No Hostile Intent: Reducing U.S. Ground Forces in Light of Korean Unification in 2025

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Scorza
Keyword(s):  
Korean Unification ◽  
Hostile Intent

Training Law Enforcement to Recognize Hostile Intent

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark G. Frank ◽  
Thomas H. Feeley ◽  
Sinuk Kang
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Hostile Intent

Japan's Two Koreas Policy and the Problems of Korean Unification

Asian Survey ◽  
1967 ◽  
Vol 7 (10) ◽  
pp. 703-725
Author(s):  
Soon Sung Cho
Keyword(s):  
Korean Unification

Detection of Hostile Intent by Spatial Movements

2021 ◽  
pp. 001872082110150
Author(s):  
Colleen E. Patton ◽  
Christopher D. Wickens ◽  
C. A. P. Smith ◽  
Benjamin A. Clegg
Keyword(s):  
Early Identification ◽  
Human Performance ◽  
Decision Aids ◽  
Movement Direction ◽  
Time Variability ◽  
Discrete Movement ◽  
Hostile Intent ◽  
Movement Characteristics ◽  
Computer Controlled ◽  
Do So

Objective The ability of people to infer intentions from movement of other vessels was investigated. Across three levels of variability in movements in the path of computer-controlled ships, participants attempted to determine which entity was hostile. Background Detection of hostile intentions through spatial movements of vessels is important in an array of real-world scenarios. This experiment sought to determine baseline abilities of humans to do so. Methods Participants selected a discrete movement direction of their ship. Six other ships’ locations then updated. A single entity displayed one of two hostile behaviors: shadowing, which involved mirroring the participant’s vessel’s movements; and hunting, which involved closing in on the participant’s vessel. Trials allowed up to 35 moves before identifying the hostile ship and its behavior. Uncertainty was introduced through adding variability to ships’ movements such that their path was 0%, 25%, or 50% random. Results Even with no variability in the ships’ movements, accurate detection was low, identifying the hostile entity about 60% of the time. Variability in the paths decreased detection. Detection of hunting was strongly degraded by distance between ownship and the hostile ship, but shadowing was not. Strategies employing different directions of movement across the trial, but also featuring some runs of consecutive movements, facilitated detection. Conclusions Early identification of threats based on movement characteristics alone is likely to be difficult, but particularly so when adversaries employ some level of uncertainty to mask their intentions. These findings highlight the need to develop decision aids to support human performance.

Korean Crisis and Russia’s Policies

2014 ◽  
pp. 63-71
Author(s):  
K. Khudoley
Keyword(s):  
Korean Peninsula ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
International Security ◽  
Medium Term ◽  
Development Models ◽  
Korean Unification

The main reason for tensions on the Korean peninsula is the competition and confrontation between the two development models, one of which is struggling to survive with such methods that create a threat to international security. It is in Russia's interests to prevent armed conflict or prolonged tension near its borders. The settlement of the Korean problem is possible in the medium term in the course of Korean unification.

Korean unification prospects: an assessment through the BDN-model

2015 ◽  
Vol 50 (3) ◽  
pp. 1059-1072
Author(s):  
Mario Arturo Ruiz Estrada ◽  
Donghyun Park ◽  
Ibrahim Ndoma ◽  
Jung Suk Kim
Keyword(s):  
Korean Unification

"Three-Stage" Approach to Korean Unification: Focusing on the South-North Confederal Stage

1999 ◽  
Vol 72 (4) ◽  
pp. 590
Author(s):  
Victor D. Cha ◽  
Dae-jung Kim ◽  
T. C. Rhee ◽  
Hee-Ho Lee
Keyword(s):  
The South ◽  
Korean Unification
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