Nuclear Deterrence: A Look at the Past and Future Through the Eyes of a Beholder

1996 ◽  
Author(s):  
NATIONAL WAR COLL WASHINGTON DC
Keyword(s):  
2001 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-77
Author(s):  
J. Peter Scoblic

Despite the radical changes in the global political and military situation in the past ten years, U.S. nuclear forces retain the same mission and the same basic structure they had when Moscow was the seat of the “Evil Empire.” As it has for decades, the United States maintains thousands of nuclear warheads on a variety of land-, sea- and air-based platforms. These forces are on a level of high alert, ready to launch within minutes of an attack warning. It is a distinctly Cold War footing in a world that has long since come in from the cold of U.S.–Soviet antagonism.


Horizons ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-42
Author(s):  
Richard B. Miller ◽  
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AbstractThis essay critically assays four recent attempts to furnish a moral justification for nuclear deterrence: the success thesis, the just war thesis, the argument from the “supreme emergency,” and the exceptionalist thesis. By entering into critical dialogue with representatives of these arguments I hope to show that the current confidence in the morality of nuclear deterrence is ill-conceived. Chief among the logical and practical difficulties plaguing these arguments are the following. (1) The success thesis rests on the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc reasoning. Nor does the assertion of the past success of deterrence furnish guarantees of future effectiveness. (2) Representatives of the just war thesis either establish conditions for accepting deterrence that are incoherent with their judgments about use (e.g., U.S. Catholic bishops) or develop a theory of deterrence that cannot be morally institutionalized (e.g., David Hollenbach). (3) The argument for the supreme emergency eclipses moral convention in the nuclear age. (4) The attempt to salvage the supreme emergency according to a classical theory of community rests on a fundamental disanalogy between the Aristotelian polis and modern nation-states. Moreover, it opens the door for a double standard to evaluate the methods of war.


2017 ◽  
Vol 41 (4) ◽  
pp. 9-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keir A. Lieber ◽  
Daryl G. Press

Nuclear deterrence rests on the survivability of nuclear arsenals. For much of the nuclear age, “counterforce” disarming attacks—those aimed at eliminating an opponent's nuclear forces—were nearly impossible because of the ability of potential victims to hide and protect their weapons. Technological developments, however, are eroding this foundation of nuclear deterrence. Advances rooted in the computer revolution have made nuclear forces around the world considerably more vulnerable. Specifically, two key approaches that countries have relied on to ensure arsenal survivability since the dawn of the nuclear age—hardening and concealment—have been undercut by leaps in weapons accuracy and a revolution in remote sensing. Various methods, evidence, and models demonstrate the emergence of new possibilities for counterforce disarming strikes. In short, the task of securing nuclear arsenals against attack is far more difficult than it was in the past. The new era of counterforce challenges the basis for confidence in contemporary deterrence stability, raises critical issues for national and international security policy, and sheds light on one of the enduring theoretical puzzles of the nuclear era: why international security competition has endured in the shadow of the nuclear revolution.


Author(s):  
Karl Mueller

AbstractThis chapter examines the theoretical principles that underpin conventional deterrence and its evolution in practice over the past century. It disaggregates conventional deterrence approaches into four strategic categories based on their geographic scope and the nature of the threats they employ, and focuses in particular on strategies of punishment through resistance to an invader on the battlefield. It concludes with an assessment of the strengths and limitations of conventional and nuclear deterrence, and a set of summary principles for conventional deterrence strategy makers.


1986 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
pp. 195-211
Author(s):  
Jan Narveson

War winning, however, is impossible precisely because of the fact that there is no defense now against all-out nuclear use and probably not for the foreseeable future. A nuclear war could therefore be controlled and won only if one side consciously chose to lose the war, an event as unlikely in the future as it has been rare or nonexistent in the past. It is not necessary to win a nuclear war in order to deter it; one has only to ensure that both are likely to lose it.It takes (at least) two to make a war, and of those combatants, one (at least) must start it. If nobody starts the war, there won't be a war. This is as true in the nuclear era as it ever was. But if any given party is certain that he would lose any war initiated by him, then presumably he would not initiate a war. One way for A to make certain that B would lose any war B starts is by having an unstoppable superpowerful weapon of retaliation at hand.


Author(s):  
A. D. Korobkov

The automation of human activity has been growing every year for the past ten years thanks to AI algorithms, increasing the amount of big data and computing power. Today, artificial intelligence technologies are used in everyday life, automating processes previously performed by humans. Moreover, it is believed that these technologies can reach human cognitive abilities and even surpass them at some point. In this regard, questions arise what the future of humanity will look like in conjunction with AI technologies. If earlier, most of the research was more technical, then in the last three to four years, there has been much scientific research in terms of disciplines in which the influence of artificial intelligence is possible. International relations are no exception. The purpose of the article is to review publications on how artificial intelligence technologies affect international relations? Within the framework of the article, six books and eight articles were considered. The author concludes that AI technologies seriously impact international relations in socio-economic and political terms. The socio-economic aspect includes the consequences of automated capitalism on world politics, the rise in unemployment, the emergence of a "hopeless" class, the polarization of society, and more. AI technologies influences strategic stability, nuclear deterrence, and cyber warfare.


1967 ◽  
Vol 31 ◽  
pp. 405
Author(s):  
F. J. Kerr

A continuum survey of the galactic-centre region has been carried out at Parkes at 20 cm wavelength over the areal11= 355° to 5°,b11= -3° to +3° (Kerr and Sinclair 1966, 1967). This is a larger region than has been covered in such surveys in the past. The observations were done as declination scans.


1962 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 133-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Harold C. Urey

During the last 10 years, the writer has presented evidence indicating that the Moon was captured by the Earth and that the large collisions with its surface occurred within a surprisingly short period of time. These observations have been a continuous preoccupation during the past years and some explanation that seemed physically possible and reasonably probable has been sought.


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