Some late questions about Transcendental Philosophy and its resignification by Philosophical Semantics

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucas Vollet
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Philosophy

Emmanuel Levinas: Um estudo sobre a ética da alteridade

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Abimael Francisco do Nascimento
Keyword(s):  
Emmanuel Levinas ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
The Other ◽  
New Thought ◽  
Philosophical Criticism ◽  
The Face ◽  
The Subject ◽  
Theoretical Foundations ◽  
First Philosophy

The general objective of this study is to analyze the postulate of the ethics of otherness as the first philosophy, presented by Emmanuel Levinas. It is a proposal that runs through Levinas' thinking from his theoretical foundations, to his philosophical criticism. Levinas' thought presents itself as a new thought, as a critique of ontology and transcendental philosophy. For him, the concern with knowledge and with being made the other to be forgotten, placing the other in totality. Levinas proposes the ethics of otherness as sensitivity to the other. The subject says here I am, making myself responsible for the other in an infinite way, in a transcendence without return to myself, becoming hostage to the other, as an irrefutable responsibility. The idea of the infinite, present in the face of the other, points to a responsibility whoever more assumes himself, the more one is responsible, until the substitution by other.

O curso de Geografia Física de Immanuel Kant (1724-1804): uma contribuição para a história e a epistemologia da ciência geográfica

GEOgraphia ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 10 (19) ◽  
pp. 103
Author(s):  
Alexandre Domingues Ribas ◽  
Antonio Carlos Vitte
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Physical Geography ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Philosophical Reflection ◽  
General Surface ◽  
The World ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Creation ◽  
Modern Geography

Resumo: Há um relativo depauperamento no tocante ao nosso conhecimento a respeito da relação entre a filosofia kantiana e a constituição da geografia moderna e, conseqüentemente, científica. Esta relação, quando abordada, o é - vezes sem conta - de modo oblíquo ou tangencial, isto é, ela resta quase que exclusivamente confinada ao ato de noticiar que Kant ofereceu, por aproximadamente quatro décadas, cursos de Geografia Física em Königsberg, ou que ele foi o primeiro filósofo a inserir esta disciplina na Universidade, antes mesmo da criação da cátedra de Geografia em Berlim, em 1820, por Karl Ritter. Não ultrapassar a pueril divulgação deste ato em si mesma só nos faz jogar uma cortina sobre a ausência de um discernimento maior acerca do tributo de Kant àfundamentação epistêmica da geografia moderna e científica. Abrir umafrincha nesta cortina denota, necessariamente, elucidar o papel e o lugardo “Curso de Geografia Física” no corpus da filosofia transcendental kantiana. Assim sendo, partimos da conjectura de que a “Geografia Física” continuamente se mostrou, a Kant, como um conhecimento portador de um desmedido sentido filosófico, já que ela lhe denotava a própria possibilidade de empiricização de sua filosofia. Logo, a Geografia Física seria, para Kant, o embasamento empírico de suas reflexões filosóficas, pois ela lhe comunicava a empiricidade da invenção do mundo; ela lhe outorgava a construção metafísica da “superfície da Terra”. Destarte, da mesma maneira que a Geografia, em sua superfície geral, conferiu uma espécie de atributo científico à validação do empírico da Modernidade (desde os idos do século XVI), a Geografia Física apresentou-se como o sustentáculo empírico da reflexão filosófica kantiana acerca da “metafísica da natureza” e da “metafísica do mundo”.THE COURSE OF PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY OF IMMANUEL KANT(1724-1804): CONTRIBUTION FOR THE GEOGRAPHICALSCIENCE HISTORY AND EPISTEMOLOGYAbstract: There is a relative weakness about our knowledge concerningKant philosophy and the constitution of modern geography and,consequently, scientific geography. That relation, whenever studied,happens – several times – in an oblique or tangential way, what means thatit lies almost exclusively confined in the act of notifying that Kant offered,for approximately four decades, “Physical Geography” courses inKonigsberg, or that he was the first philosopher teaching the subject at anyCollege, even before the creation of Geography chair in Berlin, in 1820, byKarl Ritter. Not overcoming the early spread of that act itself only made usthrow a curtain over the absence of a major understanding about Kant’stribute to epistemic justification of modern and scientific geography. Toopen a breach in this curtain indicates, necessarily, to lighten the role andplace of Physical Geography Course inside Kantian transcendentalphilosophy. So, we began from the conjecture that Physical Geography hasalways shown, by Kant, as a knowledge carrier of an unmeasuredphilosophic sense, once it showed the possibility of empiricization of hisphilosophy. Therefore, a Physical Geography would be, for Kant, theempirics basis of his philosophic thoughts, because it communicates theempiria of the world invention; it has made him to build metaphysically the“Earth’s surface”. In the same way, Geography, in its general surface, hasgiven a particular tribute to the empiric validation of Modernity (since the16th century), Physical Geography introduced itself as an empiric basis toKantian philosophical reflection about “nature’s metaphysics” and the“world metaphysics” as well.Keywords: History and Epistemology of Geography, Physical Geography,Cosmology, Kantian Transcendental Philosophy, Nature.

