Systemic Risk: Is the Banking Sector Special?

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wolfgang Bühler ◽  
Marcel Prokopczuk
Keyword(s):  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Banking Sector

scholarly journals Measuring the systemic risk in the South African banking sector

2017 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory M. Foggitt ◽  
Andre Heymans ◽  
Gary W. Van Vuuren ◽  
Anmar Pretorius
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
South African ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Risk Index ◽  
Financial Sector ◽  
Ethical Behaviour ◽  
The South ◽  
Case Scenario ◽  
Worst Case

Background: In the aftermath of the sub-prime crisis, systemic risk has become a greater priority for regulators, with the National Treasury (2011) stating that regulators should proactively monitor changes in systemic risk.Aim: The aim is to quantify systemic risk as the capital shortfall an institution is likely to experience, conditional to the entire financial sector being undercapitalised.Setting: We measure the systemic risk index (SRISK) of the South African (SA) banking sector between 2001 and 2013.Methods: Systemic risk is measured with the SRISK.Results: Although the results indicated only moderate systemic risk in the SA financial sector over this period, there were significant spikes in the levels of systemic risk during periods of financial turmoil in other countries. Especially the stock market crash in 2002 and the subprime crisis in 2008. Based on our results, the largest contributor to systemic risk during quiet periods was Investec, the bank in our sample which had the lowest market capitalisation. However, during periods of financial turmoil, the contributions of other larger banks increased markedly.Conclusion: The implication of these spikes is that systemic risk levels may also be highly dependent on external economic factors, in addition to internal banking characteristics. The results indicate that the economic fundamentals of SA itself seem to have little effect on the amount of systemic risk present in the financial sector. A more significant relationship seems to exist with the stability of the financial sectors in foreign countries. The implication therefore is that complying with individual banking regulations, such as Basel, and corporate governance regulations promoting ethical behaviour, such as King III, may not be adequate. It is therefore proposed that banks should always have sufficient capital reserves in order to mitigate the effects of a financial crisis in a foreign country. The use of worst-case scenario analyses (such as those in this study) could aid in determining exactly how much capital banks could need in order to be considered sufficiently capitalised during a financial crisis, and therefore safe from systemic risk.

scholarly journals Banks behavior patterns as a response to the population financial activity in the macroeconomic shocks in Russia

2021 ◽  
Vol 50 (2) ◽  
pp. 74-95
Author(s):  
Yu.S. Evlakhova ◽  
◽  
E.N. Alifanova ◽  
A.A. Tregubova ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Behavior Pattern ◽  
Behavior Patterns ◽  
Economic Shocks ◽  
Macroeconomic Shocks ◽  
Financial Activity ◽  
Risk Research ◽  
Systemically Important Banks

This paper finds out the behavior patterns of the Russian banking sector and systemically important banks in response to changes in the population financial activity under the economic shocks. The results show that the Russian banking sector has a behavior pattern that includes the sequence of actions: the outflow of deposits — vulnerability to non-repayment of loans — deposit bubble — credit bubble. We find no consistent evidence that systemically important banks show the same sequence of actions during the crises. We also find that the banking sector behavior and systemically important banks’ behavior varied in 2008–2009, but became the same in the crisis of 2014–2015. The coincidence of behavior patterns of the banking sector and systemically important banks increases the systemic risk. Research on intragroup differences between systemically important banks will allow finding solutions to reduce the risk.

scholarly journals Economic Insecurity as Systemic Risk

2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (s1) ◽  
pp. 29-36
Author(s):  
Ion Pârţachi ◽  
Eugeniu Gârlă
Keyword(s):  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Economic Activity ◽  
Financial Stability ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Activity Index ◽  
Analytical Description ◽  
Economic Security ◽  
Economic Insecurity ◽  
Corporate Sector ◽  
New Approach

Abstract Difficulties related to the problem of evaluating the economic security / insecurity, including the threshold of economic security / insecurity, namely the impossibility of giving an analytical description of a criterion entirely made up of a set of indicators describing the degree of economic security / insecurity, makes more and more researchers, including the authors, to seek indirect ways of finding solutions, for example considering systemic risk., as a measure of evaluation. Thus, starting from a new approach, and given the specific components of systemic risk to financial stability: the banking sector, corporate sector, public sector, volume of credits, economic activity index the threshold vector of economic security / insecurity can be developed. The study shows that systemic risk can be used to measure the threshold of economic security /insecurity.

Competition, Regulation, and Stability in Banking: Theory and Evidence

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xavier Vives
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Regulatory Reform ◽  
Reform Process ◽  
Subprime Crisis ◽  
Empirical Perspective ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Excessive Risk Taking ◽  
Excessive Risk

This chapter examines the relationship between competition and stability in the banking sector both from a theoretical and from an empirical perspective. It considers the competition–stability link from the standpoint of fragility both because of runs and because of excessive risk taking, along with the available evidence assessing how competition relates to systemic risk and how deregulation is associated with risk taking. It also explores the connection between market structure, consolidation, and internationalization and how it affects stability. Lessons from the subprime crisis are derived. The result of the analysis is to characterize the competition–stability trade-off, how regulation can alleviate it, and the need to coordinate competition policy and prudential regulation. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the regulatory reform process in the banking industry after the 2007–2009 crisis.

scholarly journals On Identifying the Systemically Important Tunisian Banks: An Empirical Approach Based on the △CoVaR Measures

Risks ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wided Khiari ◽  
Salim Ben Sassi
Keyword(s):  
Systemic Risk ◽  
Value At Risk ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Financial Institution ◽  
Herd Behavior ◽  
Financial Difficulties ◽  
Private Banks ◽  
Close Supervision ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Public Banks

The aim of this work is to assess systemic risk of Tunisian listed banks. The goal is to identify the institutions that contribute the most to systemic risk and that are most exposed to it. We use the CoVaR that considered the systemic risk as the value at risk (VaR) of a financial institution conditioned on the VaR of another institution. Thus, if the CoVaR increases with respect to the VaR, the spillover risk also increases among the institutions. The difference between these measurements is termed △CoVaR, and it allows for estimating the exposure and contribution of each bank to systemic risk. Results allow classifying Tunisian banks in terms of systemic risk involvement. They show that public banks occupy the top places, followed by the two largest private banks in Tunisia. These five banks are the main systemic players in the Tunisian banking sector. It seems that they are the least sensitive to the financial difficulties of existing banks and the most important contributors to the distress of the other banks. This work aims to add a broader perspective to the micro prudential application of regulation, including contagion, proposing a macro prudential vision and strengthening of regulatory policy. Supervisors could impose close supervision for institutions considered as potentially systemic banks. Furthermore, regulations should consider the systemic contribution when defining risk requirements to minimize the consequences of possible herd behavior.

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