scholarly journals La estructura intencional de la Ley natural, según Vázquez (s. xvi) / The Intentional Structure of the Natural Law According to Vázquez (16th century)

2013 ◽  
Vol 20 ◽  
pp. 121
Author(s):  
Juan CRUZ CRUZ
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
16Th Century ◽  
Moral Rule ◽  
Practical Judgment ◽  
Structural Requirements ◽  
Rational Nature ◽  
Intentional Structure ◽  
Self Consistency

Gabriel Vázquez (1549-1604) explained that natural law is properly «the whole of radical or structural requirements of human nature as such, which is biological and rational at the same time». Natural law has also «self-consistency» by its own nature, and not by the consent or will of anyone, not even God. There is a double natural law: the primary one is the rational nature, and the secondary one is the judgment of our reason. This secondary natural law, based on the rational nature —which is our first moral rule—, gives a guideline, a practical judgment about the morality and immorality of human acts. The first is properly rule (mensura), the second is properly law (lex). The present study examines this dual intentional structure of natural law.

Naturalizing Sharīʿa: Foundationalist Ambiguities in Modern Islamic Apologetics

2015 ◽  
Vol 22 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 45-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew F. March
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Islamic Law ◽  
Close Reading ◽  
Natural Religion ◽  
Ethical Systems

This essay discusses an important feature of much modern Islamic writing on law, politics and morality. The feature in question is the claim that Islamic law and human nature (fiṭra) are in perfect harmony, that Islam is the “natural religion” (dīn al-fiṭra), and thus that the demands of Islamic law are easy and painless for ordinary human moral capacities. My discussion proceeds through a close reading of the Moroccan independence leader and religious scholar ʿAllāl al-Fāsī (d. 1974). I discuss the ambiguities within Fāsī’s theory and suggest that the natural religion doctrine might be better understood less as a reduction of Islamic law to “natural law” and more as an apologetic effort to defend the realism and feasibility of Islamic law. In the hands of reformers like Fāsī, this project is beset with unresolved ambiguities around the constraining quality of revealed law in practice and the moral validity of non-Islamic political and ethical systems.


scholarly journals Human Rights and Human Nature

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 523-534
Author(s):  
Jean Rhéaume
Keyword(s):  
Human Rights ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Historical Context ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Positive Law

At least two important consequences follow from the fact that human rights are based on human nature. First, they exist according to natural law even in cases where positive law does not recognize them. Secondly, they cannot evolve because the nature and purpose of the human being does not change: only their formulation and level of protection in positive law can vary according to the socio-historical context.

Calvin's legacy for contemporary Reformed natural law

2014 ◽  
Vol 67 (4) ◽  
pp. 414-435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer A. Herdt
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Moral Knowledge ◽  
Empirical Science ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Fair Dealing ◽  
Modern Natural ◽  
Moral Quality ◽  
Careful Distinction

AbstractRecent scholarship has done much to uncover a continuous tradition of distinctively Reformed natural law reflection, according to which knowledge of the natural moral law, though not saving knowledge, is universally available to humanity in its fallen state and makes a stable secular order possible. A close look at Calvin's understanding of natural law, and in particular of conscience and natural human instincts, shows that Calvin himself did not expect the natural law to serve as a source of substantive action-guiding moral norms. First, Calvin held that conscience delivers information concerning the moral quality even of individual actions. But he also thought that we often blind ourselves to the deliverances of conscience. Second, he argued that our natural instincts predispose us to civic order and fair dealing insofar as these are necessary for the natural well-being or advantage of creatures such as ourselves. But he also carefully distinguished the good of advantage from the good of justice or virtue. The modern natural lawyers eroded Calvin's careful distinction between conscience as revealing our duty as duty, and instinct as guiding us towards natural advantage. They also turned away from Calvin's insistence on the moral incapacity of unredeemed humanity. The modern natural lawyers saw their task as one of developing an empirical science of human nature to guide legislation and shape international law, bracketing questions of whether this nature was fallen and in need of redemption. When Scottish Presbyterian Reformed thinkers, such as Gershom Carmichael and John Witherspoon, tried in diverse ways to restore eroded Reformed commitments to the science of human nature, about which they were otherwise so enthusiastic, they were not particularly successful. A science which could derive moral norms from an examination of human instincts, and a conscience which could deliver universal moral knowledge, proved too attractive to decline simply because of the transcendence of God or the fallenness of humankind. Those who wished to preserve an account of natural law which remained faithful to a fully robust set of Reformed theological commitments could do so only by refusing to regard the natural law as a positive source of moral knowledge.

