Innovations in Defense Acquisition: Asymmetric Information, Mechanism Design and Prediction Markets

2011 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter Coughlan ◽  
William Gates ◽  
Jeremy Arkes
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Prediction Markets ◽  
Defense Acquisition

scholarly journals Incentive Regulation and Its Application to Electricity Networks

2008 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul L. Joskow
Keyword(s):  
Quality Of Service ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Mechanism Design ◽  
Distribution Networks ◽  
Incentive Regulation ◽  
Electricity Networks ◽  
Related Quality ◽  
The Uk ◽  
Transmission And Distribution

This paper examines developments since the publication of The Economics of Regulation in the theory of incentive regulation and its application to the regulation of unbundled electricity transmission and distribution networks. Conceptual mechanism design issues that arise when regulators are imperfectly informed and there is asymmetric information about costs, managerial effort, and quality of service are discussed. The design and application of price cap mechanisms and related quality of service incentives in the UK are explained. The limited literature that measures the effects of incentive regulation applied to electricity networks is reviewed.

AGENCY PROBLEM DALAM PENERAPAN PEMBIAYAAN AKAD MUDHARABAH PADA PERBANKAN SYARIAH

ALQALAM ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 46
Author(s):  
Aswadi Lubis
Keyword(s):  
High Risk ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Human Resources ◽  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Agency Problem ◽  
Agency Problems ◽  
Islamic Banking ◽  
The Public

The purpose of writing this article is to describe the agency problems that arise in the application of the financing with mudharabah on Islamic banking. In this article the author describes the use of the theory of financing, asymetri information, agency problems inside of financing. The conclusion of this article is that the financing is asymmetric information problems will arise, both adverse selection and moral hazard. The high risk of prospective managers (mudharib) for their moral hazard and lack of readiness of human resources in Islamic banking is among the factors that make the composition of the distribution of funds to the public more in the form of financing. The limitations that can be done to optimize this financing is among other things; owners of capital supervision (monitoring) and the customers themselves place restrictions on its actions (bonding).

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