scholarly journals Disagreement and Learning in a Dynamic Contracting Model

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Adrian ◽  
Mark M. Westerfield
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Contracting ◽  
Contracting Model

A dynamic contracting model for wages and employment in three European economies

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 429-448 ◽  
Author(s):  
David de la Croix ◽  
Franz C Palm ◽  
Gerard A Pfann
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Contracting ◽  
European Economies ◽  
Contracting Model

scholarly journals Disagreement and Learning in a Dynamic Contracting Model

2009 ◽  
Vol 22 (10) ◽  
pp. 3873-3906 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Adrian ◽  
Mark M. Westerfield
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Contracting ◽  
Contracting Model

Contract institutions in the Russian economy: The sphere of state, municipal, and regulated procurement

2017 ◽  
pp. 93-110 ◽  
Author(s):  
O. Anchishkina
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Market Structure ◽  
Market Equilibrium ◽  
Statistical Evidence ◽  
Market Model ◽  
Market Behavior ◽  
Database Analysis ◽  
Russian Economy ◽  
Contracting Model

The article synthesizes information on database analysis of state, municipal, and regulated procurement through which Russian contract institutions and the market model are investigated. The inherent uncertainty of quantity indicators on contracting activities and process is identified and explained. The article provides statistical evidence for heterogeneous market structure in state and municipal procurement, and big player’s dominance. A theoretical model for market behavior, noncooperative competition and collusion is proposed, through which the major trends are explained. The intrinsic flaws and failure of the current contracting model are revealed and described. This ineffectiveness is regarded to be not a limitation, but a challenge to be met. If responded to, drivers for economic growth and market equilibrium will be switched on.

Optimal Dynamic Contracting

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Battaglini ◽  
Rohit Lamba
Keyword(s):  
Dynamic Contracting ◽  
Optimal Dynamic

Compensation Committees and CEO Compensation Incentives in U.S. Entrepreneurial Firms

2004 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 35-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Martin J. Conyon ◽  
Lerong He
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
Power Model ◽  
Entrepreneurial Firms ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Ceo Incentives ◽  
Optimal Contracting ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Contracting Model

This study uses a sample of IPO firms to investigate the relation between the compensation committee, CEO compensation, and CEO incentives. We investigate two theoretical models: the three-tier optimal contracting model and the managerial power model. We find support for the three-tier agency model. The presence of significant shareholders on the compensation committee (i.e., those with share stakes in excess of 5 percent) is associated with lower CEO pay and higher CEO equity incentives. Firms with higher paid compensation committee members are associated with greater CEO compensation and lower incentives. The managerial power model receives little support. We find no evidence that insiders or CEOs of other firms serving on the compensation committee raise the level of CEO pay or lower CEO incentives.

scholarly journals Stackelberg equilibria in a continuous-time vertical contracting model with uncertain demand and delayed information

2014 ◽  
Vol 51 (A) ◽  
pp. 213-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bernt Øksendal ◽  
Leif Sandal ◽  
Jan Ubøe
Keyword(s):  
Continuous Time ◽  
Variable Coefficients ◽  
Uncertain Demand ◽  
Uhlenbeck Process ◽  
Delayed Information ◽  
Equilibrium Prices ◽  
Special Cases ◽  
Explicit Formulae ◽  
Contracting Model ◽  
Vertical Contracting

We consider explicit formulae for equilibrium prices in a continuous-time vertical contracting model. A manufacturer sells goods to a retailer, and the objective of both parties is to maximize expected profits. Demand is an Itô-Lévy process, and to increase realism, information is delayed. We provide complete existence and uniqueness proofs for a series of special cases, including geometric Brownian motion and the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process, both with time-variable coefficients. Moreover, explicit solution formulae are given, so these results are operational. An interesting finding is that information that is more precise may be a considerable disadvantage for the retailer.

Addressing the productivity challenge using a build, own, operate, maintain (BOOM) contracting model

2014 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
pp. 517
Author(s):  
Geoff Bird ◽  
Rob Radici
Keyword(s):  
Success Factors ◽  
Oil And Gas ◽  
Oil And Gas Industry ◽  
Infrastructure Development ◽  
Gas Industry ◽  
Critical Success ◽  
Risk Environments ◽  
Subsequent Phase ◽  
Contracting Model ◽  
Project Lifecycle

Poor productivity is one of the major challenges facing the oil and gas industry in Australia. This is evidenced by significant cost and schedule overruns on every major LNG development during the recent Australian LNG construction boom. In a world where gas is a global commodity that can be easily exported, the consequences of poor productivity mean that investment dollars are directed overseas to lower risk environments to the detriment of resource development in Australia. This extended abstract explores the causes of poor productivity and it argues that one of the principle reasons is a fragmented contracting strategy, which results in the scope being split among different contractors at various phases of the project lifecycle, requiring complex and often inefficient interface management. This combined with little commercial incentive for contractors to minimise cost for the subsequent phase of the project means the responsibility falls with the operator to optimise costs during the project lifecycle. This extended abstract proposes that BOOM commercial model and contracting strategy is one way to address the productivity challenge. This model incentivises the contractor to engineer to reduce construction cost and to construct to minimise operational and maintenance costs by ensuring the contractor has a significant stake. This better aligns the commercial interests of the contractor and operator. This extended abstract also addresses the types of infrastructure development the model is best suited to and some of the critical success factors required to deliver a successful BOOM outcome.

Study on Cost Management under EPC General Contracting Model

2011 ◽  
Vol 181-182 ◽  
pp. 49-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jin Ru Zhong
Keyword(s):  
Control Method ◽  
Cost Management ◽  
Construction Project ◽  
Effective Control ◽  
General Contracting ◽  
Contracting Model ◽  
Design And Construction

As a new mode of implementation for the construction project, EPC mode is more and more highly praised by owner and contractor. The owner can reduce the risk through implementing this mode and make the price of project relatively regular at the same time. However, because the owner seldom participates in this mode, in addition, the same contractor charges design and construction of the project, the owner’s controls to the price of project becomes more and more difficult. This paper discusses reasonable determination and effective control method and means to the price of the project under EPC mode according to the characteristic.

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