scholarly journals Computation of Equilibria in OLG Models with Many Heterogeneous Households

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Rausch ◽  
Thomas F. Rutherford
Keyword(s):  
Olg Models ◽  
Computation Of Equilibria

scholarly journals Computation of Equilibria in OLG Models with Many Heterogeneous Households

2010 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sebastian Rausch ◽  
Thomas F. Rutherford
Keyword(s):  
Olg Models ◽  
Computation Of Equilibria

Indeterminacy of equilibrium in stochastic OLG models

2003 ◽  
Vol 21 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 435-454 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Magill ◽  
Martine Quinzii
Keyword(s):  
Olg Models

The Need of an Intergender Contract in Overlapping Generations (OLG) Models

2002 ◽  
pp. 91-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Doris A. Behrens ◽  
Gottfried Haber ◽  
Christian Richter ◽  
Karin Schönpflug
Keyword(s):  
Overlapping Generations ◽  
Olg Models

Stationary Markovian equilibrium in altruistic stochastic OLG models with limited commitment

2012 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 115-132 ◽  
Author(s):  
Łukasz Balbus ◽  
Kevin Reffett ◽  
Łukasz Woźny
Keyword(s):  
Limited Commitment ◽  
Olg Models

Games in Extensive Form

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
João P. Hespanha
Keyword(s):  
Saddle Point ◽  
Matrix Game ◽  
Extensive Form ◽  
Multi Stage ◽  
Form Representation ◽  
Other Information ◽  
The Matrix ◽  
Recursive Computation ◽  
Zero Sum ◽  
Computation Of Equilibria

This chapter discusses a number of key concepts for extensive form game representation. It first considers a matrix that defines a zero-sum matrix game for which the minimizer has two actions and the maximizer has three actions and shows that the matrix description, by itself, does not capture the information structure of the game and, in fact, other information structures are possible. It then describes an extensive form representation of a zero-sum two-person game, which is a decision tree, the extensive form representation of multi-stage games, and the notions of security policy, security level, and saddle-point equilibrium for a game in extensive form. It also explores the matrix form for games in extensive form, recursive computation of equilibria for single-stage games, feedback games, feedback saddle-point for multi-stage games, and recursive computation of equilibria for multi-stage games. It concludes with a practice exercise with the corresponding solution, along with additional exercises.

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