scholarly journals The Relation Between CEO Compensation Gap and Future Performance －Evidence from Korea－

2017 ◽  
Vol null (72) ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
김정애 ◽  
Jong-Seo Choi
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Compensation Gap

Minding the gap: the effect of CEO underpayment on firm-specific knowledge

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (9) ◽  
pp. 2107-2125
Author(s):  
Linlin Wang ◽  
Zhaofang Chu ◽  
Wan Jiang ◽  
Yifan Xu
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Equity Theory ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Specific Knowledge ◽  
Data Set ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Knowledge Based ◽  
Negative Effect ◽  
Compensation Gap ◽  
Specific Human Capital

Purpose This study aims to build on equity theory to assess the effect of chief executive officer (CEO) underpayment on the accumulation of firm-specific knowledge, accounting for the moderating effects of the CEO compensation gap and the clarity of the board’s informal hierarchy. Design/methodology/approach This study starts with all firms listed in the Execucomp database for the period 1992 to 2006. Then, all data sources are merged and entries with missing information are excluded. The final data set used for model estimations includes 1,152 firm-year observations. The command xtreg in Stata 12 with the fixed-effect option (fe) is used to estimate the relationship between CEO underpayment and firm-specific knowledge. Findings This study proposed and examined the role of CEO underpayment in discouraging CEO willingness to invest firm-specific human capital and, accordingly, to adopt a strategy of accumulating lower levels of firm-specific knowledge assets. The empirical analyses strongly support this argument. Moreover, CEO compensation gaps and the informal hierarchy of boards negatively moderated this relationship. That is, CEO underpayment had a weaker negative effect on firm-specific knowledge when the CEO compensation gap and the clarity of the board’s informal hierarchy were high. Originality/value Prior studies from the knowledge-based perspective have focused on the importance of firm-specific knowledge in enabling a firm to achieve superior financial performance. However, relatively little attention has been paid to CEOs’ willingness to accumulate firm-specific knowledge. The present study contributes to the knowledge-based view of the firm. This study integrates equity theory with the knowledge-based view of the firm by highlighting how unfair compensation of CEOs may discourage them to fully realize a firm’s potential to generate specific knowledge. By incorporating the fairness issue of CEO compensation into the knowledge-based view, this study contributes to a deeper understanding of the origins of firm-specific knowledge.

The Relation between CEO Compensation and Past Performance

2012 ◽  
Vol 88 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rajiv D. Banker ◽  
Masako N. Darrough ◽  
Rong Huang ◽  
Jose M. Plehn-Dujowich
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Adverse Selection ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Data Availability ◽  
Past Performance ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Theoretical Predictions ◽  
Information Rent ◽  
And Performance

ABSTRACT: This study focuses on the relation between current compensation and past performance measures as signals of a chief executive officer's (CEO's) ability. We develop a simple two-period principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection and test theoretical predictions using CEO compensation data from 1993–2006. Consistent with the predictions, we find that salary (bonus) is positively (negatively) associated with past performance for both continuing and newly hired CEOs. We also find that while current salary is positively associated with future performance, current bonus is not. As the model suggests, salary is adjusted to meet the reservation utility and information rent, and is positively correlated over time to reflect ability. Bonus serves to address moral hazard and adverse selection by separating high-ability agents into riskier contracts. Our results indicate that it is important to disaggregate cash compensation into salary and bonus components to understand the dynamic interaction between incentives and performance. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources indicated in the text.

scholarly journals Does the compensation gap between executives and staffs influence future firm performance? The moderating roles of managerial power and overconfidence

2019 ◽  
Vol 55 (4) ◽  
pp. 287-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ping Liu ◽  
Md Sajjad Hosain ◽  
Liyan Li
Keyword(s):  
Pearson Correlation ◽  
Secondary Data ◽  
Stock Exchanges ◽  
Senior Managers ◽  
Pay Gap ◽  
Future Performance ◽  
Top Managers ◽  
Compensation Gap ◽  
Managerial Overconfidence ◽  
Management Power

AbstractThe study aims at identifying the influence of interior pay gap between senior executives and ordinary employees on the organization’s future performance for listed Chinese firms. In addition, two other moderator variables have been included in the study referring management power as the percentage of senior managers holding “A” category shares for more than one position. The other one is managerial overconfidence defined as the change in management holdings by themselves (managers) positively. The paper is based on secondary data extracted from China’s ‘A’ listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges with a valid sample size of 1,189. After detailed analysis (Pearson correlation and regression) between the variables, it was found that there is a moderate positive relationship between the pay gap and firms’ future performance. The results further indicate that management power and overconfidence weaken the relationship between pay gap and corporate performance. The authors hope that this empirical study can guide the academicians intending to further excavate in this relatively uncharted area as well as the corporate body and top managers who seek some guidelines to formulate an effective pay plan.

CEO Compensation and Acquired and Acquiring Companies in Large Corporate Acquisitions

GIS Business ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 01-13
Author(s):  
Simon Yang
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Relative Sensitivity ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
Corporate Acquisitions ◽  
Acquiring Firms ◽  
Managerial Power ◽  
To Receive

This paper examines the relative sensitivity of CEO compensation of both acquiring and acquired firms in the top 30 U.S. largest corporate acquisitions in each year for the period of 2003 to 2012. We find that total compensation and bonus granted to executive compensation for acquired companies, not acquiring companies, are significantly related to the amount of acquisition deal even after the size and firm performance are controlled for. Both acquiring and acquired CEOs are found to make the significantly higher compensation than the matched sample firms in the same industry and calendar year. We also find that executives with higher managerial power, as measured by a lower salary-based compensation mix, prior to a corporate acquisition are more likely to receive a higher executive pay in the year of acquisition. The association between executive compensation and managerial power seems to be stronger for acquired firms than for acquiring firms in corporate acquisition. Overall, our findings suggest that corporate acquisition has higher impacts on executive compensation for acquired firm CEOs than for acquiring firm CEOs.

The Role And Effect Of Remuneration Consultants On CEO Compensation : Evidence Horn The UK Companic

2018 ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
مريع سعد الهباش ◽  
صالح علي فراج العقلا
Keyword(s):  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
The Uk
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