The Problem of Method: Deleuze and Simondon

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-108
Author(s):  
Daniela Voss
Keyword(s):  
Significant Role ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Transcendental Empiricism ◽  
The Relationship

This paper examines the relationship between Simondon's theory of individuation and Deleuze's transcendental empiricism. Deleuze credits Simondon with inventing a new conception of the transcendental – a claim that might have taken Simondon by surprise, as this term does not play any significant role in his oeuvre. The aim of this paper is to show both that Simondon's philosophy contributed to the construction of Deleuze's transcendental philosophy in an essential way and that the nature of his own project is radically different from Deleuze's. The most important divergence between the two thinkers lies arguably in their respective methods. What this difference brings to the fore is Deleuze's adherence to the philosophical traditions of idealism and structuralism at this stage of his thought.

Wittgenstein: Aesthetics and Transcendental Philosophy

1982 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 444
Author(s):  
B. R. Tilghman ◽  
Kjell S. Johannessen ◽  
Tore Nordenstam
Keyword(s):  
Transcendental Philosophy

Karl Rahner on Childhood

2021 ◽  
Vol 86 (2) ◽  
pp. 111-126
Author(s):  
Jessie Rogers
Keyword(s):  
Childhood Trauma ◽  
Child Language ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Childhood Studies ◽  
Karl Rahner ◽  
Seminal Work ◽  
Contemporary Christian ◽  
And Task

Karl Rahner’s ‘Ideas for a Theology of Childhood’ has become increasingly influential in childhood studies. In this article I critically assess Rahner’s ideas in this seminal work to highlight the answer Rahner proposes to the question of the meaning and task of childhood. This is brought into brief conversation with writings of Jürgen Moltmann and Jerome Berryman. Rahner’s ideas of childhood can be critiqued for a lack of careful engagement with the details of Scripture and concrete life settings, and for underestimating the effects of childhood trauma. One can also ask whether transcendental philosophy provides an accessible language, particularly in an interdisciplinary context. Nevertheless, ‘mystery of the child’ language is now near-ubiquitous in contemporary Christian authors on childhood. Rahner’s insights into childhood can function like the reality of childhood itself, remaining as a life-giving root in a theology that unfolds as others take it further.

Transcendental Philosophy and the Challenge of the Human Body: Merleau-Ponty and Kant

PARADIGMI ◽  
2012 ◽  
pp. 157-171
Author(s):  
Angelica Nuzzo
Keyword(s):  
Human Body ◽  
Transcendental Phenomenology ◽  
Transcendental Idealism ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Lived Body ◽  
Phenomenology Of Perception ◽  
Lecture Notes ◽  
Critical Account

This essay discusses Merleau-Ponty's assessment of Kant's philosophy looking first at his critique of Kant's transcendental idealism in the preface to the 1945 Phenomenology of Perception, and second at his account of the duality of the concepts of nature in the 1956-57 lecture notes on Nature at the Collčge de France. In both cases, Merleau-Ponty points to the encounter with the issue of the living/lived body as the stumbling block that halts the transcendental inquiry leading to his transcendental phenomenology. Along this itinerary, countering Merleau-Ponty's reading a different interpretation of Kant is offered. The claim is made that Kant did not evade the problem of the human body but made it functional to his own transcendental inquiry. Task of this essay is to measure the distance that separates the two accounts of Kant's view of sensibility, namely, the critical account that inspires Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the lived body leading him beyond the alleged impasse of Kant's transcendental idealism, and what the author claims to be Kant's own transcendental view of sensibility.

Reconsidering Kant’s Rejection of Indirect Arguments in Transcendental Philosophy

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Marcel Buß
Keyword(s):  
Immanuel Kant ◽  
Explanatory Power ◽  
Transcendental Philosophy ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Transcendental Arguments ◽  
Mathematical Proofs ◽  
Law Of Excluded Middle ◽  
The Law ◽  
Excluded Middle ◽  
Insight Into

Abstract Immanuel Kant states that indirect arguments are not suitable for the purposes of transcendental philosophy. If he is correct, this affects contemporary versions of transcendental arguments which are often used as an indirect refutation of scepticism. I discuss two reasons for Kant’s rejection of indirect arguments. Firstly, Kant argues that we are prone to misapply the law of excluded middle in philosophical contexts. Secondly, Kant points out that indirect arguments lack some explanatory power. They can show that something is true but they do not provide insight into why something is true. Using mathematical proofs as examples, I show that this is because indirect arguments are non-constructive. From a Kantian point of view, transcendental arguments need to be constructive in some way. In the last part of the paper, I briefly examine a comment made by P. F. Strawson. In my view, this comment also points toward a connection between transcendental and constructive reasoning.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document