A Great War More Worthy Of Relation Than Any That Had Preceded It: Thucycides History of the Peloponnesian War as a Rosetta Stone for Joint Warfare and Operational Art

2006 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kevin M. McGowan
2017 ◽  
pp. 75-96
Author(s):  
Lucyna Kostuch

The aim of the paper is to compile a list of typical complaints that a Greek soldier of the Classical period might have had. For that purpose, the author analyses the great war narratives of that time: Histories by Herodotus, History of the Peloponnesian War by Thucydides Xenophon’s Hellenica, Anabasis, and Agesilaus.


1919 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 176-176
Author(s):  
No authorship indicated

Author(s):  
Jan Moje

This chapter gives an overview of the history of recording and publishing epigraphic sources in Demotic language and script from the Late Period to Greco-Roman Egypt (seventh century bce to third century ce), for example, on stelae, offering tables, coffins, or votive gifts. The history of editing such texts and objects spans over two hundred years. Here, the important steps and pioneering publications on Demotic epigraphy are examined. They start from the beginning of the nineteenth century, when Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt found the Rosetta stone, until the twenty-first century.


2015 ◽  
Vol 39 (156) ◽  
pp. 643-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Fitzpatrick

AbstractIt is now widely admitted that the Great War was also Ireland’s war, with profound consequences for every element of Irish life after 1914. Its impact may be discerned in aberrant aspects of Ireland’s demographic, economic and social history, as well as in the more familiar political and military convulsions of the war years. This article surveys recent scholarship, assesses statistical evidence of the war’s social and economic impact (both positive and negative), and explores its far-reaching political repercussions. These include the postponement of expected civil conflict, the unexpected occurrence of an unpopular rebellion in 1916, and public response to the consequent coercion. The speculative final section outlines a number of plausible outcomes for Irish history in the absence of war, concluding that no single counterfactual history of a warless Ireland is defensible.


1924 ◽  
Vol 63 (6) ◽  
pp. 546
Author(s):  
D. W. B. ◽  
Julian S. Corbett

The Geologist ◽  
1861 ◽  
Vol 4 (11) ◽  
pp. 465-467

Old bones, that would be worthless to anybody else, become valuable to the geologist. There may be nothing picturesque or strikingly singular in their appearance. They may be too rotten or too fragile for the manufacturer; too sapless for the agriculturist; nay, too few or too far between to be of any commercial value at all. And yet bits of bones may be inscriptions of much value to the palæontologist. As every letter in the few lines incised on the famous Rosetta stone was a key to some passage in a forgotten language of the past, so every new bit of bone may be the key to some passage in that greater history of a greater past which geology unrolls. Many years ago—how time flies past—I met with a little patch of mammaliferous drift at Folkestone; I gathered every fragment of bone, every tooth, every shell, which the workmen's picks and spades exhumed, and most of what I could not determine myself at that time, Professor Owen, and my then living and active friend, Mr. Turner, looked over and named.Amongst the bones I then collected were two of form to me before unknown, and which I often since brought back to mind. Two—both fragments of horns—flat at the basal part, perfectly round towards the tip; no goat, nor antelope, nor deer, that I knew, had horns like them; and so those fragments were laid aside (not carelessly) for future thought and comparison. Shortly since in walking through the gallery of the British Museum, I visited the cases containing deers' remains, and there, at once I saw, not the counterparts, but what seemed to me the fac-similes of my bits of horns.


1964 ◽  
Vol 84 ◽  
pp. 69-72 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank J. Frost

In his discourse on the causes of the Peloponnesian War (Pericles 31–32), Plutarch devotes an inordinate time to what he calls ‘the worst charge [against Pericles], but that having the greatest number of supporters’. The elements of this charge may be outlined briefly:1. Pheidias was indicted for embezzling the precious materials used in the construction of the great statue of Athena Parthenos. The informer was a certain Menon, a fellow workman, who was subsequently given immunity and tax-free status by a decree of the assembly proposed by Glycon.2. At the same time, Pericles' consort Aspasia was indicted and his friend and teacher Anaxagoras was attacked indirectly through a law against religious nonconformity brought by Diopeithes.3. While the people were still in this mood, Dracontides had a decree passed, requiring that Pericles' accounts be deposited with the council and that the dicasts try any resulting cases on the acropolis with ballots specially sanctified at the altar. This last clause was stricken from the bill by Hagnon, who specified that any resulting suits were to be tried by a jury of 1,500.4. Because of all these attacks, Pericles resolved to start the war, using the Megarian decree as provocation.Plutarch reports here the popular fancy—that Pericles started a foreign war to avoid domestic embarrassments. The development of this tradition is a well-known chapter in the history of Greek literature, but as it is fundamental to this discussion, a brief review is called for.


Author(s):  
Harald Høiback

AbstractMilitary operations can be a complex and cumbersome undertaking, involving millions of soldiers and tonnes of equipment. Even though war has been part of human experience for time immemorial, systematic thinking about how to prepare, conduct, and use military operations is nonetheless a rather new undertaking. This chapter explores the history of thinking about military operations, broadly defined, and narrows down on operations as the concept is used today.After the historical exploration, the chapter investigates how military operations can be studied. In principle, there are four different ways to approach operations as a field of study. The most common methods are the historical method and operations research, i.e., making heuristic models of reality. Game theory and axiomatic foundationalism are the other two but are far less used than the former two.The development of modern military thinking notwithstanding, it is still difficult to convert military power to strategic gains, and the latter part of the chapter explains why. Military commanders and planning groups do not always get the what and why from the political level, making it difficult to find the how. Military operations are also intrinsically difficult because your opponent will try to make it difficult for you. The concept of an operational level of command is also problematic, since it tends to do the opposite of what is intended. Instead of pulling tactics and strategy closer together, it tends to push them apart. And finally, the word “art” in “operational art” is perhaps also an unfortunate misnomer?


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