly journals Central bank independence and its effect on money market stability

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 112
Author(s):  
MSc. Anera Alishani
Keyword(s):  
Central Bank ◽  
Transition Countries ◽  
Money Market ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Western Balkans ◽  
Market Growth ◽  
Main Research ◽  
Research Task ◽  
Stable Growth ◽  
The Relationship

Since 1990s many countries have moved toward greater central bank independence (CBI) by either amending their Central Bank’s laws or writing them de novo. Also countries of Western Balkans and many other transition countries have moved toward greater CBI. There are many potential benefits associated with greater CBI, and one of them is stable growth of money and liquidity. For a given level of money market development the hypothesis is that a more independent CB is likely to promote more stable growth of money supply (Dželetović et al., 2008). As a result the main research task of this work is to estimate the effects of CBI on money market growth for five Western Balkans countries and five other European transition countries. Because the empirical studies were very limited for the relationship between CBI and money market growth, there were no clear conclusions. In addition, there were different measuring methodologies that attempt to quantify the extent of legal and actual CBI. Related to the main research task, this dissertation has examined the effects of CBI on money market stability (proxied by bank deposit growth) for a sample of 10 countries for a period from 1999-2009 by using fixed effect model. Through this methodology different regressions have been estimated, but the results were not robust and there are no clear finding on the relationship between CBI and money market growth.

Peaks and Troughs

2019 ◽  
pp. 58-98 ◽  
Author(s):  
Donato Masciandaro ◽  
Davide Romelli
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Central Bank ◽  
Institutional Design ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Central Bank Independence ◽  
Banking Supervision ◽  
Macroeconomic Shocks ◽  
Increasing Trend ◽  
The 2008 Financial Crisis ◽  
Exchange Rate Shocks

This chapter investigates the endogenous evolution of central bank institutional design over the past four decades. From a theoretical perspective, it employs a stylized political economy model to highlight some key determinants of the level of central bank independence as a function of macroeconomic shocks and political economy characteristics of countries. It then employs recently developed dynamic indices of central bank design to describe the evolution of central bank independence over the period 1972–2014. In a sample of sixty-five countries, it shows that the increasing trend in central bank independence during 1972–2007 has been reversing after the 2008 financial crisis, mainly due to significant changes to the roles of central banks in banking supervision. The authors find that this evolution can be related to several macroeconomic shocks, such as inflationary, fiscal, and exchange-rate shocks.

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