Compensation and Non-Compensation Inducements and the Supply of Military Manpower

1973 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sheldon E. Haber
Keyword(s):  
Military Manpower

Psychiatry and military manpower policy.

1955 ◽  
Vol 52 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-172
Author(s):  
Leonard Carmichael
Keyword(s):  
Manpower Policy ◽  
Military Manpower

Markets and Manpower

2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 436-458 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lindsay P. Cohn ◽  
Nathan W. Toronto
Keyword(s):  
Labor Markets ◽  
Economic Variables ◽  
Data Set ◽  
External Threat ◽  
Military Manpower ◽  
Threat Levels ◽  
Over 40 Years ◽  
Economic Studies ◽  
Relevant Factors

Economic studies of military manpower systems emphasize the advantages of voluntarism under all but the most total threats, but this explains neither the persistence of institutionalized conscription in many states nor the timing of shifts from such conscription systems to volunteer militaries. Traditional explanations focus on external threat levels, but this has also proven unsatisfying. We theorize that threat variables establish the state’s baseline need for manpower, but structural economic variables determine whether the necessary manpower can be more efficiently obtained by conscription or voluntarism. Using a new data set of 99 countries over 40 years, we find that states with British origins are less likely and those experiencing greater external threat are more likely to employ conscripts. Most importantly, states with more highly regulated labor markets are more likely to employ conscripts, which suggests that, controlling for a number of relevant factors, labor markets matter in military manpower decisions.

scholarly journals Inter-Nation Influence: A Formal Model

1963 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 420-430 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. David Singer
Keyword(s):  
Gross National Product ◽  
International Politics ◽  
Formal Model ◽  
National Product ◽  
Objective Measures ◽  
Analytic Model ◽  
National Power ◽  
Technological Level ◽  
Military Manpower

Students of international politics often state that power is to us what money is to the economist: the medium via which transactions are observed and measured. Further, there seems to be a solid consensus that power is a useful concept only in its relative sense; such objective measures as military manpower, technological level, and gross national product are viewed as helpful, but incomplete, indices. The concept does not come to life except as it is observed in action, and that action can be found only when national power is brought into play by nations engaged in the process of influencing one another. Until that occurs, we have no operational indices of power, defined here as the capacity to influence. In this paper, then, my purpose is to seek a clarification of the concept of power by the presentation of a formal, analytic model of bilateral inter-nation influence.

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