British Air Control: A Model for the Application of Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict?

Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict

10.21236/ada186694 ◽

1987 ◽

Author(s):

Gary N. Schneider

Keyword(s):

Air Power ◽

Low Intensity

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Breaker of Armies: Air Power in the Easter Offensive and the Myth of Linebacker I and II in the Vietnam War

International Security ◽

10.1162/isec_a_00226 ◽

2016 ◽

Vol 40 (3) ◽

pp. 139-178 ◽

Cited By ~ 5

Author(s):

Phil Haun ◽

Colin Jackson

Keyword(s):

Control System ◽

Vietnam War ◽

Air Power ◽

The North ◽

South Vietnam ◽

The Vietnam War ◽

North Vietnam ◽

Air Control

Most traditional accounts identify the Linebacker I and Linebacker II campaigns as the most effective and consequential uses of U.S. air power in the Vietnam War. They argue that deep interdiction in North Vietnam played a central role in the defeat of the Easter Offensive and that subsequent strategic attacks on Hanoi forced the North Vietnamese to accept the Paris accords. These conclusions are false. The Linebacker campaigns were rather ineffective in either stopping the Communist offensive or compelling concessions. The most effective and consequential use of U.S. air power came in the form of close air support and battlefield air interdiction directly attacking the North Vietnamese Army in South Vietnam. The success of these air strikes hinged on the presence of a U.S.-operated tactical air control system that incorporated small numbers of ground advisers, air liaison officers, and forward air controllers. This system, combined with abundant U.S. aircraft and a reasonably effective allied army, was the key to breaking the Easter Offensive and compelling Hanoi to agree to the Paris accords. The effectiveness of close air support and battlefield air interdiction and the failure of deep interdiction and strategic attack in the Vietnam War have important implications for the use of air power and advisers in contemporary conflicts in Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan.

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Rolling Thunder and Linebacker Campaigns: The North Vietnamese View

Journal of American-East Asian Relations ◽

10.1163/187656101793645524 ◽

2001 ◽

Vol 10 (3-4) ◽

pp. 197-230

Author(s):

Merle L. Pribbenow

Keyword(s):

World War Ii ◽

World War ◽

Combat Experience ◽

Air Power ◽

Desert Storm ◽

Low Intensity ◽

The North ◽

The World ◽

North Vietnam ◽

Iraqi Freedom

AbstractNorth Vietnam has the dubious distinction of having more combat experience against U.S. air power than any other nation in the world. Rolling Thunder, the first U.S. bombing campaign against North Vietnam (1965–68), lasted longer than U.S. air operations in Europe during World War II. When one adds the 1972 Linebacker air campaign against North Vietnam and the almost nine-year bombing campaign against the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos, only Iraq, with the air campaigns of Operations Desert Storm and Iraqi Freedom book-ending a twelve-year (1991–2003), low-intensity confrontation against U.S. aircraft over the no fly zones, faced U.S. air attacks longer. The air battles over Iraq, however, cannot be compared with the battles fought in the skies over North Vietnam. During the course of the war, more than 1,100 U.S. fixed wing aircraft were lost in combat operations.

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