Can Profit Policy and Contract Incentives Improve Defense Contract Outcomes?

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scot A. Arnold ◽  
David L. McNicol ◽  
Kenton G. Fasana
Keyword(s):  
Defense Contract ◽  
Contract Incentives

Can Profit Policy and Contract Incentives Improve Defense Contract Outcomes?

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scot A. Arnold ◽  
David L. McNicol ◽  
Kenton G. Fasana
Keyword(s):  
Defense Contract ◽  
Contract Incentives

States and Power in Africa by Jeffrey I. Herbst: A Review Essay

2002 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 510-519 ◽  
Author(s):  
James A Robinson
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Analysis ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Review Essay ◽  
State Failure ◽  
Contract Enforcement ◽  
Law And Order ◽  
Defense Contract ◽  
Comparative Institutions

Herbst argues that Africa is plagued by “state failure” to provide certain public goods in society, such as law and order, defense, contract enforcement, and infrastructure. Herbst has provided a bold, historically informed theoretical analysis, essential reading for economists interested in comparative institutions and development.

Does a Rubber Baseline Guarantee Cost Overruns on Defense Acquisition Contracts?

1998 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 43-51 ◽  
Author(s):  
David S. Christensen ◽  
James A. Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Department Of Defense ◽  
Defense Acquisition ◽  
Performance Indices ◽  
Cost Performance ◽  
Cost Overruns ◽  
Significant Relationships ◽  
Defense Contract ◽  
Official Policy ◽  
Contract Type ◽  
The Stability

A common assertion in defense literature is that an unstable budget baseline contributes to cost overruns on defense acquisition contracts. Using cost performance data from over 400 defense acquisition contracts, we tested this assertion. The stability of the baseline was characterized by the number of significant changes to the budget, and by a statistical measure of the baseline's variability, the coefficient of variation. Cost performance was characterized by cost and schedule performance indices. Using 2 statistical methods, we found no significant relationships between baseline instability and cost overruns. Further, these results were insensitive to the managing service, the buying activity, and the contract type. Changes on a defense contract are not compelling rationale for cost overruns. Other possible causal factors should be more closely examined. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense of the U.S. government.

Ouality Control Review of KPMG Peat Marwick LLP and the Defense Contract Audit Agency The Smithsonian Institution Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 1996

1998 ◽  
Author(s):  
Barbara E. Smolenyak ◽  
Donald D. Steele ◽  
Andrew Katsaros ◽  
Sunil R. Kadam ◽  
Nancy C. Cipolla
Keyword(s):  
Smithsonian Institution ◽  
Fiscal Year ◽  
Defense Contract
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