Report of the Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety on Nuclear Weapons Inspections for the Strategic Nuclear Forces

2008 ◽  
Author(s):  
DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD WASHINGTON DC
2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Gallagher ◽  
Michael Cevallos

Abstract A counterforce attack intends to disable an opponent's nuclear arsenal to limit potential damage from that adversary. We postulate a future when hardening and deeply burying fixed sites, transition to mobile strategic systems, and improved defences make executing a counterforce strategy against an adversary's nuclear forces extremely difficult. Additionally, our postulated future has multiple nations possessing nuclear weapons. Consequently, each country needs to consider multiple actors when addressing the question of how to deter a potential adversary's nuclear attack. We examine six nuclear targeting alternatives and consider how to deter them. These strategies include nuclear demonstration, conventional military targets, and attacks consisting of communications/electronics, economic, infrastructure, and population centers that a nation might consider striking with nuclear weapons. Since these alternative strikes require only a few nuclear weapons, executing one of them would not significantly shift the balance of nuclear forces. The attacking country's remaining nuclear forces may inhibit the attacked country or its allies from responding. How can nations deter these limited nuclear attacks? Potentially, threatening economic counter-strikes seems to be the best alternative. How might escalation be controlled in the event of a limited attack? Other instruments of power, such as political or economic, might be employed to bolster deterrence against these types of nuclear strikes.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Hunt

The development of military arms harnessing nuclear energy for mass destruction has inspired continual efforts to control them. Since 1945, the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Israel, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and South Africa acquired control over these powerful weapons, though Pretoria dismantled its small cache in 1989 and Russia inherited the Soviet arsenal in 1996. Throughout this period, Washington sought to limit its nuclear forces in tandem with those of Moscow, prevent new states from fielding them, discourage their military use, and even permit their eventual abolition. Scholars disagree about what explains the United States’ distinct approach to nuclear arms control. The history of U.S. nuclear policy treats intellectual theories and cultural attitudes alongside technical advances and strategic implications. The central debate is one of structure versus agency: whether the weapons’ sheer power, or historical actors’ attitudes toward that power, drove nuclear arms control. Among those who emphasize political responsibility, there are two further disagreements: (1) the relative influence of domestic protest, culture, and politics; and (2) whether U.S. nuclear arms control aimed first at securing the peace by regulating global nuclear forces or at bolstering American influence in the world. The intensity of nuclear arms control efforts tended to rise or fall with the likelihood of nuclear war. Harry Truman’s faith in the country’s monopoly on nuclear weapons caused him to sabotage early initiatives, while Dwight Eisenhower’s belief in nuclear deterrence led in a similar direction. Fears of a U.S.-Soviet thermonuclear exchange mounted in the late 1950s, stoked by atmospheric nuclear testing and widespread radioactive fallout, which stirred protest movements and diplomatic initiatives. The spread of nuclear weapons to new states motivated U.S. presidents (John Kennedy in the vanguard) to mount a concerted campaign against “proliferation,” climaxing with the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Richard Nixon was exceptional. His reasons for signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) with Moscow in 1972 were strategic: to buttress the country’s geopolitical position as U.S. armed forces withdrew from Southeast Asia. The rise of protest movements and Soviet economic difficulties after Ronald Reagan entered the Oval Office brought about two more landmark U.S.-Soviet accords—the 1987 Intermediate Ballistic Missile Treaty (INF) and the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)—the first occasions on which the superpowers eliminated nuclear weapons through treaty. The country’s attention swung to proliferation after the Soviet collapse in December 1991, as failed states, regional disputes, and non-state actors grew more prominent. Although controversies over Iraq, North Korea, and Iran’s nuclear programs have since erupted, Washington and Moscow continued to reduce their arsenals and refine their nuclear doctrines even as President Barack Obama proclaimed his support for a nuclear-free world.


Subject China's pledge to 'no first use' of nuclear weapons. Significance The recent introduction of more offensive capabilities into China's nuclear forces, such as multiple warheads, together with Chinese military writings that toy with a future launch-on-warning capability, all seem to complicate China's long-standing pledge of 'no first use' (NFU). China is the only nuclear weapons state to maintain an unconditional and continuous NFU pledge ever since it developed nuclear weapons. Impacts China will not become more transparent in its nuclear policy: Beijing sees opacity as tied to survivability. China will focus on conventional military modernisation (including space and cyber), where NFU does not restrict use of force. China's adherence to NFU stabilises the non-proliferation regime only in upholding continuity amid uncertainty in Moscow and Washington. US-China dialogue on strategic relations will not progress while Washington presses Beijing for details on operational conditions of NFU.


Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

This chapter explores the ability of nuclear weapons to deter conventional war. For nuclear weapons to mitigate traditional security competition, they must not only render nuclear war unwinnable but also serve as a robust deterrent to major conventional attacks. It explains how a potential victim of conventional attack can make credible threats to escalate to nuclear war if the attacker can retaliate in kind. The chapter also discusses about countries facing threats of overwhelming conventional attack that have almost always opted to develop nuclear forces that are flexible enough to be used in limited ways. It shows that nuclear-armed countries that face dire prospects in conventional war are the same ones that tend to develop nuclear postures tailored to coercive nuclear escalation.


1995 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avery Goldstein

The collective goods theory of alliances and neorealist theory yield conflicting expectations about the security policies of states. The former emphasizes the temptation to “ride free” on the efforts of others, while the latter emphasizes the incentives for self-help. In the cases of Britain, China, and France during the early cold war, the constraints identified by neorealist theory, reinforced by the advent of nuclear weapons, prevailed. Each discounted the value of the security benefits superpower partners could provide. The second-ranking powers' decisions to shoulder the burden of developing independent nuclear forces are at odds with collective goods arguments that portray especially strong temptations to ride free in the circumstances that prevailed at that time—an international system dominated by two superpowers, each possessing large nuclear deterrent arsenals that could easily be employed on behalf of allies. This analysis suggests that present efforts to discourage additional states from acquiring nuclear weapons by offering them international security guarantees are unlikely to succeed.


2015 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 7-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fiona S. Cunningham ◽  
M. Taylor Fravel

Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in future U.S.-China strategic stability. In the past decade, advances in U.S. strategic capabilities, especially missile defenses and enhanced long-range conventional strike capacity, could undermine China's nuclear retaliatory capability, which is based on a relatively small force and second-strike posture. An exhaustive review of Chinese writings on military affairs indicates, however, that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy of assured retaliation. Instead, China will modestly expand its arsenal, increase the sophistication of its forces, and allow limited ambiguity regarding its pledge not to use nuclear weapons first. This limited ambiguity allows China to use the threat of nuclear retaliation to deter a conventional attack on its nuclear arsenal, without significantly increasing the size of its nuclear forces and triggering a costly arms race. Nevertheless, China's effort to maintain its strategy of assured retaliation while avoiding an arms race could backfire. Those efforts increase the risk that nuclear weapons could be used in a crisis between the United States and China, even though China views this possibility as much less likely than the United States does.


Futures ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 446-447
Author(s):  
Warren H. Donnelly

2015 ◽  
Vol 97 (899) ◽  
pp. 563-599 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hans M. Kristensen ◽  
Matthew G. McKinzie

AbstractIn this article, the highly destructive potential of global nuclear arsenals is reviewed with respect to nuclear force structures, evolution of nuclear capabilities, modernization programmes and nuclear war planning and operations. Specific nuclear forces data is presented for the United States, the Russian Federation, Great Britain, France, China, Pakistan, India, Israel and North Korea. Hypothetical, escalatory scenarios for the use of nuclear weapons are presented, including the calculated distribution of radioactive fallout. At more than seventy years since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and twenty-five years since the end of the Cold War, international progress on nuclear arms control and disarmament has now nearly stalled, with the emphasis shifting to modernizing and maintaining large inventories of nuclear weapons indefinitely. This perpetuates a grave risk to human health, civil society and the environment.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
P. Sean Morris

This article concerns two Cold War treaties on nuclear nonproliferation and arms control and whether the success of one treaty can be instrumental in leading to the reduction of nuclear weapons. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) have been essential to world peace. Although it might be impossible to envisage a world free of nuclear weapons, the post-Cold War nuclear posture requires multilateral engagement to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons technology and treaties such as the NPT can be amended to include the INF treaty and therefore lead to further nuclear disarmament. This is because the NPT treaty has been granted indefinite extension and the INF treaty has been one of the success stories in nuclear disarmament and that success should be further built upon. The paper is not an exhaustive discussion of the nuclear treaties regime—rather the arguments and policy prescription in the paper are illustrative.


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