Redefining The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program

1994 ◽  
Author(s):  
Patrick M. Cronin ◽  
Michael J. Green
Keyword(s):  
National Defense ◽  
The U.S

The U.S. Constitution And National Defense: A Bicentennial Reappraisal

1987 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 9-15
Author(s):  
George C. Edwards ◽  
Wallace Earl Walker
Keyword(s):  
National Defense ◽  
The U.S

Remarks by Col. Gary Corn

2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 57-59 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary Corn
Keyword(s):  
Department Of Defense ◽  
National Defense ◽  
The Future ◽  
The Moment ◽  
The U.S

First, I should note that I am speaking today in my personal capacity only, and my views do not represent those of the U.S. government, the Department of Defense, or U.S. Cyber Command. At the outset, let me provide a brief overview of U.S. Cyber Command. It is a relatively new command within the Department of Defense. Established about seven years ago as a subunified command, it is an operational headquarters at the strategic level but at the moment subordinate to U.S. Strategic Command, one of the combatant commands within the Department of Defense. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act included a provision stating that there shall be established a combatant command known as U.S. Cyber Command. As a result, there is now a lot of movement afoot to see how we will meet that legislative intent. In all likelihood, U.S. Cyber Command will elevate at some time in the future as a full combatant command.

scholarly journals A New Way Forward: Rebalancing the U.S. Security Cooperation with Greece in a Fast Changing Geostrategic Environment

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 98
Author(s):  
Michail Ploumis
Keyword(s):  
Eastern Mediterranean ◽  
The United States ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Security Cooperation ◽  
The Balkans ◽  
Ww Ii ◽  
Mediterranean Regions ◽  
Security Assistance ◽  
Defense Cooperation ◽  
The U.S

The Hellenic National Defense Forces (HNDF) modernization is at a crossroads because of the current and persistent Greek economic and fiscal crisis. After WW II until today, Greece benefitted from the U.S. security assistance and cooperation programs. Meanwhile, the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean regions geostrategic environment is changing fast to an unpredictable future. That said, Greece, and the U.S.A. under rebalanced approaches, should consider the U.S. security assistance and defense cooperation programs to meet HNDF modernization requirements and current security challenges for both countries in the region. A new framework of cooperation would serve common national security interest of both Greece and the United States in the Balkans and the Eastern Mediterranean regions.

The Nuclear Obsession: V. The “Stately Minuet” of the A.B.M. Debate

Worldview ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 10 (4) ◽  
pp. 4-5
Author(s):  
Jack Walker
Keyword(s):  
Air Force ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Defense System ◽  
Missile Defense ◽  
Nuclear War ◽  
National Elections ◽  
The Past ◽  
Ballistic Missile Defense ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The U.S

The currently emerging debate on the desirability of the U.S. undertaking to deploy an anti-ballistic missile defense system (A.B.M.) threatens to become the next national defense issue to have an impact on national elections. In the past we have all become familiar with real or alleged “bomber gaps,” “missile gaps,” and “conventional gaps.” The basis for all these “gaps” was a deep fear that potential enemies would subject ns to nuclear blackmail, or that our own failure to develop other kinds of military forces would require us to respond to any emergency with an all-out nuclear attack.In an earlier essay, I pointed out how our obsession with nuclear war had encouraged us to discount the significance of conventional war. I want now to turn to an examination of how specific groups in the U.S. have changed their positions in recent years on the subject of defensive weapons. In doing so I have borrowed the term used in 1960 by Henry Kissinger to describe the shifting arguments of the Air Force and Navy.

scholarly journals Illusions of Autonomy: Why Europe Cannot Provide for Its Security If the United States Pulls Back

2021 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 7-43
Author(s):  
Hugo Meijer ◽  
Stephen G. Brooks
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
The United States ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Policy Issues ◽  
Threat Perceptions ◽  
The Past ◽  
Future State ◽  
Strategic Autonomy ◽  
The U.S

Abstract Europe's security landscape has changed dramatically in the past decade amid Russia's resurgence, mounting doubts about the long-term reliability of the U.S. security commitment, and Europe's growing aspiration for strategic autonomy. This changed security landscape raises an important counterfactual question: Could Europeans develop an autonomous defense capacity if the United States withdrew completely from Europe? The answer to this question has major implications for a range of policy issues and for the ongoing U.S. grand strategy debate in light of the prominent argument by U.S. “restraint” scholars that Europe can easily defend itself. Addressing this question requires an examination of the historical evolution as well as the current and likely future state of European interests and defense capacity. It shows that any European effort to achieve strategic autonomy would be fundamentally hampered by two mutually reinforcing constraints: “strategic cacophony,” namely profound, continent-wide divergences across all domains of national defense policies—most notably, threat perceptions; and severe military capacity shortfalls that would be very costly and time-consuming to close. As a result, Europeans are highly unlikely to develop an autonomous defense capacity anytime soon, even if the United States were to fully withdraw from the continent.

Improvement, 1921–1925

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas I. Faith
Keyword(s):  
Chemical Industry ◽  
Financial Constraints ◽  
Chemical Warfare ◽  
Public Image ◽  
Chemical Weapons ◽  
Postwar Period ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Army Officers ◽  
The Military ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the Chemical Warfare Service's (CWS) efforts to improve its public image and its reputation in the military in the first half of the 1920s. It shows that while the National Defense Act preserved the CWS as an organization within the military, it was surrounded by army officers who still had doubts about chemical weapons. It highlights the tenuous relationship between the CWS and the rest of the military that was exacerbated by the financial constraints of the postwar period. It considers the ways that Amos A. Fries and his fellow CWS officers continued to build on the foundations they had laid during the U.S. Army's reorganization crisis and tried to change public opinion with respect to chemical weapons, mainly by cultivating relationships within the military and with civilians in the chemical industry, as the organization struggled to consolidate its gains and carry out its mission in the postwar world.

The National Defense Language Institutes: A Critical Report

PMLA ◽  
1965 ◽  
Vol 80 (2) ◽  
pp. 33-36
Author(s):  
Donald D. Walsh
Keyword(s):  
Modern Language Association ◽  
National Defense ◽  
Modern Language ◽  
Academic Year ◽  
The U.S

The modern Language Association, under contract with the U.S. Office of Education, has organized and supervised the evaluation of National Defense Language Institutes in the summers of 1963 and 1964 and during the 1963–64 academic year. A total of 45 evaluators (21 in 1963, 28 in 1964, some of them serving in both years) visited 132 institutes (all of the 82 institutes in the summer of 1963, the 4 academic-year institutes in 1963–64, and 46 of the 80 institutes in the summer of 1964).

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