Great Britain and the United States: Analogy of Two Great Powers Separated by Time and a Common Language

2001 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael C. Sevcik
Author(s):  
Mary S. Barton

This is a book about terrorism, weapons, and diplomacy in the interwar years between the First and Second World Wars. It charts the convergence of the manufacture and trade of arms; diplomacy among the Great Powers and the domestic politics within them; the rise of national liberation and independence movements; and the burgeoning concept and early institutions of international counterterrorism. Key themes include: a transformation in meaning and practice of terrorism; the inability of Great Powers—namely, Great Britain, the United States, France—to harmonize perceptions of interest and the pursuit of common interests; the establishment of the tools and infrastructure of modern intelligence—including the U.S.-U.K. cooperation that would evolve into the Five Eyes intelligence alliance; and the nature of peacetime in the absence of major wars. Particular emphasis is given to British attempts to quell revolutionary nationalist movements in India and elsewhere in its empire, and to the Great Powers’ combined efforts to counter the activities of the Communist International. The facilitating roles of the Paris Peace Conference and League of Nations are explored here, in the context of the Arms Traffic Convention of 1919, the Arms Traffic Conference of 1925, and the 1937 Terrorism Convention.


1919 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-212
Author(s):  
Charles G. Fenwick

The difficulty of threading one's way through the intricacies of the organization of the Peace Conference is due chiefly to the fact that the conference is from one point of view a continuation of various interallied conferences and councils created for the prosecution of the war. In some cases the functions of these bodies have apparently been taken over by the conference, and in other cases the preëxisting councils and commissions have continued in operation as interallied agencies distinct from the organization of the conference. A brief review of the most important of these agencies will be of assistance, therefore, in making clear the origin and special functions of the conference.The Supreme War Council was created by an agreement between Great Britain, France and Italy at a meeting held at Rapallo, Italy, in the first week of November, 1917. It was composed of the prime ministers and a member of the governments of each of the great powers fighting on the western front. Its purpose was to watch over the general conduct of the war and prepare recommendations for the decision of the governments. It was to be assisted by a permanent central military committee, consisting of Generals Foch, Wilson and Cadorna, but the decisions of these technical advisers were merely to be the basis of recommendations from the War Council to the several governments, leaving the general staffs and military commands of each power responsible to their individual governments. The United States subsequently adhered to the Rapallo agreement, and participated in the meeting of the council at Versailles on December 1, 1917.


2020 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 90-126
Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson

International relations scholarship overwhelmingly expects that relatively rising states will threaten and challenge declining great powers. In practice, however, rising states can also cooperate with and support declining powers. What explains the rising state's choice of policy? When do rising states support or prey on declining great powers, and why do such strategies vary across time and space? The answer depends on the rising state's broader strategic calculations. All things being equal, a rising state will generally support a declining power when the latter can be used to offset threats from other great powers that can harm the rising state's security. Conversely, when using a declining state to offset such challenges is not a plausible option, the rising state is likely to pursue a predation strategy. The level of assertiveness of support or predation, meanwhile, depends on the declining power's military posture: the stronger the declining state is militarily, the less assertive the rising state tends to be. A review of the strategies adopted by two relatively rising powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, toward a declining Great Britain after 1945, and of a rising United States vis-à-vis a declining Soviet Union in the late Cold War, illustrates how this argument outperforms explanations that focus instead on the importance of economic interdependence and ideology.


1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (5) ◽  
pp. 970-975
Author(s):  
James K. Pollock

With the military defeat of Germany now assured, it becomes imperative to complete plans for occupation of the country. There is apparent agreement among the United Nations that Germany must be occupied; but, although much work has been done on the subject, by both the military and political branches of the several Allied Governments, to date we have not had any general policy directives from the heads of the three great powers, namely, Russia, Great Britain, and the United States. Presumably, at the Teheran conference Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin came to a preliminary meeting of minds with reference to the various aspects of the war against Germany. At the second Quebec conference, it may reasonably be assumed that the President and Mr. Churchill, keeping in close contact with the Soviet leader, finally came to some definite agreement regarding the measures necessary to encompass the complete defeat and occupation of Germany.It has been generally agreed all around that Germany must be occupied by the troops of the Allied Nations, but many of the specific details of such an occupation have not yet been thought through. When we speak of the occupation of Germany, we must first of all define exactly what we mean by the term Germany. It is expected that “Germany” will be understood to cover only those territories included within the Republic prior to Hitler's accession to power. It might be better to agree that the boundaries shall be understood to be those of January 1, 1932.