Natural Law and Protestant Reform: Lessons from the Forgotten Reformer

Pro Ecclesia ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 28 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-319
Author(s):  
J. Daryl Charles
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
16Th Century ◽  
Recent History ◽  
Natural Law Ethics

Despite Protestants’ suspicion of natural law ethics in their recent history, there are signs that in some Protestant circles a re-awakening to the importance of natural law is occurring. This is as it should be, given the fact that the magisterial reformers of the 16th century all affirmed without equivocation the natural law. Foremost among these champions was the forgotten reformer, Phillip Melanchthon, whose remarkable output and influence during the 16th century were unparalleled and whose emphasis on natural law reasoning was notable.

Epilogue and Conclusion

2021 ◽  
pp. 268-272
Author(s):  
Sarah Mortimer
Keyword(s):  
Seventeenth Century ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Religious Belief ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Political Thought ◽  
Political Authority ◽  
Historical Change ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Hugo Grotius ◽  
The Church

This chapter draws together the themes of the book and looks forward to the later-seventeenth century. It argues that for much of the sixteenth century politics was subordinate to religion; temporal authorities needed the additional sanctions provided by religious belief if they were to exert any power over the consciences of individuals. The effect was to entangle temporal power in the deepening conflicts over religious truth, and thus to reveal the brittleness of any conception of political authority which relied on the support of the Church. At the same time, older traditions of political thought did not go away and often became stronger. The circulation of classical ideas, the discovery of new peoples, the growing interest in historical change and development all suggested alternative ways of legitimizing political power, often using natural law and avoiding any reliance on specifically Christian commitments. What happened in the early-seventeenth century, and most obviously in the writing of Hugo Grotius, was a move not only to ground political society in a particular conception of human nature (conceived of juridically, as a source of rights and obligations) but also to detach Christianity from that view of human nature. It was this understanding of human beings which enabled the development of a social contract tradition through the seventeenth century and beyond, and became an important source for modern liberalism. The questions it raised would help to shape the thought of the next century.

Kelsen’s Enemies

2021 ◽  
pp. 8-35
Author(s):  
Robert Schuett
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
The Other ◽  
Pure Theory ◽  
White Sand ◽  
International Legal Order ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
The Many ◽  
Political Thinker

Why is Kelsen such a consequential and controversial, perhaps even misunderstood, political thinker and actor? Who wants to make us believe that Kelsen was a naïve idealist dreaming up a Kantian peace and throwing white sand at battle cruisers? The chapter is a rebuttal of the many clichés propounded by Schmittians and the other pseudo-realists that are thrown at Kelsen and the project of a Pure theory of law, state, and international legal order. The fact that the FBI was after Kelsen as an alleged communist is as ridiculous as it is tragic, and even two of his own students, Hans J. Morgenthau and John H. Herz, did not seem to understand legal positivism’s cold analysis of political and international life. The same goes for the fact that Kelsen was, actually, a tough Freudian human nature realist who turned the tables on natural law ideologues. Who’s naïve now?

The Spark That Still Shines: John Calvin on Conscience and Natural Law

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Constance Y Lee
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
John Calvin ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Reformed Theology ◽  
Human Reason ◽  
Moral Discernment ◽  
Central Figure ◽  
Knowledge Of God ◽  
Sufficient Knowledge

Abstract John Calvin (1509–64), a central figure in Reformed theology, is perhaps best known for his bleak doctrine of total human depravity. This dismal view of human reason has commonly overshadowed his statement that ‘some sparks still shine’. This article proposes that Calvin’s account of conscience, by conserving an illuminated space in human nature, makes possible a formal doctrine of natural law. Calvin enlists the interconnectedness between the knowledge of God and human reason to frame his anthropology. According to this, human reason was originally created to perfectly access knowledge of God but after the Fall, can only attain imperfect access. Within this broader framework, by adopting a dialectic of dual perspectives, Calvin maintains that, however fallen, human nature still partially reflects the Imago Dei as first intended. As through a glass darkly, this divine image is reflected in human conscience endowing it with sufficient knowledge for moral discernment. Calvin’s emphasis on ‘common grace’ in the preservation of this knowledge allows him to simultaneously maintain human ignorance and their universal accountability to objective norms. In this way, Calvin’s account of conscience enables him to hold both apparent extremes in tension: the immanent fallibility of human beings with the external normative standards they ought to pursue.

The nature and role of morality in situational action theory

2020 ◽  
pp. 147737082097709
Author(s):  
Jennifer Barton-Crosby
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Action Theory ◽  
Moral Rule ◽  
Personal Morality ◽  
Rule Breaking ◽  
Situational Action Theory ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Perception Of Action

For situational action theory (SAT), morality is key to the definition of crime and the explanation for why and how acts of crime happen: acts of crime are acts of moral rule-breaking and personal morality guides individuals’ perception of moral rule-breaking as an option before controls become relevant. However, the nature and role of morality in SAT can be misread. Within this article I respond to misinterpretations of the theory by elaborating and adding further context to the concept of morality in SAT. I contend that the root of misunderstanding is grounded in alternative assumptions regarding human nature: SAT assumes a fundamentally rule-guided human nature, whereas the prevailing view within criminology is that people are primarily self-interested. In this article I delineate SAT’s assumption of a rule-guided human nature and set out how this assumption informs the definition of crime and personal morality in the theory. I further specify the nature and role of morality in the perception of action alternatives, and in so doing distinguish SAT from theories that view constraint as the measure of morality. Finally, I develop and clarify SAT’s position on the relationship between morality and the law.

The Leviathan’s Conscience: Hobbesian Human Nature and Moral Judgment

2017 ◽  
Vol 70 (4) ◽  
pp. 778-789 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Branstetter
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Human Nature ◽  
Thomas Hobbes ◽  
The State ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Practical Judgment ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Moral Improvement ◽  
Individual Judgment

Hannah Arendt claims that Thomas Hobbes was responsible for constituting modern people as apolitical subjects who can no longer make independent moral judgments. The refusal to think that Hobbes allegedly engendered was a major factor in twentieth-century totalitarianism’s worst crimes. In her view, Hobbes’s Leviathan established the architecture of the totalitarian state and initiated the cultivation of people so incapable of exercising moral judgment that they stood idly by and let such a state commit horrors in their name. I argue that Hobbes rejected the proto-totalitarian form of domination Arendt attributes to him and expressed hope about the human capacities for practical judgment and moral improvement. Instead of creating thoughtless subjects which authorize any crime the state might commit, he suggests that the Leviathan should cultivate the public’s capacity for reason and judgment to make violence unnecessary. Considering Hobbes’s accounts of reason and science in light of his materialism shows that the Leviathan requires the exercise of individual moral thought and judgment to function properly. I suggest that the primary duty of the Hobbesian sovereign might be understood primarily in terms of the cultivation of individual judgment and reason rather than its suppression.

scholarly journals The problem of egoism in Rousseau’s practical philosophy

2012 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 148-162
Author(s):  
Slobodan Sadzakov
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Natural Law ◽  
Practical Philosophy ◽  
General Will ◽  
Practical Principle ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Legal Sense ◽  
The Way

This paper discusses the aspects of Rousseau?s understandimg of egoism, primarily those related to his highlighting of historical dimension of the problem, including the economical reasons for establishing this practical principle as an important part of the civil reproduction of life. Among other things, it analyses the contextual connection of egoism with relevant definitions in Rousseau?s work such as human nature, natural law, general will etc. and the difference of Rousseau?s overview of this problem from other important philosophers, for example Hobbes. This paper underlines how the French philosopher, on the basis of key assumptions of his practical philosophy, points at the historical dependence and the possibility of overcoming the egoistic actions, and endeavors to pave the way to a multilateral practical unlocking of the potentials of freedom in its political, moral and legal sense.

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