Author(s):  
Myroslav Dnistryanskyy

Comparative analysis of objectives and basic directions of geopolitics of the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Russia and China are made. A place of Ukraine in geopolitics of great powers is appointed. Contradictions of realization of geopolitical interests by great powers in context of global security and sustainable development are shown. Key words: geopolitics, geopolitical analysis, great powers, foreign policy, geopolitical interests.


1999 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. 787-820 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth Chadwick

The Geneva Arbitration of 1872 was convened to settle various differences between the United States and Great Britain and, in particular, American allegations of British collusion with regard to shipbuilding for the Southern Confederacy during the American Civil War. The Arbitrators ultimately found Britain liable, and awarded $15,500,000 to the United States. This decision remains controversial to the extent that it rested on rules which were not yet accepted as principles of general international law, and which clearly favoured the case of the United States from the outset. It is thus the purpose of this article to explore the facts behind the Geneva Arbitration, and to argue that the finding of British liability in Geneva marked the beginning decline of the laws of neutrality. Neutral Countries […] may be exploited by the Great Powers both strategically and as a source of additional armies and fleets. Of central importance to the game are those Neutral Countries and provinces which are designated as “Supply Centres.” […] A player's fighting strength is directly related to the number of Supply Centres he or she controls, whilst the game is won when one player controls at least 18 Supply Centres.


Legal Studies ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 3 (3) ◽  
pp. 267-282
Author(s):  
Christine Gray

In 1908 international law governed relations between ‘civilised states’ only. It applied exclusively to those states within the Family ofNations - 45 fully sovereign states according to the first edition of Oppenheim's International Law. These 45 included the six ‘Great Powers’, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Russia, various lesser European states, the United States of America and 20 Latin American states. In Africa ‘The Negro Republic of Liberia and the Congo Free State were the only real and full members ofthe Family of Nations’, in Asia only Japan. The position ofsuch states as Persia, Siam, China, Korea and Abyssinia was doubtful; ‘These states are certainly civilised states, and Abyssinia is even a Christian state.


1965 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 55-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph L. Powell

In terms of Western political science or military doctrine it seems somewhat irrational that the leaders of Communist China should refer to great powers as “paper tigers.” It appears even more illogical that they should call atomic bombs “paper tigers,” especially when they themselves place the highest priority on the development of a nuclear capability. Yet, since the first Chinese nuclear explosion on October 16, 1964, the official Communist Press has again referred to the United States, Great Britain and the “revisionists” (both Khrushchev and the present leaders of the Soviet Union) as “paper tigers.” This same metaphor has also been applied to “imperialism” and “all reactionaries,” as well as to nuclear weapons, air-power and sea-power.


Author(s):  
Jakub J. Grygiel ◽  
A. Wess Mitchell ◽  
Jakub J. Grygiel ◽  
A. Wess Mitchell

From the Baltic to the South China Sea, newly assertive authoritarian states sense an opportunity to resurrect old empires or build new ones at America's expense. Hoping that U.S. decline is real, nations such as Russia, Iran, and China are testing Washington's resolve by targeting vulnerable allies at the frontiers of American power. This book explains why the United States needs a new grand strategy that uses strong frontier alliance networks to raise the costs of military aggression in the new century. The book describes the aggressive methods which rival nations are using to test American power in strategically critical regions throughout the world. It shows how rising and revisionist powers are putting pressure on our frontier allies—countries like Poland, Israel, and Taiwan—to gauge our leaders' commitment to upholding the American-led global order. To cope with these dangerous dynamics, nervous U.S. allies are diversifying their national-security “menu cards” by beefing up their militaries or even aligning with their aggressors. The book reveals how numerous would-be great powers use an arsenal of asymmetric techniques to probe and sift American strength across several regions simultaneously, and how rivals and allies alike are learning from America's management of increasingly interlinked global crises to hone effective strategies of their own. The book demonstrates why the United States must strengthen the international order that has provided greater benefits to the world than any in history.


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